Despite their known and indisputable need for protection, North Koreans often have their applications for asylum rejected. This paper outlines the differing interpretations of North Koreans’ right to asylum and investigates the rationales and justifications behind them through the case studies of the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and China (PRC). The paper argues that the rationale of the European countries analyzed is based on their generally restrictive view on asylum, independent from their political positioning on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Contrastingly, the rationales of the United States and the PRC are grounded in interests directly related to the Korean peninsula and Cold War narratives.
In the last decades, there has been an increase in advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that relate to vital political interests directly affecting the sovereignty of states. Even though advisory opinions are not binding and do not require the consent of the states involved, advisory proceedings have been increasingly and strategically used by states and international actors as contentious proceedings in disguise. Exploring the history of the advisory function of the ICJ and its predecessor, this article argues that advisory proceedings constitute a “soft” litigation strategy and a particularly useful tool for small states or non-state entities, as it has the potential to counterbalance the inherent power disparities in the process of international bargaining by adding the authoritative voice of the ICJ to the debate. This paper connects this development to a modern tendency of states to judicialize international affairs.
The Mediterranean Sea has become the deadliest passage in the world over the past decade, as thousands of migrants lose their lives at sea each year. It has become a key actant of European border violence perpetrated against migrants, as European national and supranational migration institutions instrumentalize the Mediterranean’s natural properties through necropolitical strategies of deterrence. The sea must be understood as a wet ontology and a fluid hybrid border. It is shaped by dynamic and complex interactions between human actors and more-than-human elements through which European violence is passed onto non-European migrants’ bodies. It conceals migrants’ deaths and disappearances, as they become ‘inevitable accidents’ caused by natural and untamable elements. The Mediterranean Sea therefore invisibilizes European structural violence occurring at the border zone and acts as an archive and witness to this violence.
Contrary to the long-held logic that giving Guam a stronger, more autonomous voice will undermine U.S. strategic interests, failing to provide Guam with a stable pathway of interest advancement beyond Congress hinders its development and with it the federal government’s ability to achieve soft-power advantages and basic military readiness in the Indo-Pacific theater.
Since the United States assumed responsibility for administering the territory of Guam in 1898, it has treated the prospect of Guam’s status improvement as detrimental to U.S. strategic interests. This has informed its chosen method of territorial administration, which places U.S. territories under the authority of the Department of the Interior. Each territory is then given only one formal representative in Congress, specifically the U.S. House of Representatives, but without full-voting rights. This paper will explore how Guam has managed to advance its interests in Washington since 1972, highlighting how congressional representation has become Guam’s most successful pathway of interest advancement with the federal government to date. However, the agency and success of Guam’s congressional delegates must be framed within a broader discussion of the fragility of the U.S. approach to territorial administration, which has relegated Guam to a pathway of interest advancement incredibly vulnerable to political sea change. Ultimately, this paper will illustrate how Guam’s main pathway of interest advancement in Washington is quickly narrowing at the expense of U.S. strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific.
How is the imperialism of a small African country connected with questions about its own identity and troubled past? In this paper, I try to analyze through the lenses of historical continuity how the ghosts of a dramatic past have crafted Rwanda’s foreign policy. My analysis goes deeper into the pre-colonial era, observing patterns of similarities throughout Rwandan history, starting from the kingdoms of Rwanda in the 18th century until Paul Kagame’s presidency (2000–present). Moreover, instead of seeing a historical break between the pre- and post-1994 genocide governments, I have found historical parallels with the Rwandan independent governments, especially between those of Juvénal Habyarimana (1973–1994) and Paul Kagame. Those similarities swing around the necessity of controlling ethnic dissent, determining a common truth, centralizing power, and establishing the cult of the leader. Nonetheless, the dramatic consequences of the genocide and the international legitimation that has brought on Kagame’s party Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) have had, as a result, an imperialistic project based on the necessity of defending “national security.” Rwanda’s delicate balance between managing internal dissent, the homogenization of the society through shared collective memory, and the imperialistic project is at the center of this work.
Africa is becoming an important strategic hub for the Russian state as Putin’s regime faces rising ostracization elsewhere. In this paper, I analyze Russian influence in Africa by examining over 1,700 pieces of online content created or re-posted by 4 Russian embassies in Ghana, Ethiopia, the Republic of the Congo, and Tanzania between January 15 and December 31, 2022. I demonstrate that, despite new developments in Russian strategic communications, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has mostly fed pre-existing narratives rather than drastically shifting the focus or direction of state rhetoric. All four of the embassies used in the analysis promoted narratives that depicted Russia as a revisionist power going up against a “neocolonial” West, portrayed Ukraine as a neo-Nazi puppet of the West, and attempted to contrast this with Russia’s purportedly friendly relations with Africa. The scale and intensity of these narratives exploded in the leadup to and in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine—to the extent that some embassies began to focus almost exclusively on Ukraine in their communications. Meanwhile, many African nations were willing to pragmatically engage with Russia as an alternative (or complementary) ally to the West. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, I show that the war in Ukraine has revealed the fault lines of Russian and African thinking, loyalty, and strategy.
This analysis delves into the concerns surrounding debt-trap diplomacy in Kyrgyzstan by examining a leaked loan contract of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for the construction of the Alternative North-South Road. This unique occasion—as contracts are usually shrouded in confidentiality—sheds light on the dynamics of BRI lending in the region and on a global level. The analysis considers the political and economic implications of China's investments in Kyrgyzstan, aiming at investigating whether the investment is geared toward exerting political influence, as has been suggested by the active political debate around the narrative of debt-trap diplomacy. While acknowledging the limited data available, this analysis neither finds application for debt-trap diplomacy nor an active attempt by Chinese entities to utilize contractual provision, even though on paper the contract could allow for the latter. Despite the lack of hard evidence, the paper contributes to the academic debate by shifting attention from broader geopolitical considerations and the debt-trap narrative, to increased scrutiny of contractual provisions in large-scale infrastructure projects, in which BRI lending indeed appears to differentiate itself.
When does China use force to settle territorial disputes? This paper leverages data from the Correlates of War project and Stanford’s Mapping Interstate Territorial Conflict repository to demonstrate that China takes different approaches to settling terrestrial and sea-based disputes. While China has tacitly accepted the territorial status quo and generally used force only after a rival challenged extant terrestrial boundaries, it has initiated revisions to the territorial status quo in the maritime domain. This paper contends that China takes different approaches to its terrestrial disagreements and maritime disputes due to the Chinese Communist Party’s internal risk calculus. While land-based disputes can stoke unmanageable levels of escalation, factors specific to the maritime domain are more likely to keep militarized incidents contained.
This paper explores the climate change, conflict, and state-building nexus, challenging the prevailing one-dimensional view of this relationship. While global actors like the UN Security Council and the European Union recognize climate change as a "threat multiplier" that intensifies conflict risks, this paper argues that state-building processes can also significantly influence the impact of climate change. By examining the story of Basra, Iraq, this case study highlights how Iraq's vulnerability to climate change is not solely a consequence of environmental factors but also stems from the enduring legacy of decades of war. This vulnerability, coupled with the state's limited monopoly of violence, creates a feedback loop wherein non-state actors strengthen their control over territory and resources as the state’s climate change vulnerability increases. The findings of this analysis have implications for climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, underscoring the need to address both conflict dynamics and state-building processes to effectively tackle climate change.