In the past, new strategies have been imposed upon Latin American countries by the US. Now, Latin American nations should proactively promote and engage policy changes in the mutual interests of migration, security, critical infrastructure, and commerce.

by Jose Echeverria, '25 for Annotations Blog

The first visit of the recently appointed U.S. Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, was to Central America. What does President Donald Trump’s second term mean for Latin America?  If the U.S. defines an effective foreign policy that resolves some of the most pressing policy issues in Latin America, it could regain the leadership that had been diminishing over the last decades in the Western Hemisphere.

Trump administration prioritization of Latin America

The first days of President Trump’s foreign policy prioritized Latin America, which for some decades has been perceived as a neglected region due to the lack of consistent foreign policy strategy from the U.S.. On his first days in office, President Trump signed an executive order, the America First Trade Policy, which may represent the most significant challenge—but also the biggest commercial opportunity—for Latin America.  

As Secretary of State, Marco Rubio decided to visit Central America on his first foreign trip on duty. Showing particular deference to the region, Rubio stayed several days in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic—a different approach from past diplomacy traditions of short visits and direct messages to Central American countries. 

The recent interactions between Central American presidents and the U.S. Secretary of State have conveyed messages about critical infrastructure, immigrant deportations, border security, and commercial cooperation. This isn’t the first time the U.S. has deployed a political effort to build a joint foreign policy approach to Latin America. Other instances include the Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America in the eighties, the Northern Triangle strategy, and the root causes strategy from the Biden administration, which included a single visit of Vice President Harris to Honduras and Guatemala. So, why might this time be different?

This U.S. administration brings a radical shift from soft-power diplomacy to a hard-power transactional negotiation. In addition, the foreign policy leadership in the White House has been interacting and engaging with Latin America for a long time. Marco Rubio is the first Latino top political leader in the White House – he has had extensive participation in foreign affairs regarding Latin America.  National Security Advisor Mike Waltz presented a bill in the Senate to hold Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela’s dictator accused of organizing fraudulent elections and violating human rights, accountable. They share a direct vision against Caracas, Havana, and Managua's influence on international crime and how that could increase in the region. This knowledge of Latin America in key positions within the Department of State along with the intensive focus on trade may lead to improvements in Latin American countries’ negotiation positions.

Latin American window of opportunity

Migration, security, and economic cooperation are crucial for Latin America, where economic growth is not enough. Crime generates corruption that erodes institutions in charge of safety, preventing private investment and efficient policies. What happens in Latin America also directly affects the U.S., and the current administration is aware of this. The relationship between social problems in Latin America and the U.S. relates to an increase in migration, corruption that limits the potential trade between the countries, and the detriment of institutional security which impacts national security and border control. The solutions to these policy issues would create value and strengthen the Western Hemisphere. This is where the opportunity lies. 

The U.S.’s interest in Latin America is not only because of its direct domestic impacts but also because of broader geopolitical interest. With the increase of China’s influence in the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. has an incentive to increase the effectiveness of foreign policy in the region. If Latin American countries leave the table of cooperation with the U.S., China would be the alternative. U.S. policy leadership is already trying to reduce China's influence in the Western Hemisphere, as in the case of the Panama Canal.

While commercial and geopolitical tensions between China and the U.S. continue, the U.S. alternative to build supply chains and commercial opportunities with Latin America becomes more pressing. Visiting Central America as a first destination for the Secretary of State may not be a coincidence and may signal the potential for a Latin American first approach to U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration. To effectively use this window of opportunity, adaptation and proactiveness are key. To negotiate successfully, Latin American leadership needs to know their counterpart as well as they know themselves. Understanding the U.S.’s needs, resistance points, commercial opportunities, and limitations could transform foreign policy in the region. 

Conclusion

There are concrete mechanisms to begin this collaboration. For example, Central American countries can lead the establishment of a new chapter of foreign policy for the Latin American region by using their follow-up visit to Secretary Rubio in the second semester of 2025 to coordinate the collaboration. On past occasions, new strategies have been imposed upon Latin American countries by the US. This time, Latin American nations should proactively promote and engage policy changes in the mutual interests of migration, security, critical infrastructure, and commerce.

Meet the Author: Jose Echeverria

Jose Echeverria is a candidate for a Master’s in Public Policy at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, where he is pursuing a certificate in science, technology, and environmental policies. Originally from Guatemala, Echeverria is a lawyer by training, and his expertise is in policy advocacy, Latin American international relations, public engagement, and diplomacy. He is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and Millennium Leadership Program.