American policy on submarine data cables is ineffective and counterproductive, and the national security of the United States would be better off if it encouraged international cooperation and multi-firm ownership. 

by Anna Blue, MPA '24 for Annotations Blog

The United States and China are competing in almost every realm imaginable: on land, in space, and most importantly, underwater. The latest target of the U.S.-China rivalry? Submarine data cables, or the wires laid on the seabed floor that are responsible for transmitting energy and facilitating the flow of information. The United States is committing extensive resources to expanding American control, and undermining Chinese influence, in the world of undersea infrastructure. However, government efforts to isolate Beijing from the cable market have undermined weaponized interdependence and reduced the free flow of information. In the end, American policy on submarine data cables is ineffective and counterproductive, and the national security of the United States would be better off if it encouraged international cooperation and multi-firm ownership. 

There are approximately 485 submarine data cables, spanning 900,000 miles, operational or under construction throughout the globe. They transit $10 trillion in transactions every day, and they are responsible for much of the world’s Internet, voice, and data communication. Some analyses have called the cables the “linchpin of the global economy” because they are the fastest, most reliable, and most cost-effective method of data transfer. For years, building submarine cables was a group effort; laying cable is expensive, so private telecommunication companies would pool resources and collaborate to connect countries to one another. However, the past few years have seen an explosion of independent projects from big tech companies like Google and Meta, and more significantly, an increasing interest in cables from governments. 

The United States is in the middle of extracting itself from a decades-long codependent economic relationship with China. The Biden administration has built upon many of the limitations on technological cooperation put in place during the Trump presidency, including the restriction on doing business with Huawei, and introduced many of their own. In October of 2022, the Department of Commerce announced export controls intended to reduce Beijing’s access to certain computing chips and, just this month, the White House raised tariffs on Chinese imports of solar panels, electric vehicles, and more. Behind the scenes, Washington has also made a huge push to cut China out of any participation in or collaboration on submarine cable infrastructure. 

For decades, the installation of cables was dominated by companies in the United States, Japan, and France. Then, Chinese companies started to make headway in the submarine data cable sector because of encouragement and sponsorship from Beijing. However, recent actions by Washington have significantly hampered the success of Chinese businesses. The Financial Times claims that HMN Tech, the largest Chinese supplier, has provided or is set to provide the equipment to only 10% of all existing and planned cables, a massive win for the West considering that French cable maker ASN has supplied 41% and American company SubCom has supplied 21%.

The methods used by the federal government to isolate China have been both subversive and direct. For instance, in 2018, a joint venture between Amazon, Meta, and China Mobile to build a cable connecting California to Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong was temporarily halted when the United States urged China Mobile to drop out of the consortium. Even after China Mobile withdrew from the venture, Amazon and Meta were unable to complete the cable on their own when the U.S. government suggested the project was doomed by China’s original involvement. The United States has not shied away from pressuring partners and allies to avoid doing business with HMN Tech, one of the main Chinese cable suppliers. According to Reuters, the U.S. intervened in at least six contracts between 2019-2023 to prevent HMN Tech from building cables or to force companies to abandon projects that purported to connect China and the U.S. via cable. 

Capitol Hill has also gotten involved, tackling security concerns through bills like the Undersea Cable Control Act, which passed the House in March this year. The legislation states clearly its intention: “The bill seeks to prevent foreign adversaries from acquiring goods and technologies capable of supporting the construction, maintenance, or operation of undersea cable projects,” which suggests how contentious cable construction has become. The White House has also militarized submarine data cables in a way never before seen in a space that used to thrive on partnership and teamwork. Undersea infrastructure is now an essential element in security relationships, and initiatives like The Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience show that the public sector is more invested in future builds. The United States, for example, is contributing $5 million to providing technical assistance to Indo-Pacific governments through its CABLES program, making a previously private sector-dominanted space fraught with geopolitical interests. 

Some experts have argued for the United Nations or the International Telecommunication Union to formalize a protection plan that prevents attacks on underseas cables, but in the meantime, the United States can and should support multi-firm contracts that involve Chinese companies.

Although the United States is right to consider submarine data cables a national security priority, the government approach so far has been all wrong for two reasons: (1) it is ineffective and (2) it is counterproductive. The United States is concerned that more Chinese control of data pipelines will allow the Chinese Communist Party to spy on confidential information. Yet, it’s still possible for China to eavesdrop on American cables even if Chinese companies have no stake in the infrastructure; Russian submarines spy on data cables outside of their control all the time. Plus, it makes it harder to move data abroad and undermines the expansion of American influence by reducing the opportunities for U.S.-based companies (that would have previously partnered with Chinese companies) to build and participate in the Asia Pacific region. 

Second, should China control access to crucial data pipelines, the worry goes that Beijing will be able to slash access in times of conflict and thereby harm American war efforts. However, the right response to that fear is not the cessation of all partnership. Joint cables help weaponize interdependence, since both countries depend on them for communication, and building independent cables only incentivizes China to treat them as targets for attack. As a result, cables that are built without China and Chinese companies become more vulnerable to hybrid warfare. It’s worth noting that American businesses currently depend heavily on Chinese companies to fix broken cables. Not only does the purposeful exclusion of China from cable collaboration thereby demand the U.S. commit more resources to East Asia to build and repair their own cables, but it also dramatically impairs undersea infrastructure. More than ten cables are typically cut around the world at any given moment (usually as a result of fishing or natural disasters), and isolating Chinese suppliers makes it more difficult to repair those cuts quickly. Furthermore, it makes the Chinese government, who must provide permits to allow repair ships to fix cables in their sovereign waters, less likely to provide those permits to U.S.-friendly boats. 

With its actions, the United States is breaking down a global network and creating two separate and disconnected spheres of data cables. The cabotage laws recently introduced by Canada and Indonesia, which require that cable work done in their territorial waters be done by a sovereign ship, are a testament to the hostility and noncooperation that have come to define maritime politics. Some experts have argued for the United Nations or the International Telecommunication Union to formalize a protection plan that prevents attacks on underseas cables, but in the meantime, the United States can and should support multi-firm contracts that involve Chinese companies. Building, repairing, and maintaining cables is an extremely complex job, one that is made better with plentiful resources, local expertise, and open communication. If the United States truly believes in an interconnected world, then reinforcing global cooperation on undersea infrastructure is an important step towards that ideal. If not, then at least multi-firm ownership will ensure that the United States maintains control of its connectivity and discourages China from building its own network of cables into which Washington has no visibility or influence. 

The reality is that climate change is more of a threat to cable infrastructure than China, as the world witnessed in 2012 when Hurricane Sandy knocked out several exchanges that linked North American and Europe. If the United States is going to effectively shore up cables against more threatening climate events, then it will need all the help it can get to ensure information can continue to travel around the world.

Meet the Author: Anna Blue

Anna Blue is a graduate student in Public Affairs at Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs, where she studies issues at the intersection of democracy and technology and serves as a Social Impact Fellow at the Responsible AI Institute. Before arriving at Princeton, Anna worked in international crisis management for Meta, Inc. for three years. Her other work experience includes serving at a think tank in Los Angeles and conducting research on digital government services in Estonia as a Fulbright Fellow. She has a B.A. in International Relations from Stanford University, where she wrote an honors thesis on religious violence in Mexico.