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By Qi Wang

Abstract

This paper examines China’s evolving role in the solar energy surge of the Gulf region, with a focus on the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. It identifies three approaches through which China has progressively deepened its participation: (1) large-scale export of solar products, (2) investment and construction of solar power projects, and (3) offshore investment in local solar manufacturing bases in the Gulf. These approaches reflect not only China’s response to ambitious green energy commitments and rising solar demand in the Gulf, but also the strategic efforts of China’s solar industry to address domestic overcapacity under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative and mitigate growing trade protectionism. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for China and the Gulf countries to strengthen solar cooperation, tackle trade barriers, and ensure a balanced, transparent, and sustainable energy transition.

Solar photovoltaics (PV) is a key pillar of the global clean energy transition. In the International Energy Agency’s Net Zero Scenario, 88 percent of global electricity will be generated from renewable sources by 2050, and solar PV will account for more than 50 percent of annual renewable additions (IEA 2021, 14-15).

The Gulf region of the Middle East, which fueled the global economy after World War II due to its abundant oil reserves, is experiencing a solar surge. As shown in Figure 1, the broader Middle East has seen rapid growth in renewable energy capacity over the past decade, with almost all of the growth coming from solar energy (International Renewable Energy Agency 2024). The proportion of solar energy in renewables has rapidly increased from less than 10 percent in 2014 to 50 percent in 2023. Particularly, in 2023, solar growth in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia accounted for 92.2 percent of the entire Middle East’s growth.

China has played a critical role in driving the renewable energy surge in the Gulf. Chinese companies are estimated to have participated in green projects worth a total of $9.5 billion USD in the Gulf, mainly in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, between 2018 and 2023 (Wang 2024, 10). However, few studies have shifted the focus from general renewable energy to focus specifically on solar energy. Furthermore, the literature lacks a systematic review and evaluation of the approaches and drivers for China’s involvement in the Gulf’s solar surge. Hence, this paper seeks to answer two questions: 1) How is China, increasingly the global leader in the solar industry, participating in the solar surge in the Gulf? 2) What political, economic, and strategic factors influence China’s participation approach?

This paper will use the UAE and Saudi Arabia as key cases in the Gulf region to answer the questions, as they account for the vast majority of solar additions in the Gulf. It should be noted that this paper does not intend to provide a comprehensive causal mechanism framework for China’s participation in the Gulf’s solar surge, nor can it consider all the drivers behind China’s participation in each. This paper assesses China’s solar expansion in the Gulf mainly from the perspective of China’s solar industries to evaluate the opportunities and challenges faced by China’s solar industry.

This paper proposes three approaches through which China has engaged in the solar surge in the Gulf: first, exporting large quantities of solar modules to the Gulf with average prices lower than those from other regions; second, directly participating in the construction and investment of solar power projects in the Gulf; and third, transferring the solar PV supply chain by investing in local solar PV manufacturing base in the Gulf. This paper argues that the three approaches are progressive and representative of China’s deepening participation over time. The first approach is entirely market-driven. China’s cheap and high-quality solar products and the Gulf’s increasing demand for solar energy have led to a large export of Chinese solar products to the region. The second approach involves an active effort to create demand for solar products in the Gulf. This primarily takes place within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Similar to previous BRI projects, these solar power projects aim to address China’s domestic overcapacity issue while also furthering China’s influence in the Gulf and access to fossil fuel resources. The third approach marks a deliberate transfer of China’s supply chain to the Gulf. This move aims to reduce Chinese PV companies’ transportation costs and meet local demand. As an offshoring project, it also allows them to better circumvent tariffs imposed by the United States and Europe and counter global efforts to diversify supply chains from China, thereby further solidifying Chinese market dominance.

The deepening investments testify to the global expansion and pivotal role of China’s solar industry in making solar energy and green targets more accessible worldwide. However, two critical issues are expected to  shape the future of China’s solar industry and its involvement in the Gulf and beyond. First, overcapacity has led China’s solar industry to face significant financial losses. Second, an even more hostile trade environment for Chinese solar companies may emerge as global protectionism leads to restrictive measures like tariffs, quotas, and subsidies To tackle these two challenges, this paper puts forward the following policy recommendations: For China, the government should lessen excessive subsidies for solar manufacturers, accelerate the clearing of overcapacity, and deepen its energy cooperation with the Gulf and other BRI regions to ensure long-term strategic alignment. For the Gulf region and other developing countries, they should push for localization of all stages of the solar manufacturing supply chain, push for technology transfers from China, and work with China to address trade protectionism.

This paper will first introduce the development of China’s solar industry and the green commitments by the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Next, it will review China’s three approaches for participating in the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s solar surge. Then, the paper will analyze the drivers of these three approaches, mainly from the perspective of China’s solar energy industry. Finally, this paper will summarize the implications of these three approaches for China’s solar energy industry and solar energy development in the Gulf to provide policy recommendations.

Background

China’s leading position in the global solar industry has developed in parallel with the Gulf’s growing investments in renewable energy, particularly solar power. This alignment has facilitated China’s significant role in the Gulf’s solar expansion.

China’s Dominance in the Global Solar Manufacturing Industry

Since 2011, China has invested $50 billion USD in building a leading solar supply chain, which is 10 times the figure for Europe (IEA 2022, 7). In return, the global solar manufacturing base has gradually shifted from the United States, Japan, and the European Union (EU) to China during the past decade.

As shown in Figure 2, the solar PV supply chain includes polysilicon, ingots, i.e., solid blocks formed by melting and crystallizing polysilicon; wafers, i.e., thin slices cut from the ingots; cells, i.e., processed wafers that can convert sunlight into electricity; and modules, i.e., panels assembled from interconnected cells. Figure 3 shows the global distribution of manufacturing capacity in each stage in 2022. China accounts for more than 75 percent of global manufacturing capacity in each stage, and even as high as 96 percent and 85 percent for wafers and cells, indicating China’s dominant and near-monopoly status in the global solar supply chain. In 2024, 18 of the top 20 solar manufacturers were from China (PV Time 2024).

Government subsidies, including direct subsidies such as tax rebates and indirect support, such as feed-in tariffs and export subsidies, have largely driven the rise of the Chinese solar industry over the past decade (Bayaliyev et al. 2012, 16-21; Zhi et al. 2014, 308). Chinese state-owned banks also reportedly heavily lent cheap debt to the industry, even as solar manufacturers may have been on the verge of bankruptcy (Bradsher 2024; Shellenberger 2021). In addition to financial support, China’s cheap labor, the vast land in the western region, and low electricity prices have greatly benefited its solar industry (Bradsher 2024). With these advantages, Chinese solar manufacturers can expand production, which in turn reinforces China’s solar technological innovation, allowing China to further enhance its competitiveness. According to Wood Mackenzie, in 2022, the production cost of solar modules in China was 0.24 USD/W, while India, the United States, and Japan were only slightly higher at 0.26, 0.3, and 0.33 USD/W, respectively (Wood Mackenzie 2023a). However, in 2023, China began to iterate solar cell technology, replacing the traditional PERC technology with the more efficient TOPCon technology (Sungold 2023). As shown in Figure 5, given the rapid expansion of TOPCon technology, the production cost of solar modules in China fell by 42 percent in 2023, thereby maintaining its competitive edge over India, the EU, and the United States, where costs experienced minimum reductions or even escalated (Wood Mackenzie 2023a).

In fact, many companies are already investing in third-generation solar cell technologies, such as Back Contact (BC) technology. Such advancements will further diminish the manufacturing costs of Chinese solar PV, ensuring its long-term dominance in the global solar industry. Wood Mackenzie estimates that within the next five years, Chinese manufacturers will continue to account for more than 80 percent of the manufacturing capacity in all sectors of the global solar supply chain (Wood Mackenzie 2023b).

Solar Policies and Potentials in the UAE and Saudi Arabia

The UAE and Saudi Arabia contested international climate negotiations and the green transition for a long time, fearing that it would affect their income from fossil fuel exports (Dargin 2021, 313). However, in recent years, there has been a paradigm shift in these two countries; the UAE and Saudi Arabia have successively announced ambitious climate commitments. The drivers of change are broad-based and include economic diversification to decrease dependence on a single resource, declining hydrocarbon reserves, and loss of oil export revenues (Malik et al. 2019, 20798). Table 1 summarizes representative green policies and commitments in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. These policies have attracted substantial green investments. For example, since the inauguration of Saudi Green Initiatives, 77 initiatives have been activated, with a total investment value of $186 billion USD.

The UAE and Saudi Arabia have set ambitious goals for the deployment of renewable energy, with specific emphasis on solar energy, since 2016 and 2017. Located in the so-called “Global Sunbelt,” the Gulf region possesses some of the highest solar radiation in the world (IRENA 2016, 43). According to IRENA analysis, 60 percent of the Gulf is suitable for deploying solar energy, and these areas are concentrated in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman (IRENA 2016, 45). Developing just one percent of these areas could create an additional 470 GW of solar capacity.

Before 2017, there was minimal annual addition in the UAE’s solar capacities, and the total installed capacities in the UAE were less than 200 MW (see Figure 7). However, as a result of national policy support in 2017, the UAE’s installed solar capacity expanded nearly 16-fold to reach around 6GW within 6 years. Saudi Arabia’s installed capacity also experienced a dramatic sixfold increase in 2023 alone compared to 2022. It is foreseeable that the installed solar capacity in both countries will continue to grow rapidly in the future, as it is far from reaching its potential limit calculated by IRENA.

In brief, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have significant demand for solar PV due to their national green policies and commitments to the energy transition, as well as their vast solar energy potential. Chinese solar manufacturers, which dominate the global market, are able to supply an extensive quantity of solar PV at a substantially low price to meet the demand in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. This fundamental supply-demand relationship has become the cornerstone of China’s participation in the solar surge in these two countries.

China’s Three Approaches in the Gulf's Renewable Energy Sector

Export of Solar PV (from 2017)

China is the leading exporter of solar PV due to its strong comparative advantage in solar PV manufacturing introduced above. According to the estimation of Ember Energy, in 2024, China exported a record 240 GW of solar PV to the world (Ember n.d.). The UAE and Saudi Arabia have always been two crucial customers for Chinese solar PV exporters. As shown in Figure 8, between 2017 and 2024, solar PV exports to the UAE consistently accounted for two percent of China’s total exports, while solar PV exports to Saudi Arabia have risen rapidly since 2022, and in 2024 accounted for nearly seven percent of China’s total exports.

Although the increments of China’s exports to the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been evident since 2022 from Figure 7, the UAE’s imports in 2017 were already substantial. In that year, the UAE had less than 500 MW of installed solar capacity, yet it imported over 1000 MW of Chinese solar PV. Its imports, which far exceeded its demand in the early years, were mainly due to the large number of solar projects under construction. In other words, it can be reasonably inferred from the data that the solar projects that have been completed since 2017 use a large number of solar PV from China. Due to the limited availability of the data, we cannot extrapolate prior to 2017, but China's first participation approach in the Gulf solar surge has been in place since at least 2017.

Construction of and Investment in Solar Power Projects (from 2021)

Apart from exporting solar PV to supply the increasing number of solar projects in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Chinese companies are often involved as Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) contractors and equity investors of these projects. Table 2 shows the names and capacities of the solar power projects in which China has been involved. Most of these projects have been in operation since 2023, but given the timing of the construction of the solar power plants, most of them were decided in 2021. China’s second participation approach starts around 2021.

Two conclusions can be drawn from Table 2. First, China’s involvement has increased the construction and development of solar projects in both countries. As of 2023, there was a total of 4.23 GW of operational solar projects in the UAE with China’s involvement, accounting for 70 percent of the country’s total solar installed capacity by the end of 2023. The figure for Saudi Arabia is relatively low at 15 percent, but this could increase significantly in the next three years with the commissioning of 6 GW of solar projects with China’s involvement. Second, Chinese participation in the UAE and Saudi solar projects has occurred in three main ways: State-owned enterprises have served as contractors in the design and construction of projects; private solar giants and state-owned funds have invested in project equity as sponsors; Chinese entities work as both EPC contractors and sponsors.

The Silk Road Fund’s equity investment is particularly noteworthy. In addition to investing in the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park Phase IV project, the Silk Road Fund acquired a 49 percent stake in ACWA Power Renewable Energy Holdings, a subsidiary of ACWA Power, in May 2020 (ACWA Power 2019). ACWA, an energy giant in Saudi Arabia, owns 12.3 GW of renewable energy projects in Saudi Arabia, mainly solar projects, and it also has stakes in the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park Phase V and Phase VI projects, which have a total capacity of 1.85 GW (ACWA Power 2023). The partial acquisition of its subsidiary by the Silk Road Fund attests to cumulative Chinese investments in local solar projects. This move also insinuates the Chinese inextricable capacity-building initiatives in the BRI, which will be discussed later in this article.

Investments in Solar Manufacturing Base (from 2024)

Since late 2023, China’s private solar giants have begun to announce investments in solar manufacturing bases in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. These investments will create local solar supply chains, including all the production stages in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Similarly, the investment information is summarized in Table 3.

In the domestic market, Chinese solar giants often build vertically integrated manufacturing bases like Trina Solar’s in the UAE to achieve economies of scope. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that once these solar giants find manufacturing feasible in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, they will quickly complete their production chains. Full establishment of the production chains will yield at least 30GW of local solar PV manufacturing capacity in both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which is expected to sufficiently support their respective 2030 solar installation targets—30 GW for the UAE and 70 GW for Saudi Arabia—with a solid foundation of industrial self-reliance.

Three Approaches in Summary

China has adopted a three-level approach to participating in the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s solar surge. The 1st level of the approach is the large-scale export of cheap solar PV from China to the UAE and Saudi Arabia. This level started around 2017, roughly coinciding with the rapid rise of the Chinese solar industry and the launch of green commitments in the Gulf. The 2nd level is China’s involvement in the investment and construction of solar power projects in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Most of these projects were announced since 2021, with expected completion from 2023 to 2026. The 3rd level is investments from Chinese solar giants in solar manufacturing bases in the UAE and Saudi Arabia to localize the supply chain. Most of these investments were announced throughout 2024 and will start operations after 2026.

The aforementioned three approaches are not only progressive in chronological order but also gradually deepen in terms of the level of participation. The first approach resembles free trade driven by the market and basic supply-demand relationships, whereas the second and third approaches of investment and construction are decisions made by the Chinese government, state-owned enterprises, and private solar giants. The third approach further involves the shift and localization of the supply chain, which is even more in-depth than the second approach.

There is a traceable motive for the proactive participation of Chinese entities in the Gulf’s solar surge. At the 2022 China-Arab States Summit, China pledged to support renewable projects in the Arab region with a capacity of more than 5GW (新华网 2022). In May 2024, at the 10th Ministerial Meeting of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that the Chinese government would support Chinese energy companies and financial institutions in participating in renewable energy projects in the Arab region with a capacity of more than 3GW (Liu 2024b). The question, therefore, is: what are the main economic, political, or strategic motivations of these two deepening participation approaches? The next two parts of this paper focus on answering this question from the perspective of the Chinese solar industry.

Promoting Solar Power Projects to Drive Demand: A BRI Framework

Most of the solar power projects that Chinese entities are involved in have been put within the scope of the BRI. Not only are some of these projects funded by the Silk Road Fund, but even private Chinese investments are linked to the BRI in press releases. The UAE and Saudi Arabia were also among the first countries to join the BRI, signing BRI cooperation documents in 2016 and 2018, respectively. This section will examine China’s motives for the 2nd participation approach within the framework of the BRI.

There are different opinions about China’s motives for promoting the BRI. Some scholars believe that the BRI attends to international considerations, such as increasing China’s international influence (Wang et al. 2022, 409; Beeson et al. 2023, 45), while others believe that the BRI mainly serves China’s domestic interests, including sustaining an export-oriented economy, addressing overcapacity in infrastructure, and obtaining access to strategic resources (Ohashi 2018, 85; Choudhury 2021, 64). Some research on the BRI cites overcapacity and the unsustainability of China’s economic model as the core reasons for the BRI (Jones and Hameiri 2020, 7).

This paper argues that China’s engagement in local solar power projects in the UAE and Saudi Arabia under the BRI framework primarily aims to address the domestic overcapacity of Chinese solar manufacturers. These investments also involve strategic considerations in exchange for the oil resources in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, reflecting the evolving energy relationship between China and the Gulf region.

Domestic Overcapacity in Solar Manufacturing

Despite China’s large-scale debt-fueled infrastructure investment to promote the formation of export-oriented industries in the 1980s (Jones and Hameiri 2020, 5), the country has been facing a serious surplus problem since 2008 concerning its domestic infrastructure production capacity, especially steel production capacity. It is estimated that at the height of the problem, overcapacity in various industries reached as high as 20 percent to 30 percent (European Chamber of Commerce 2016). BRI is tackling China’s domestic overcapacity problem by ‘exporting’ infrastructure construction. Economic research shows that the BRI is effective at addressing China’s steel overcapacity problem by boosting steel consumption by more than 15 percent (Ni et al. 2021, 301).

China’s domestic solar PV industry faces a serious problem of overcapacity, as the steel industry did before, mainly resulting from the government's unrestrained subsidies (Hu et al. 2020, 1). As shown in Figure 9, in 2018, China’s solar PV manufacturing capacity was slightly higher than the global solar installation of that year. The increasing solar installations and huge demand for solar PV in the following years made it hard to identify overcapacity conditions in 2018. Since then, China’s solar manufacturing capacities have increased faster than the global solar installation and doubled global installations in 2021. This indicates a worsening of China’s excessive capacity. In 2023, China’s solar manufacturing capacities exceeded 700GW, while the domestic installation in 2023 was only 200 GW, and even the global total installation was only 350 GW. In fact, according to the IEA’s Net Zero Scenario, by 2030, 4000 GW of solar capacity will need to be installed worldwide (IEA 2020)—which means that China’s current solar PV manufacturing capacity, if all fully operational in the next 6 years, would be sufficient to meet this global 2030 target by 2030, without requiring additional capacities from other countries.

China is the only country whose domestic solar supply capacity greatly surpasses domestic solar demand. Severe overcapacity can cause serious financial problems for Chinese solar giants (The Economist 2024). Leading solar companies, including LONGi and JA Solar, have reported significant losses in 2024 H1. Similarly, solar silicon wafer manufacturers Tongwei and TCL Zhonghuan have also shifted from profitability to losses. In response to the problems of overcapacity, Chinese solar manufacturing giants have to find alternative markets and expand demand bases, and the countries along the BRI provide ample opportunities (Zhu et al. 2024, 25763). In BRI, state-owned companies usually lobby foreign governments to apply for certain BRI projects that favor these Chinese entities. Nevertheless, very little is known about the project application procedure in the cases of the UAE and Saudi Arabia. By promoting local solar projects as indispensable stakeholders within the UAE and Saudi Arabia, those Chinese state-owned EPC and solar giant companies create local higher demand potential for Chinese solar products, absorbing domestic excess capacity (Fang 2020, 103).

The UAE and Saudi Arabia, as two of the most important countries along the Belt and Road, are the most suitable choices for China to create overseas demand. This is because the two countries have abundant solar energy resources and preferential policies to attract foreign investment and stable investment conditions (Fouad 2024). Saudi Arabia has developed special economic zones, such as Jazan Economic City and King Abdullah Economic City, which offer tax breaks and preferential infrastructure to foreign investors (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia n.d.). Similarly, the UAE has established more than 50 free zones, which offer foreign businesses zero corporate tax, zero import tax, and 100 percent foreign ownership (UAE Ministry of Economy n.d.).

In short, in 2021, overcapacity in China’s solar industry escalated rapidly. Since then, China has been heavily involved in the solar project development in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. This suggests that by promoting Gulf BRI solar projects, China is seeking to solve domestic overcapacity by expanding into alternative markets and creating overseas demand for Chinese solar products (Calabrese 2025). Research has also found that Chinese solar companies prefer expanding into countries with existing trade linkages with China through BRI (Zhu et al. 2024).

Access to Oil Reserves

China’s BRI may serve a similar function to the ancient Silk Road, which sought to strengthen trading relationships with other countries. For a long time, China has been highly dependent on oil imports from the Gulf region, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Despite the explosive growth of renewable energy, in 2022, China’s oil and gas still accounted for 25 percent of its total energy supply, and its energy imports are rising (IEA n.d.). In 2023, China imported 85.97 million metric tons and 41.81 million metric tons of crude oil from the UAE and Saudi Arabia, respectively, ranking Saudi Arabia second and the UAE fifth among China’s oil importers (International Trade Center n.d.). Securing the oil imports of these two countries remains one of China’s policy priorities. Engaging in the development of solar projects in the UAE and Saudi Arabia through BRI has provided opportunities for China to enhance energy cooperation with these two countries, especially in their fossil fuel business.

In 2018, during talks with UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President Xi Jinping proposed creating a comprehensive and multi-dimensional energy cooperation framework (中国法院网 2018). This framework includes China’s increased investment in renewable energy in the UAE in return for the UAE allowing China to gain a greater stake in its oil and gas operations. For instance, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in 2017 got an eight percent share in a 40-year onshore oil concession (Reuters 2017) and ten percent shares in two offshore concessions in Abu Dhabi (ADNOC 2020). Aramco, the state-owned oil company of Saudi Arabia, has similar collaborations with several Chinese companies, including through a $10 billion USD refinery and petrochemical complex built with the Chinese state-owned company Sinopec (Chen 2024).

China’s engagement in local solar project development in the UAE and Saudi Arabia represents a transformation of the energy relationship between China and the Gulf. Whereas once the energy relationship was purely an export-import relationship, it is now a two-way, mutually beneficial street. China is using its expertise to promote solar development in the Gulf, while the Gulf is allowing China to take an increasing number of stakes in and collaborate with its state-owned oil companies to ensure energy security goals.

Investments in Solar Manufacturing Bases: An Offshoring Strategy

China’s third participation approach, investing in the local solar supply chain, is a typical offshoring strategy. Manufacturing offshoring is usually driven by lower manufacturing costs in foreign countries, better serving local markets, and bypassing tariffs and trade barriers. China’s solar manufacturing investments could potentially better serve the UAE and Saudi Arabia because of the location proximity, especially as many Chinese solar suppliers have seen the Gulf’s solar potential throughout their second-level participation (Sim and Griffiths 2024; Calabrese 2024b). This third-level participation is closely related to prevailing solar trade protectionism directed towards the Chinese solar industry by Western countries. Building the Gulf into a global re-export hub, China’s solar industry can bypass the tariffs and continue to expand in the presence of other diversification efforts made by Western countries.

Trade protectionism in the clean energy sector has grown increasingly prevalent. According to IEA statistics, the number of antidumping, countervailing and import duties has been rising since 2011 (see Figure 9). As of 2022, a total of 16 duties are in effect, and 8 more are under discussion, which cover 15 percent of global demand outside of China, indicating widespread trade protectionism in the international solar market (IEA 2022, 71).

Trade protectionism has targeted Chinese solar PV. The United States took the lead in 2011 by launching an anti-dumping investigation against Chinese solar products and accusing China of dumping solar goods into the U.S. market through government subsidies (United States Department of Commerce 2011). In 2012, the U.S. Department of Commerce ruled that anti-dumping duties would be imposed on Chinese polysilicon, solar cells, and modules, with rates ranging from 18 percent to 249 percent. Shortly afterwards, the EU also imposed provisional anti-dumping duties on Chinese solar products, with rates ranging from 11.8 percent to 47.6 percent (European Commission 2013). Although the EU’s anti-dumping duties were eliminated in 2018 due to the rise in internal EU demand for solar PV (European Parliament 2018), U.S. tariffs have been retained.

To avoid U.S. tariffs, Chinese solar manufacturers have been setting up factories in Southeast Asia since the 2010s. Almost all Chinese solar giants, including JA Solar, LONGi Solar, Trina Solar, and Jinko Solar, have their factories in Southeast Asia. As a result, Southeast Asia’s total solar manufacturing capacity has grown significantly, becoming a key manufacturing hub for the Chinese solar industry. Data shows that by 2023, Chinese companies had a total of 17.15GW and 8.6GW of module and cell manufacturing capacity, respectively, in Southeast Asia (Thompson 2024). The gap between solar module manufacturing capacity and that of solar cells shows that these manufacturers are more likely to assemble solar cells produced in Chinese factories in Southeast Asia into solar modules and then export them to the United States under the name of Southeast Asia-produced solar modules to avoid tariffs.

However, in 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced an investigation into the circumvention of tariffs by Chinese solar manufacturers through its assembly of products in Southeast Asia. In early December 2024, after a two-year investigation, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced preliminary anti-dumping tariffs ranging from zero percent to 271.3 percent on solar modules and cells imported from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam (International Trade Center 2024). The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced plans to impose a 50 percent tariff on solar-grade polysilicon and wafers imported from China starting in 2025, extending the anti-dumping tariffs against China to the entire solar supply chain (USTR 2024).

Against the protectionist backdrop, Chinese solar manufacturers have been looking for alternative investment destinations to replace Southeast Asia since the U.S. investigation in 2022. Although not always smooth, the UAE and Saudi Arabia generally have relatively stable trade relations with the U.S. due to their long-standing oil trade (Khatib 2018). Accordingly, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, given their large local solar potential and good relationship with China, naturally became the next destinations for Chinese solar manufacturers to invest and build manufacturing bases. This largely coincides with China’s  announcement of massive solar manufacturing base investment in the UAE and Saudi Arabia in 2024. While Western countries other than the United States have not added additional tariffs on Chinese solar products, the EU and G7 countries have made statements about moving away from reliance on China's clean supply chain since 2023. Investing in manufacturing bases in the Gulf could also allow the Chinese solar industry to continue exports to these countries despite any future trade targeting measures.

Simultaneously, China’s investments also align with the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s objectives to create jobs and diversify their economies. The IEA estimates that the solar PV manufacturing industry can create 1,300 manufacturing jobs for each GW of manufacturing capacity (IEA 2022, 10). Furthermore, LONGi has established a solar academy in Dubai to provide sales engineers, installers, engineering, procurement, and construction personnel with the knowledge and skills required in the solar sector (PR Newswire 2023), all of which can contribute to the local economic development (Sim and Griffiths 2024, 9).

However, the UAE and Saudi Arabia cannot simply be regarded as the next Southeast Asia. The two countries’ abundant solar irradiation and bilateral energy cooperation with China demonstrate that the marginal benefits of investing in a manufacturing base in the two countries are greater than those in Southeast Asia. Manufacturing activities in the Gulf seem to not  undermine or threaten the competitiveness of Chinese solar products. As noted previously, the cost advantage of China’s solar industry mainly derives from technology innovation, which will be offshored along with the investments. Before any solar manufacturing investments, China, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE had already established industrial cooperation zones, which eliminated the need for preliminary preparations such as infrastructure and logistics. For example, Trina Solar’s large-scale solar PV manufacturing base will be located in the China-UAE Capacity Cooperation Demonstration Park in Khalifa Industrial Zone in Abu Dhabi (Calabrese 2024). In 2020, the site encompassed a total of about 73,000 square meters of buildings, as well as 8.5 kilometers of roads and pipe networks and other infrastructure by 2020 (Belt and Road Portal, 2021).

Conclusion, Discussion, and Policy Implications

This paper explores the UAE and Saudi Arabia cases to introduce three approaches for China’s participation in the solar surge in the Gulf region from the perspective of the Chinese solar industry. These three approaches are progressing in time and degree of participation. The first approach, demand-supply driven solar PV trade under market forces, seeks to meet the Gulf region’s growing solar energy demand with China’s low-cost, high-quality solar production. The second approach, promoting solar power project development, is driven by China’s efforts to create demand for its solar industry, largely within the BRI framework, aiming to address domestic overcapacity and enhance geopolitical influence. The third approach, investment in local solar manufacturing bases, is driven by strategic offshoring and allows Chinese firms to minimize logistics costs, bypass Western trade barriers, and counter global supply chain diversification efforts, thus reinforcing China’s dominance in the global solar industry.

As discussed above, China currently stands as the only country engaged in the Gulf’s solar surge at such a scale. While other international companies, such as France’s TotalEnergies and Japan’s SoftBank, have collaborated on some solar power and manufacturing projects in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, their involvement has been less intensive than the Chinese partnerships, in terms of the number of projects and the amount of investment, highlighting China’s unique role in shaping the region’s solar landscape.

Nonetheless, using the UAE and Saudi Arabia as representatives for the entire Gulf may carry certain limitations. While China has also made solar investments in other Gulf countries, including Oman and Kuwait, these countries have shown less commitment to green transitions and economic diversification compared to the UAE and Saudi Arabia (Sim 2022; Prasad et al. 2023). Accordingly, China’s involvement in these countries remains relatively limited. For example, although China has invested in a 3.5 GW solar power project in Kuwait (阿中产业研究院 2025), there is currently no evidence suggesting that Chinese solar manufacturers intend to localize the supply chain. Therefore, while it is feasible to extend the analytical framework of this paper to other Gulf countries, it is crucial to carefully consider the depth of China’s involvement in each national context. 

The three approaches mark the transition from passive market-driven trade to active overseas demand creation and eventually to supply chain offshoring. The progressive approaches not only illustrate China’s proactive engagement in the Gulf, but also reflect the global expansion of China’s solar industry. This global expansion embodies both the opportunities and challenges facing China’s solar sector.

On the opportunity side, China’s solar industry has risen to global dominance through heavy government subsidies. Early-stage subsidies provided the foundation on which continuous technological improvements that allowed Chinese firms to outcompete rivals and drive down costs were built. At the same time, global solar demand is surging due to global net-zero targets, creating vast opportunities for Chinese manufacturers. Through the BRI, China is not just responding to demand but actively creating it, aiming to ensure sustained market expansion. The unparalleled growth of China’s solar industry provides accessible, affordable, and scalable solar solutions and so may be essential to the global green energy transition.

Nevertheless, China’s severe overcapacity and increasing international trade disputes threaten China's solar industry. Despite their evolving nature and uncertain outcomes, these significant obstacles will ultimately shape the future of China’s solar industry and the course of the green transition on a global scale.

Market Consolidation and Excess Capacity Clearing 

At the 2024 Central Economic Work Conference, President Xi Jinping urged officials to “comprehensively address the problem of ‘vicious competition’ and regulate the behavior of local governments and enterprises” (中央人民政府网 2024). The central government requests that domestic bureaucracies stop unlimited incentives and curb the unchecked expansion of clean energy companies.

On one hand, severe overcapacity threatens the financial health of China’s solar industry, potentially hindering further expansion and technological innovation. On the other hand, if the central government intervenes, excess solar manufacturing capacity in China will be rapidly eliminated. But the question is, once there is no excess capacity and the financial situation improves, will China still be motivated to invest in solar energy in the Gulf region under the framework of the BRI?

This paper argues that the domestic manufacturing overcapacity and lasting energy partnerships will continue to drive Chinese investments in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Hence, China should maintain its energy cooperation with the Gulf and other BRI regions. By advancing energy cooperation, even if there is no overcapacity, the Chinese government will also incentivize private and state-owned enterprises to take part in solar energy investments and resolve overcapacity impediments.

China should accelerate overcapacity clearance and market consolidation to ensure the continuous healthy development of the solar industry. Moreover, this will also provide an opportunity for the Chinese government to effectively supervise these enterprises that invest in solar energy in the Gulf and disclose relevant information on solar investments—after all, weak supervision and transparency have always been criticized in China’s BRI.

Anti-Dumping Tariffs on Solar Products Produced in the Gulf

Chinese solar manufacturers are able to circumvent anti-dumping duties against China by assembling solar modules in the Gulf and then exporting the modules to the United States. Yet, the United States may expand the anti-dumping investigation in Southeast Asia to the Gulf region once China’s manufacturing in the Gulf expands rapidly. Such circumstances will greatly curtail the Chinese solar giants’ motivations to invest in manufacturing bases in the Gulf. Unlike Southeast Asia, the Gulf harbors numerous clean energy companies such as ACWA Power and Masdar that also manufacture solar PV. Consequently, imposing U.S. anti-dumping duties solely on modules produced by Chinese manufacturers without harming local clean energy manufacturers in the Gulf remains difficult. This paper proposes the following policies to prevent such situations:

First, as the solar industry matures, the Chinese government should promptly remove subsidies for manufacturers to encourage fair global competition amidst the ongoing Sino-U.S. tariffs disputes. Second, Chinese solar manufacturers should accelerate investments in an entire solar supply chain in the Gulf, including manufacturing bases for polysilicon, wafers, and cells. Anti-dumping investigations would be harder to justify on solar PV whose components are entirely produced within the Gulf region. Finally, China should join forces with Gulf countries to address trade protectionism in the clean and renewable industries to foster sustainable energy transition.

*This article was edited by Nancy Zhou (Columbia University) and Patrick McCabe (Princeton University).

About the Author

Qi Wang is a master’s student in International Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is currently an intern at the International Energy Agency. His interests center on China’s energy transition, with a particular focus on renewable energy supply chains and electricity market reform.

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AI Statement

AI tools were used solely for formatting and organizing the references in accordance with citation guidelines. All research, analysis, and writing in this article are entirely my own, and AI was not used for content generation, data analysis, or substantive revisions.

February 19, 2025
Qi Wang

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