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Statement from the Editors

A great deal of interesting research takes place at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. The intent of the Journal of Public and International Affairs is to gather some of the best of that work into one publication, for the benefit of faculty, students, and the larger public and international affairs community.

This is the first issue of JPIA. Its theme is one that none of us anticipated in the fall of this term. When it came to reviewing the accepted manuscripts, we found that half of them reflected the global revolution of 1989. We have grouped these together, forming the first section "The Politics of a New Era." The second section contains papers on a variety of topics from each of the School's areas of concentration; International Relations, Development, Domestic Policy and Economics and Public Policy.

JPIA seeks to publish both scholarly and expository articles on a diversity of subjects, reflecting the School's focus on public affairs. The Journal will be an annual publication, accepting submissions from any Princeton University student, or students in an approved joint degree program with the Woodrow Wilson School. Please send submissions to: Kathryn Roth, Robertson Hall, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton NJ 08544-1013.

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Section 1:
The Politics of a New Era
The Democracy for Which They Died: The Chinese Popular Movement of 1989

by Robert Orr

The "democracy" for which the Chinese people risked their lives in the spring of 1989 was not a Western concept, nor was it necessarily anti-communist or new to China. While the call for democracy echoed and drew upon the official and unofficial Chinese tradition of democracy, the movement in 1989 had its own meaning and context. In 1989 democracy was seen not only as a means of "saving the country," but also an end in itself insofar as it represented specific freedoms, an end to corruption, hope, individuality, friendship, and personal liberation. The sense of personal liberation and hope people experienced during the movement profoundly transformed both participants and observers, and will continue to influence the course of democracy in China.

The popular movement that erupted in Beijing and swept across China during the spring of 1989 has been referred to as "the democracy movement" by people from all over the world—everywhere, that is, except China. While it is true that min zhu, or "democracy," was the rallying cry for the people in the streets, and that an unprecedented democratic dynamic flourished during the month-long occupation of Tian An Men Square, the Chinese themselves referred to their movement as the "student movement," the "people’s movement," or simply "the movement." Though it is not easy to identify what people meant when they used the term "democracy," it is important to recognize that the people did indeed call for democracy with great enthusiasm and commitment, indeed, many were even willing to die for it.

The fact that the people used non-ideological, participant-centered terminology when referring to the movement helps explain what the "democracy" they called for was not. For the Chinese participants and observers, the term "democracy" did not necessarily represent a well-defined ideology or a political program, nor was it even limited to the political sphere. Democracy was not strictly a Western concept, nor did it imply a need to overturn the Chinese communist system. The movement was not so much anti-communist as it was "acommunist."

The "democracy" for which the Chinese people struggled in 1989 had its own unique meaning and context. It was a powerful and pure ideal with an almost mystical ability to unite people even though their

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definitions of "democracy" differed greatly. Over time, these differing definitions coalesced to become a new ordering principle that would integrate various aspects of national and personal life.

Democracy meant everything from strengthening the country by rectifying official abuses and "cleaning up" society, to providing individual freedoms in political, social, and personal life. It also meant creating a more universal basis for personal interaction based on friendship rather than traditional family connections or revolutionary ideology. The sense of personal liberation which developed in the course of the movement combined with a collective commitment to national salvation to create a vague yet powerful vision of a better future. Eventually, democracy came to represent this hope and belief that China could somehow be improved.

**A Brief History of Democracy in China**

The call for "democracy" is not new to China. In the wake of the crisis of cultural, political and national identity caused by large-scale Western penetration of China in the 19th century, democracy became associated with the modernization process necessary for China to resist domination by foreign powers. For many intellectuals democracy was a principle whose desirability had already been settled in the West, and they looked to it for national salvation. From the outset, however, the definition of democracy was imbued with traditional Chinese attributes such as the Confucian concept of the state of natural harmony between the rulers and the ruled.

The Chinese notion of democracy carved out its own special place in the political and social lexicon of modern China during the May Fourth Movement which occurred between 1919 and approximately 1921. This seminal nationalistic movement, spawned by the warlord government's accession to unfavorable terms at the Treaty of Versailles, brought people into the streets advocating "Democracy and Science" as an all-encompassing alternative to Confucian tradition. During this time, democracy became a powerful symbol and gained such great stature that few dared to oppose it overtly.²

Since that time, "democracy" has existed in some form or another within official ideology, first as one of Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles (adopted as official doctrine of the Kuomintang), then as Mao Zedong's "New Democracy", Lin Biao's "Extended Democracy," and finally, as a part of Deng Xiaoping's drive for modernization and reform after he consolidated power in 1978.

In 1980 Deng asserted to his Politburo colleagues that democracy would "help pool collective wisdom for economic development" and would "promote the smooth development of our modernization drive." Though Deng supported "democracy," he wanted to control it, to harness it for the sole purpose of promoting the national interest as defined by the "Four Modernizations" he had promoted since 1975 (of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense).

By legitimizing democracy, however, Deng unintentionally spurred a new phase in the life of Chinese democracy — the resurgence of unofficial, unsanctioned pro-democracy movements. The Democracy Wall Movement in 1978-79 was the first of three separate, though related movements during the reform period. Supporters of this movement shared the goals of modernization and "antibureaucratism" with the reformers, yet they soon pushed beyond the narrow confines envisioned by Deng and the reformist faction within the government.

Wei Jingsheng, one of the more radical and outspoken democrats, went so far as to advocate democracy as the "Fifth Modernization," above and beyond Deng's Four Modernizations and the goal of a strong state they were intended to achieve. For such ideas Wei was sentenced to fifteen years in prison when the movement outlived its usefulness to the reformers and was crushed in 1979.
In 1986, however, a second unsanctioned pro-democracy movement sprang up. Between 1979 and 1986 much had changed in China and the new movement reflected this change. The Democracy Wall Movement was made up of a fairly small core of activists, mostly workers and non-student intellectuals, which supported the reformist faction of the government in the aftermath of the scarring experience of the Cultural Revolution. In 1986, however, the movement was powered by thousands of young, idealistic students who had been encouraged by economic and social liberalization, but who were greatly frustrated by the lack of a corresponding political opening and concrete changes in their lives. They were not supporting a faction within the government, but rather their own broadly defined agenda that transcended the government's version of democracy. As one student participant commented, the movement in 1986 "was more about Democracy, less about politics."

In 1989 the call for democracy echoed and drew upon the official and the unofficial tradition of democracy in China. The movement also adopted new meanings of democracy as the lao bai xing, or "common people," joined in the protest on an unprecedented scale. The people were as diverse as their reasons for joining in — students fired by idealism and patriotism, workers dismayed by inflation, teachers angry about governmental neglect, retirees disgusted by increasing economic inequality, government ministry employees disillusioned with their work, journalists frustrated by their inability to express "the truth," and everyone incensed by corruption in government — yet all discovered a profound unity acting together in the streets.

The liberating effect of observing and participating in the movement not only released energy, but also created it. This synergistic process itself came to be associated with democracy. As one student leader explained from atop the Monument to the People's Heroes on May 17th, "This, what you see here," gesturing to the nearly one million people who were demonstrating, debating, and singing in Tian An Men Square, "this is democracy. People come alive, their spirit grows."

The Many Faces of Democracy in 1989

Freedom

The concept of freedom has not been traditionally regarded as a purely positive concept in China as it has in the West. "Freedom" often is associated with an abdication of personal responsibility, which runs counter to many important Chinese cultural traditions. Yet "freedom" was almost universally accepted in 1989 as an unquestionable "good." Indeed freedom was at the core of the movement, for the movement itself provided the context for participants to actually experience it in some measure for the first time. People tasted more freedom than they ever had before, and they wanted more of it.

Freedom of speech and freedom of the press were at the heart of most people's definition of democracy in 1989, and each served to unite the movement in a powerful way. While xinwen ziyou (freedom of the press) was the single most common element among individual definitions of democracy, freedom of speech was central to the actual development of the movement. Since many people did not have a specific program in mind, being able to express their discontent and hopes freely was extremely important. Freedom of speech was a concrete, immediately realizable freedom, at least in the context of the movement.

People spoke more openly in the spring of 1989 than at any point in the history of the People's Republic of China, and few tried to avail themselves of the potential protection which anonymity could provide them. Indeed, many went out of their way to avoid anonymity, choosing instead to identify themselves along with that which they advocated. One 47-year-old factory worker who had travelled to Beijing
from the distant city of Harbin, was chastised for "inciting the crowd" by the commander of the troops sealing off the entrance to Zhongnanhai, the residential and work compound of top Communist Party officials. The man responded with a lecture on the "fundamental right of free speech," punctuating it with interjections, "no, I will not be silent, I have been silent far too long!" He then ended it dramatically by identifying himself and volunteering a look at his identity card to the commander of the troops.

Freedom of the press, though not as immediately realizable as freedom of speech, was even more explicitly identified with the movement. Xinwen ziyou was not only the one common denominator of virtually everyone's definition of democracy, but it also served as a dramatic focus and source of support. For the first time in the history of the People's Republic, journalists took to the streets in large numbers demanding freedom of the press. For a few days at the height of the movement the television and many newspapers displayed unprecedented candor.

The reason participants most often cited for wanting a free press was that it could serve as a watchdog to combat corruption and "bureaucratism." This directly challenged the view of democracy held by Deng and the reformers which assumed that the people's "supervisory function" over government could be carried out by increased participation in the party. The people's view of the role of the press in 1989 implicitly recognized the tension between rulers and ruled, and revealed that their notion of democracy had changed. It had shifted from being solely a means of creating a state of harmony and development, or a strong country, to a way to protecting people from government, (acknowledging the tension upon which Western democracy is premised).

Participants valued freedom of the press both for its "watchdog role," and, on an almost subconscious level, for the role it could play in recognizing and affirming individual contributions. People felt that they were worth covering, that what they were doing was news, much more so than the daily fare of leaders shaking hands, leaders attending ceremonies, and leaders inspecting factories. For the first time in the history of the P.R.C. virtually everyone was willing to talk to journalists. Many even asked to be interviewed, often at great risk to themselves.

Throughout the movement participants were thrilled by coverage of "the people" — not the impersonal, generic "people" of communist tradition, but rather of themselves, a collection of common individuals. This coverage confirmed that they, ironically, were making history in the shadow of the Great Hall of the People and the Museum of the Revolution which were built on a scale designed to negate the importance of the individual.

While hunger strikers read articles about the movement out loud on the square and passed them around until they were illegible, hotel workers sat in groups by televisions exclaiming how wonderful it was to see the lao bai xing, or the common people, on the screen. One even exclaimed "That's us!", jiu shi zamen!, using the inclusive form of "us" in Chinese, even though he knew that it was neither he nor anybody else in the room that was on television.

An End to Corruption

The movement focused not only on freedoms of speech and press, but also on freedoms from recriminations for patriotic actions, from arbitrary authority, and from corruption. Indeed, combatting corruption, along with freedom of the press, was one of the two most explicit, unifying themes of the movement and of people's definition of democracy. People were intensely concerned about corruption—corruption resulting not only from abuses of "connections" and revolutionary ideology, but also from the "solution"—the reforms. By liberalizing certain sectors of the economy while leaving control of key
economic decisions in bureaucrats’ hands, the government created a situation rife with potential for corruption.

Corruption became so rampant in the 1980s that during the movement some participants went so far as to carry portraits of Mao Zedong to highlight the official corruption which had flourished since his death. Though the democracy activists clearly intended some irony by carrying portraits of Deng’s totalitarian predecessor, they were sincere in their condemnation of corruption under Deng. As one young man said, “Mao made many mistakes, but he was not corrupt.”

People were in part reacting to the increasing inequity brought about by Deng’s reforms in the 1980s. For many of the Chinese democrats earlier in the twentieth century “democracy” represented a type of equalization. It meant not only “social and economic democracy,” but also the “equality of personality” and the elimination of unequal livelihood. In 1989 people were not seeking economic equalization so much as the opportunity to be able to exist and compete fairly in the social and economic arena. They wanted the process to be “clean,” not sullied by corrupt bureaucrats and corrupted ideals.

**Friendship and Universal Bonding**

For some participants democracy defined a new type of system, and for others it was associated with a set of principles. For a great number of participants and observers, however, democracy was a new means of personal interaction. While to define democracy as little more than “friendship” and “universal bonding” would be overly simplistic, the tendency toward open sharing, cooperation, and experiencing valuable interactions with other individuals was indeed significant.

The movement provided a context in which people could interact, often for the first time, on the basis of individual feelings and universal human connections rather than on family-based connections (guanxi) or threadbare revolutionary ideology. With the widespread abuse of personal connections and the erosion of communist ideology as a unifying force, these methods of personal interaction were no longer effective means of ordering society in a complete way. Friendship and open exchanges in the movement were able to fill the void caused by the eroding legitimacy of the two former ways of relating to other people.

The revolutionary paradigm for interpersonal interaction had been so discredited in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution that it was considered almost irrelevant in 1989. Guanxi-based interaction, on the other hand, which had been severely undermined by its association with favoritism and corruption, was a target of the movement. People uttered the term guanxi with great disdain and anger, in a way that highlighted the modern connotation of the word. Guanxi no longer meant “connectedness” as much as “connections,” and the abuse of such.

The overcoming of “guanxi-think,” or the concern for those related, at the expense of those not related, is perhaps the most remarkable and the most important accomplishment of the movement. People were able to relate to and help those with whom they had no traditional or institutional connections. Popsicle and soda vendors could be seen giving their wares away; some people even prepared their own food to donate to strangers on Tian An Men Square at a time when shortages were feared.

The increasing importance of friendship was based on an even deeper trend towards recognizing the universality of human connection. This showed in many ways — from steel workers carrying signs addressed to the hunger strikers which read “Hold on little brothers, your big brothers are here now,” to the mother of a hunger striker who could not find her son, breaking down and crying, “They are all my children.”
Hope and Belief

Virtually everyone involved in the movement was well aware of the shift toward a more "equal" interaction between people. This was a great source of pride and hope for participants. One student, having just voted on whether to continue the occupation of Tian An Men Square or not explained, "This is the first time that I have felt that China could ever overcome her feudalistic past. Even the Communist Party could not break the back of feudalism, but now, with democracy, students with no connections are equal to those who have them."

Associating this kind of hope with democracy in 1989 had a clear precedent in Chinese history. In the early part of the twentieth century when China was confronted by foreign aggression, internal division, and its own weakness, "democracy" was put forth by many intellectuals and revolutionaries as China's only hope for survival. Indeed, revolutionary leader Sun Yat­sen went so far as to say, "If we want China to progress and our race to be safe, we must put democracy into effect."

In 1989 one leaflet distributed by hunger strikers on Tian An Men Square read in part, "At this life and death moment of the Chinese race, countrymen, all countrymen with a conscience, please hear our cry...Democracy is the noblest sentiment and greatest hope for survival." Almost eighty years after the revolution that overthrew the imperial system in China, "democracy" had become the hope not only for national salvation, but also for personal liberation.

The awesome mission for, and great hope invested in democracy in the 1980s was in part a result, as was the case earlier in this century, of the great void created in both individual and national life when the prevailing belief system was seriously undermined. By the late 1970s the communist ideology which had provided the underpinning of Chinese society since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, had effectively collapsed in the wake of the disastrous Great Leap Forward and the dogmatic excesses of the Cultural Revolution.

Ironically, the reforms of the 1980s not only failed to fill the ideological vacuum that had been created, but indeed contributed to it. The reforms raised expectations that could not, or simply were not met, and they failed to include a comprehensive, convincing, doctrine or ordering principle that could meet peoples', especially the youths', needs for something to believe in.

People found themselves caught in a netherland. The country turned to Western economics to remedy stagnation, but at the same time they were told not to believe in the Western economic system. In addition, the emphasis on material gain, captured by Deng Xiaoping's famous slogan "to get rich is glorious," while welcome at the time of its inception, was not sufficient to satisfy most intellectuals and idealistic youth (especially in light of the unequal distribution of material gains, biased against the intellectuals and students).

The movement in 1989 was immediately preceded by a period best characterized by its absence of idealism as all people worked to get ahead, and by increasing despair among students as their prospects for doing so remained dim. Failures of certain aspects of the reform program caused unprecedented inflation which ravaged the vast majority of urban households on fixed incomes. Even the successes of reform brought adverse side-effects such as increasing inequality of incomes. Many Chinese personally identified themselves with the fate of the country, and thus the troubled situation in China did much to contribute to the lack of idealism and hope preceding the movement. This was especially true among students at top universities such as Beijing University which has long assumed a leadership role in the country and whose students feel called to a special mission for spearheading change.
In 1989 the vast majority of the Chinese people seemed proud of being Chinese, but not of China. In fact, many students were ashamed of their country. They commonly referred to it as "backward" and often compared it unflatteringly with the "better" countries in the West. One of the most poignant indications that students lacked, and needed, a belief in something, anything, was their tendency to ask foreigners what they believed in, at times almost begging to know — did they believe in a religion, in their government, in capitalism?

In this climate, the impulse to turn to democracy — a principle associated with success in the West, with freedoms people desired, and historically with national salvation — was further encouraged by the increased exposure to the West during this time. In the context of the spiritual and political vacuum, democracy quickly became an almost mystical force for many students, representing everything positive that their system and their lives were not.

**Recognizing the Individual and Personal Liberation**

Increased exposure to the West also contributed to the increasing awareness and valuation of the individual that developed throughout the 1980s. In 1989 this sense of the individual, though seldom discussed per se during the movement, was a crucial element of people's understanding of democracy. In previous pro-democracy movements "saving the nation" was the paramount, almost exclusive goal of the struggle for democracy. In 1989 a much more developed sense of the individual's rights, needs, and potential contributions helped to shape the movement.

While the movement concerned itself with obtaining more freedoms for individuals and legitimizing individual worth, it was not the product of individualistic impulses. In fact, the collective action formed in response to the isolation many felt due to the individualistic tendency in Chinese society that had developed throughout the 1980s. Democracy meant more freedom for individuals, but it also implied cooperation and connectedness between them.

For many of the participants who had never before engaged in any type of movement, activity, or even discussion relating to democracy, "democracy" was defined by what they experienced during the movement. It was the process of emancipating individuals who could then cooperate and unite to achieve collective goals. Ten years earlier, on a poster on Democracy Wall Wei Jingsheng had stated, "Democracy...implies a cohesion of individuals and that is why it is in essence a form of cooperation." In 1989 this cohesion was fully evidenced by extraordinary cooperation among the people in the streets and on the Square. Any breach of the spirit of cooperation such as trespassing on the lanes being maintained for ambulances and food and water supplies, immediately provoked exhortations such as "That's not democratic!"

To the extent that people were concerned with individual freedom and well-being, they did not value it for self-gain as much as for its potential for saving the nation. In fact, society-wide participation in the movement was stimulated by some individuals who were willing to sacrifice themselves for their country during the hunger strike.

The hunger strike served as the catalyst for the entire movement because individuals were willing to sacrifice themselves and the government did not even seem to care. It certainly did not meet its traditional obligation as responsible parent of all the people. In many ways, the citizenry saw themselves as foster parents to the "orphans" on the Square. They were motivated not only by the tradition of making sacrifices for the country, but also a desire to assert their individuality. While some observers were alarmed
by the alienation and isolation these individualistic acts demonstrated, others were empowered by the
strength and resolution the hunger strikers displayed.

The growing recognition of the individual as an element of democracy was also manifest in the
challenge to the idealized, impersonal, class-based term "the people" as it is used in the communist lexicon
(i.e. People's Liberation Army, People's Congresses, Great Hall of the People, people's parks, people's
toilets, etc...). During the movement people pointed out the irony of this terminology — "You are the
People's Liberation Army, and we are 'the people'!" — and also began to use the term in a more humanistic,
personal manner. This was a critical development in the concept of democracy in China because the
recognition that "We are the people" was necessary before "of, by, and for the people" could even be
considered.

The movement and its participatory, egalitarian dynamic served to validate the increasing
importance placed on the individual and the more personalized use of "people." This was a profound
experience for many students, as revealed in many comments they made on the personal importance they
attached to the movement. One highly ranked Beijing University student, who in many ways embodied the
Chinese success story, confided, "This is the first time I've ever done anything important in my whole life."

This sense of importance shared by many people was derived in part from the fact they were
making decisions as individuals for the first time. At the outset of the movement almost all the students were
participating against their parents' wishes or without their knowledge, and some were very conscious of
their deviation from the age old traditional bonds and responsibilities of 小我, or filial piety. One
hunger striker and student leader on Tian An Men Square received five letters from his parents alternately
begging and ordering him not to participate after they saw him on Hong Kong television (some areas in
southern China receive Hong Kong stations). Though he carried all the letters with him constantly, he said
"I have always been a loyal son, but I cannot obey them now, for democracy is even more important."

Democracy, and the inherent value it places on the individual, challenged other cultural traditions
as well. Young people felt they could pursue happiness and what they believed in rather than making all
their decisions solely on the traditional criteria of responsibility, duty, and obligation. This was most
strikingly displayed on Tian An Men Square, where students held hands, walked arm in arm, embraced,
and even kissed in public.

This type of open behavior was only one aspect of a multi-faceted dynamic of personal liberation
that developed during the movement. Though seldom identified as an explicit goal of the movement,
personal liberation became an integral part of the process in the square and in the streets, and in so doing
came to be seen by many as an inherent element of the democracy they were advocating. In the early 1980s
Deng Xiaoping stated that, "Democracy is a major condition for emancipating the mind." In 1989 the
people saw emancipating the mind and the self as an act of democracy.

The energy released by participants' sense of personal liberation to a large extent powered the
movement. For numerous participants, this was the part of the movement that "cannot be forgotten" and
"can never go away," implying its important future role in developments in China. People were almost
euphoric when they experienced "liberation" for the first time — a realization made more poignant by the
fact that they themselves had accomplished it. Many derived a sense of almost invincible power from their
liberation, asserting that, "It almost doesn't matter what the government does now," and "The government
cannot defeat the people."

It is telling that the V-for-Victory sign became the hallmark of the movement. This sign was
symbolic of the victories already won when facing down the police (and their own fears), of hope for future victories, and also of "people power" (which they consciously emulated from the Philippines).

In China "people power" was associated with the oft heard, Women Zhongguo ren qilaile, "We Chinese people have stood up." This phrase was an important modification of the declaration made by Mao from the top of Tian An Men gate when he founded the People's Republic — "The Chinese people have stood up, and the future is infinitely brighter." In 1989 a new generation stood up, and they felt that the future, their future, did indeed look infinitely brighter because of it.

The Synthesis of Old and New Democracy

The movement in 1989 not only resonated with history, it actively integrated many historic elements of Chinese democracy with new ones. During the May Fourth era "democracy" had come to embody an all encompassing, somewhat elastic vision of change and renewal in China. Though many of the specific issues had changed in the course of the twentieth century, in 1989 "democracy" was similar in that it contained elements of not only politics, but also economics, education, morality, family life, and social conditions.

In 1989 students revived the term "Mr. Democracy," the same term that their predecessors had used seventy years earlier to sum up their alternative to the extant system. This way of referring to the movement highlighted people's view of democracy as a personal phenomenon rather than as an abstract ideology or "ism" (min zhu zhu yi, the full term identifying democracy as a doctrine, was scarcely used at all). The term "Mr. Democracy" was significant not only because of its personal quality, but also because it revealed a melding of the historical notion of democracy in China with contemporary, more Western democratic values which had arisen as a result of China's increased exposure to the West throughout the 1980s.

In fact, the way people referred to "Mr. Democracy" in 1989 revealed the dual nature of the term. In 1919, when democracy was still a relatively new concept, people used the transliteration Demokelashi xian sheng, or "Mr. De" for short. This use of transliteration, seldom used in China, revealed an incomplete synthesis of East and West with respect to democracy. By 1989 "democracy" had been internalized as both a Chinese concept and a distinct Chinese word. The transliteration was abandoned, and instead people used the Chinese phrase Min zhu xian sheng, or "Mr. Democracy."

The term "Mr. Democracy" was originally coined in 1919 by the Dean of Humanities at Beijing University who strongly supported the May Fourth Movement. While this term had its own special significance in 1989, its historical content was also relevant. "Mr. Democracy" represented a movement which entirely rejected the socio-cultural-political order of the past. While the prevailing order was different in 1989, the sense of crisis, rejection, and patriotism strongly resonated with the spirit of the movement in 1919.

Another reason students in 1989 revived the term was because it invoked the Dean of Beijing University who had coined the phrase. Two students carrying "Mr. Democracy" placards explained that they liked this phrase because it had been created by a "caring and responsive" official. Much of the dynamic between demonstrators and officials during the movement in 1989 focussed on the issue of making authority figures and government officials responsive to the students' and the peoples' concerns. As many hunger strikers explained, "They should care about us."

Like the Democracy Wall activists in 1978-79 and the students demonstrating for democracy in
1986-87, the students in 1989 in some ways saw themselves in a traditional role — as demonstrators. They were patriotic and they demanded to be recognized as such. Yet the government responded by labeling their movement with the highly pejorative term *dongluan* (turmoil) in the April 26 People's Daily editorial. The frustration and anger this caused was compounded when the government refused to show concern for the well-being of the hunger strikers. This led to new, more antagonistic slogans and actions.

The initial remonstrative protests were carried out by elite groups of students, mostly from Beijing, Qinghua, and People’s Universities. These were in some ways reminiscent of the first democratic demonstration in 1895 of 8,000 Confucian scholars. The protests began to take on a harder edge though, as the government continued to demonstrate its clear lack of concern. When the government refused to accept a petition from the students on April 28, the day of Hu Yaobang’s funeral, some students waited on their knees on the steps of the Great Hall of the People with the petition held above their head. Through this mocking action, students displayed that they were conscious of their historic role, and, implicitly, that they were prepared to challenge an unresponsive government.

While the term “Mr. Democracy” on one hand invoked certain historical circumstances and highlighted the students’ desire for authorities to be sensitive to the concerns of the people and the traditional relationship that this implied, it also signified a radically new phenomenon in Chinese history. The people wanted someone in the government to take their concerns to heart and assert strong leadership, but they knew that this was not forthcoming. Indeed, Hu Yaobang’s death set the movement in motion because the students realized that their last real “friend at court” had passed from the scene. If change was to come, it would have to come from them. As proclaimed by one big character poster displayed at Beijing University the day following his death, “A true leader has died. We must collect the pain of bereavement, turn it into power, into movement, into democracy." In a way, “Mr. Democracy” filled the leadership gap, and became the savior everyone was looking for. People transferred their hope from a single leader to the movement and the open, participatory democratic dynamic between the people.

**Prospects for Democracy in China**

In China, as in the West, democracy has traditionally been considered simply a means and not an end in itself. While the participants of the movement in 1989 did in some ways see democracy as a means of achieving the long honored goal of modernizing and thereby “saving” China, democracy was also an end in itself insofar as it represented specific freedoms, “cleanliness” in both government and society, hope, individuality, friendship, and personal liberation. This notion of democracy as an end in and of itself was in part due to the elastic notion of democracy developed throughout the twentieth century, its idealization in the context of the political and spiritual vacuum in the 1980s, and its association with the liberating movement of 1989 itself. The potential for realizing democracy in the future will in part depend upon the extent to which the practical, institutional nature of democracy as a means can be brought together with the synergy and spirit derived from democracy as a set of specific, diverse objectives.

The movement in 1989 did little to establish a structure for democracy or to institutionalize its gains. Though a new, independent press was discussed and actually emerged during the movement, it was squelched by the subsequent crackdown. Likewise, the broad-based Autonomous Student Union and unsanctioned trade unions have been forcibly disbanded and are unlikely to resurface any time soon. Those leaders who escaped the crackdown such as Wu'er Kaixi and Yan Jiaqi have been unable to unite the highly fragmented democratic organizations outside China, being relegated instead to becoming simply one more wave of Chinese exiles.
THE DEMOCRACY FOR WHICH THEY DIED

The part of the experience in 1989 which will have a lasting effect is the hands-on experience with a more open, participatory democratic dynamic, the new understanding about the antagonistic relationship between the government and the Chinese people, and the sense of hope that the movement brought. Hu Shi, a leading Chinese democrat early in this century, stated that "The only way to have democracy is to have democracy." In 1989, many felt that this was exactly what had happened — for the first time ever. Democracy was the freedom, the happiness, and the togetherness of the movement. They had put themselves beyond the Party and all it represented, and had acted out their ideals. This experience left an indelible mark on them. Looking to the future, this is the important legacy of 1989.

Given the Chinese government's current regression to repressive, closed tendencies, democracy is likely to assume an even more positive connotation. It may become more and more a panacea, a dream, an end as well as a means. This situation, along with the legacy of experience and hope left by the movement in 1989, guarantees that "democracy" will find its way to the streets of China once again.

Notes

1 The most common terms used to describe the movement were xueshengyun dong, and xuesheng huo dong, "student movement" and "student activities/movement" respectively. You xing, or "demonstration" was also used, as was xue chao, or "student wave/movement." With the "occupation" of Tian An Men Square many people began to refer to the movement as Tian An Men yun dong, Ren min yun dong, or just yun dong ("the Tian An Men movement", "the People's movement", or just "the movement"). It is important to note that most people did not use kangyi or fan dui ("protest" or "oppose") to describe their relationship with the government.


3 Mao wrote his treatise "On New Democracy" in 1940 during the United Front with Kuomintang. In this past and future vision for China, he identified the May Fourth Movement as the dividing line between Old Democracy and New Democracy. After the communist victory in 1949, he moved toward "socialist democracy" and Leninist "democratic centralism". Though his repeated use of the term "democracy" in some form or another may not necessarily be proof of belief in "democracy" as conceived of in the West, it does at least indicate the ongoing political coinage of the term in China throughout this century.


5 Chen, Tu-hsiu "Shih-hsin min-chih ti chi-ch’u (The Basis for the Realization of Democracy)," La Jeunese, VIII, No. 1 (Dec. 1, 1919).


9 Though in hindsight Zhao Ziyang was seen as a "friend" of the students after he was pushed to the side by hardliners, at the time of the movement he was closely associated with the troubled economic situation of the country. Few, if any, thought of him as a savior or even active advocate for the students in the early stages of the movement. Ironically, he generated little enthusiasm among students until May 18, the day he made his early morning visit to the hunger strikers, and the same day he was effectively sidelined by the hardliners.
The Arms Control Process in a Changing World: Promise and Complexity

by Barry Pavel

The Bush Administration's forthcoming proposal to the Soviet Union in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks is entirely consistent with the historic domination of security policies over the arms control process. While arms control has affected the size and structure of military forces, the superpowers' security policies have generated force postures and military doctrines that mold the entire arms control framework. However, new trends in world politics are highly favorable for initiating a different type of arms control in which the quest for meaningful and mutually beneficial agreements may surmount the exigencies of domestic politics.

In these times of budgetary stringency and rapidly decreasing military threats, the Bush Administration appears to be making necessity the mother of invention. Here, necessity has taken two forms:

1. There has been strong resistance in Congress to Bush's request that they procure both of the Pentagon's mobile land-based missiles (the multiple-warhead, rail-garrison MX and the single-warhead Small ICBM [or "Midgetman"]).

2. To enhance crisis stability, the Administration would like to lower the number of warheads per missile in both Soviet and U.S. ICBM forces (so that the resulting forces would present less attractive targets to the other side).

Thus, Bush's invention is to propose to the Soviet Union a ban on mobile land-based missiles with multiple warheads in the upcoming round of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).

Considering the goals of U.S. security policy, this proposal makes eminent sense. But the choice of arms control as the means to accomplish the objective could backfire. The Soviet Union, predictably, has already objected to the proposal on the grounds that it is one-sided. The majority of Soviet ballistic-missile warheads are on multiple-warhead ICBMs, while most of the U.S. force is on submarines, which were excluded from the Bush Administration's proposal.

If the past is any guide to the future, it is likely that the Bush Administration will now try to use these Soviet objections as a justification to induce Congress to procure both missiles. The missiles could then become bargaining chips to be cashed in for Soviet concessions on similar weapons in future negotiations. Thus, if fully played out, this scenario could result in the expenditure of significant sums of money on...
military hardware that may be both unnecessary and unaffordable. Such a result would again prove that the potential for abuse of the arms control process can make it a poor means for achieving U.S. security policy goals.

This essay examines the historical effects of the arms control process on military forces as well as the ways in which the great powers' security policies have affected arms control. This examination points out that, while arms control has had significant effects on the size and structure of military forces, great power security policies have dominated arms control through the generation of force postures and other effects.

In general, there are feedback effects between the arms control process and security policies. Arms control affects security policy through its influences on force postures and other security variables; security policy, which at least partially guides the generation of force postures, affects the arms control process through generated forces, through alliance strategy and doctrine, and through its other manifestations. The future promise of arms control appears highly dependent on the degree to which the great powers come to perceive it as an increasingly integral component of their security policies.

The Effects of the Arms Control Process on Force Size and Structure

This essay focuses on the most significant arms control episodes of the postwar period: The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) and START negotiations, and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks. Though important, other arms control negotiations have been omitted because they are not considered to have been wide enough in scope to have had a distinct effect on superpower force postures; thus, the lessons of such episodes provide little guidance for the centrally important START process. Even the most salient of these omitted agreements, the 1968 Limited Test Ban Treaty, did little except drive nuclear tests underground.

In contrast, the 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement set unequal ceilings on each side's ballistic missile arsenals. The numerical limitations on land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers roughly corresponded to the levels of each side's inventories at that time. However, the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) ceilings for the USSR were set well above the number of Soviet SLBMs then on-hand, though any buildup was constrained by the requirement to dismantle an older ICBM or SLBM launcher for each additional SLBM deployed. The SALT I agreement also limited the USSR to 308 heavy ICBMs; however, it did not limit qualitative improvements (e.g., MIRVing or improving accuracy), except for limits on increases in silo size. Thus, the rest of the 1970s saw the Soviet introduction of MIRVs and increases in SLBMs, as well as U.S. increases in its MIRVed ballistic missiles and the beginning of the U.S. ALCM program.

The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and its 1974 protocol dampened the growth of strategic forces by limiting each side's ABM deployments to one site containing no more than 100 interceptor missiles. Combined with its restrictions on testing, these provisions enabled the superpowers to avoid an offensive and defensive strategic arms race that neither side wanted but would have likely occurred in response to large-scale ABM deployments. Thus, arms control had a visible impact — each side's force structure and size would have been very different if there had been no ABM agreement.

The best description of the 1979 SALT II Treaty (signed, but never ratified) was offered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who called it a "modest but useful step" during ratification hearings. Its novel provisions included numerical limits on MIRVed systems, sublimits on both MIRVed ballistic missiles and ICBMs, a
three-year ban on long-range submarine- and ground-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs and GLCMs, respectively), a freeze on increases in warheads per missile for existing missiles, and limits permitting only one new ICBM per side. Though SALT II may have somewhat slowed the rate of strategic forces’ quantitative and qualitative increases before its official expiration in 1985, both the U.S. and USSR have modernized each leg of their strategic “triads” (bombers, ICBMs, SLBMs) throughout the 1980s, in the process breaking at least some of SALT II’s provisions. Further, this period of modernization has generally emphasized advances in strategic offensive capability rather than survivability improvements.

The effects of the 1987 INF Treaty were more significant: Its provisions effected modest but important changes in the structure of each side’s forces, narrowing the range of available theater nuclear options. The treaty also marginally reduced the overall size of each side’s nuclear arsenals, and its verification provisions have contributed to the prospects for future arms control treaties.

In sum, the ABM and INF Treaties clearly affected the growth and structure of each side’s military forces. The SALT I provisions that limited SLBM increases to replacement of older systems and SALT II’s combination of limits may also have contributed to these trends. In addition, the SALT limits enhanced arms race stability by introducing a higher degree of predictability into force planning; the agreed-to limits enabled force planners to bound their assumptions about future trends, thereby limiting the planning uncertainties that accelerate the growth of arsenals.

The Effects of Security Policy on the Arms Control Process
Security policies, however, have remained significant determinants of the limits of what arms control can accomplish. Ideally, under the guidance of strategy, the force planning process generates force postures, which are the subjects of arms control bargaining. Although in practice, the link between force planning and force postures has been loose, national security policies have nonetheless affected the arms control process through their dominant effects on force postures. Security policies have also affected arms control in other ways, including the effects of changing security tenets on arms control diplomacy and military policy. The discontinuous evolution of strategic nuclear and conventional military doctrines has shaped the superpowers’ approaches to both deploying and limiting their military forces.

Arms Control and Traditional Security Policies
The clearest demonstration of the impact of security policies on arms control is the fact that no serious strategic nuclear negotiations were undertaken until the Soviet Union had achieved rough nuclear parity. The SALT process remained dormant until the deployment of advanced satellites, which, under the euphemism of “national technical means” (NTMs), were legitimized in the SALT I Agreement as instruments of verification. However, the technical limitations of NTMs, and the MIRV development gap, constrained SALT I to limiting only missile launchers. The Soviets’ closing of the MIRV gap in the 1970s and the formulation of cooperative verification measures made it possible to constrain both warheads and launchers in SALT II. Thus, the great powers’ force development policies clearly affected the timing and scope of the SALT process.

The British and French security policies of maintaining independent nuclear deterrents and the U.S. policy of deploying forward-based aircraft have also affected the course of superpower arms control. Although these Western systems threaten strikes on Soviet territory with no comparable threat to the U.S., Soviet attempts to include them in their SALT, START, and INF proposals have proven unacceptable to
the U.S. In SALT II, Soviet negotiators responded by insisting on retaining their heavy ICBMs as compensation for the excluded European systems. Thus, the great powers' security policies affected the dynamics of these negotiations through their policies' effects on force postures.

Overall, the distinct evolution of each side's strategic forces has both hindered and advanced the arms control process. On one hand, the existence of important similarities between each side's forces has encouraged negotiating progress. For example, because both side's planned ABM systems were essentially of the same character, it was easier to reach agreement in 1972.

On the other hand, the existence of force asymmetries — for instance, the U.S. emphasis on SLBMs and the Soviet stress on ICBMs (especially heavy ones) — has complicated the arms control process. The U.S. has tried to use this process to move the Soviets "out to sea" and to reduce the Soviet land-based threat to U.S. ICBMs, while the USSR has been more concerned with using arms control to restrict U.S. high-technology programs (e.g., SDI) and forward-based systems (e.g., Pershing II, a manifestation of both concerns). These concerns have clashed because each side has wanted to protect certain systems that it has deemed essential for maintaining or increasing the survivability and effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. Unfortunately, such systems have often been the very weapons that are most threatening to the other side. Prime examples of this tension between force planning and each side's arms control "will" are the U.S. MX and the Soviet SS-18 series of ICBMs.

Another example of the frequent tension between unilateral aims and arms control is the case used to motivate this historical survey — the U.S. Midgetman ICBM. The tension here is between force planning and arms control "capability": In brief, the Midgetman's mobility would give it increased survivability but would also hinder Soviet verification of the number of such missiles in the U.S. inventory.

The relative differences in each side's conventional defense policies has also had a large impact on the arms control process. Among other things, the Soviet emphasis on numerical superiority in both troops and equipment, combined with NATO's stress on qualitative capabilities, created differences that helped bog down the European conventional arms control process for years. More recently, NATO's strategy of forward defense has led some analysts to assert that certain minimum "force-to-space" ratios mitigate against the desirability of deep conventional force reductions. This analysis was influential in the formulation of NATO's opening CFE proposal in March 1989.

The arms control process has also been affected by force postures through "bargaining chips" and "compensation" rationales, which have been used to justify some aspects of U.S. security policies. Before and during U.S.-Soviet negotiations, the bargaining-chip rationale has been used to bolster domestic support in the U.S. for particular weapons programs. Before SALT I, some advocates of a U.S. ABM system considered procurement of ABM interceptors necessary to force the Soviets to negotiate constraints upon their ABM program; and in SALT II and START, the MX was said to be needed to induce the Soviets to reduce their arsenal of heavy ICBMs.

In a way, there is a chicken-and-egg syndrome afflicting analysis of arms control: For example, the MX, at least partly a result of U.S. security policy, certainly affected the arms control process; but to the extent that the MX originated as a bargaining chip, it represents even more clearly a case of the arms control process affecting force postures. In an attempt address this confusion, Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin have stressed the impact of arms control on force postures:

We now justify the deployment of new systems as necessary to get the Soviets to the
bargaining table. In most cases, we are then not willing, or not able, to give up the system. As a consequence arms negotiations have at time acquired a competitive, even an inflammatory, character that seems to drive the arms race as much as to dampen it.

In spite of this argument, most historical cases reveal that effects run in both directions. Thus, the bargaining-chip rationale can safely be considered as both an additional effect of arms control on force postures and an influence of security policies on arms control.

The same can be said for compensation rationales, which have been at least as prevalent as bargaining chips. After every nuclear arms control agreement except the INF Treaty, the explicit price of the endorsement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was an administration promise to maintain or accelerate certain weapon modernization programs to "compensate" for the force-constraining effects of the treaty. Blacker and Duffy cite the reasons for the Chiefs' SALT I request for compensatory programs as the need, "...to match the Soviets' ongoing development programs, to provide an incentive to the Soviets and bargaining leverage for the United States in future SALT negotiations, and as a hedge in case the SALT agreements or negotiations failed to yield the desired results." The mutual feedback between arms control and security policies (through the process of force modernization) is readily observed in this practice.

Security policies have also affected the arms control process without involving force postures per se, most notably as a result of military interventions. The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia caused the SALT I negotiations to be delayed; in the interim, the U.S. tested its first MIRVed missiles, opening a gap that was to affect the arms control process for years. The debilitating political costs of the Vietnam War certainly contributed to Nixon's desire for an early SALT I Treaty, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the proximate factor that prevented the ratification of SALT II. An example not involving military conflict was the mid-1980s flurry of diplomatic activity in pursuit of a South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone; these efforts were a response to continuing French nuclear tests in that region and the transit of U.S. naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons.

"New Thinking" on Arms Control
Recent developments in Soviet security policy highlight the dominating effects of security policies on arms control. The Soviets incorporated "glasnost" into arms control by shifting from their traditional intransigence concerning onsite inspection to acceptance of intrusive measures in several negotiations. This change removed a major obstacle to the INF Treaty and enhanced the prospects for obtaining other arms control agreements. The arms control manifestations of Moscow's new "reasonable sufficiency" concepts similarly bode well for START and CFE reductions.

The traditional Soviet objective of achieving a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe also appears to have been altered. Guided by the primary aim of preventing war (instead of winning a war should it occur), Gorbachev told President George Bush at Malta that the USSR would prefer that some American forces remain in Europe to maintain continental stability. This new stance will have important effects on the CFE talks. In fact, the new Soviet thinking has made the current arms control process as a whole more dynamic than traditional arms control. Thus, we can expect more arms control business to be conducted and more significant effects from those transactions.

Furthermore, although new thinking has yet to preclude the continuation of major modernization programs, it will surely do so in the near future. Taken as a whole, these new developments could
change the historical role of arms control from a comparatively marginal tool of security policy to a central means by which the great powers can try to reduce the military dangers present in the international environment.

Conclusion
While arms control has had some important effects on force postures, security policies have clearly dominated the arms control process. The superpowers' political will to unilaterally mold the shape and size of their military forces has consistently exceeded their desire to submit to bilateral arms control arrangements.

The recent Bush ICBM overture to the USSR is entirely consistent with this historic domination of domestic politics over arms control. Nonetheless, new political conditions and trends in world politics seem likely to make past precedent irrelevant. Growing pressures for "common security" approaches to arms control appear overwhelmingly favorable for initiating and sustaining a different type of arms control, one in which the quest for mutual benefits surmounts domestic politics. These developments make the post-cold-war prospects for achieving meaningful arms control agreements exceedingly bright.
A Crisis in Theory: Why Experts Failed to Predict the "Global Democratic Revolution"

by Jennifer Windsor

The numerous democratic transitions in the last decade were clearly unanticipated by international experts. In their recent writings, both Samuel Huntington and Robert Dahl are pessimistic about the prospects for expansion of democracy in the world. Huntington bases his predictions on the fact that most countries in the world lack the required domestic preconditions for democracy. While Dahl also accepts the importance of preconditions, he recognizes the potential for transcending structural obstacles. That potential seems to be borne out by recent events, which especially highlight the role for individual initiative and international encouragement in facilitating the establishment of democratic institutions where domestic preconditions seem inhospitable.

The ongoing global wave of democratization defies the bleak predictions put forth by international experts in recent years. Samuel Huntington asserted that, "the limits of democratic development in the world may well have been reached." His predictions were based on the absence of certain economic, social and cultural preconditions which he believed severely limited the chance for a successful establishment of democracy. Robert Dahl is also pessimistic: he states that it would be "surprising" if the proportion of "polyarchies" (as he terms current democracies) in the world were to increase, a proportion that has remained nearly the same as it was 50 years ago. Although Dahl also emphasizes domestic determinants, he is much more open than Huntington to the possibility that structural obstacles can be overcome.

Meanwhile, we are in the midst of what has been widely heralded as the "decade of democracy." Nations in regions as diverse as Eastern Europe, Latin America and East Asia have taken steps toward reinstituting or building nascent democratic systems. Although the process in each region varies greatly and many of the gains made are still fragile, clearly we are witnessing a significant trend towards democratization in the world today. Even the leaders of those countries which have remained authoritarian now claim they are acting in the name of democracy: there has been, "... an historically unprecedented global expansion in the acceptability of democratic ideas," according to Robert Dahl. Francis Fukuyama goes farther by proclaiming the end of "history as such" due to, "... the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."
Huntington, in a comprehensive 1984 article, summarizes the record of democratic development. In particular, he emphasizes the key role played by domestic preconditions and the way in which the process of democratization occurs. His predictions are largely based on the presence of certain structural factors which he considers highly favorable to democracy: economic development and growth, a market economy, the absence of extreme income inequalities, social pluralism, a culture that is not monistic and tolerant of diversity and compromise, and the influence of democratic nations. Given the fact that most Third World nations lack the appropriate cultural, social and economic make-up, Huntington forecasts limited possibilities for democratization in these regions, with the exception of the "redemocratization" of the bureaucratic-authoritarian states in Latin America. Furthermore, he asserts that, "...the likelihood of democratic development in Eastern Europe is virtually nil."

A similar, though moderated, pessimism can be found in a recent work by Robert Dahl. The most plausible scenario, according to Dahl, is that a non-expanding core of already-established "stable" democratic states will survive, surrounded by an ever-changing group of nations experiencing transitions to and breakdowns of democracy.

Can these noted theorists have so completely missed the mark? Have they succumbed to what Chalmers Johnson sees as the drawback of Western social science theory, overgeneralizing the experience of the West? Perhaps, as E.E. Schattschneider observed, "...the crisis here is not a crisis in democracy but a crisis in theory." This essay will argue that theoretical approaches may be inherently limited in explaining how and why nations have made transitions towards democracy today. Yet, the successful establishment of a democratic system is no guarantee of its stability — the preconditions and processes that international relations experts emphasize may yet be important in determining whether the new democracies will survive.

An examination of the transitions to democracy in Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe often involves several of the conditions that Huntington emphasizes, yet each case invariably introduces new factors, linkages or dynamics that Huntington's theorizing does not adequately consider.

For example, the bureaucratic-authoritarian states of Latin America are considered the most likely to become democratic, according to Huntington, because they have a sufficiently high level of economic development, "appropriate" cultural traditions, social pluralism and previous democratic experience — all of which are considered to be favorable conditions for a successful transition to democracy.

But many explanations of the impetus for the redemocratization of Latin America are more complex. Authoritarian regimes began to lose their legitimacy — whether because of lagging economic performance, military defeat, or simply popular discontent with the limited venues for political expression. This trend, combined with regional pressures and factionalization within the ruling elite, created a momentum towards the reinstatement of democracy. Many of the military rulers, who had convinced themselves that their guardianship was necessary to the survival of society (General Pinochet in Chile), realized that change was inevitable (sometimes only after surprising election results), often then deciding to initiate democratic reform themselves in order to retain control of the process. The results include multi-party elections and transitions to civilian democratic regimes in countries such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile.

Despite high rates of economic growth and exposure to democratic states, Huntington predicts that democratization in the newly industrialized nations of East Asia is limited by cultural traditions, social
structure and, "... a general weakness of democratic norms among key elites." Yet, two of those nations — South Korea, and in a more limited fashion, Taiwan — have recently taken steps towards a more democratic system. In Taiwan, the relaxation of restrictions of expression and association, elections (in which the opposition Democratic Progressive Party dramatically increased its representation in the legislature), and the succession of a native Taiwanese to the presidency all constitute noticeable steps towards a more open political system. In South Korea, even more dramatic changes have recently captured world attention: the resignation of President Chun Doo Hwan, constitutional reforms, the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections, and the opposition's capture of the national legislature.

One may attribute the movement towards democracy in South Korea and Taiwan to the noted correlation between economic development and growth and prospects for democracy. Economic growth might have fostered popular demands for political freedom, but governments chose to ignore the rising demands for an extended time period and were capable of doing so. An obvious and substantial lag time occurred between the initial economic push and steps towards a political opening. Furthermore, both cases suggest a new dimension in the correlation between economic factors and transitions to democracy — the dependence on foreign trade. Through economic contacts (as well as education abroad) these societies have been increasingly exposed to democratic notions and practices. Such exposure may have fostered proclivities towards political liberalization.

Yet, other factors not foreseen by Huntington also seem to be at work. Especially in South Korea, international attention played a critical role in advancing prospects for democracy. The holding of the Olympics may have presented a "window of opportunity" for popular expression of long building demands for greater political freedom. The perceived need for international legitimacy, symbolized by the successful holding of the Olympics, and the increased focus on South Korea as the event approached increased the reluctance of the regime to use massive, coercive force to put down student demonstrations. Dahl's axiom that, "... the more the costs of suppression exceed the costs of toleration, the greater the chance for a competitive regime" appears to be well-illustrated in the South Korean case.

In addition, the decisions of key individuals were crucial to these democratization processes, a fact not fully appreciated in Huntington's "preconditions." In both East Asian cases, critical actors calculated that democratization in some sense served their (or the party's) interests. Before his death, Taiwan's President Chiang Ching-kuo began to take steps towards political liberalization for reasons of pure political expediency — the approaching end of the ruling dynasty and the need for a KMT constituency amongst native Taiwanese. In a similar fashion, the decision of Korea's Roh Tae Woo to split from President Chun Doo Hwan and agree to opposition demands for constitutional change was a decisive factor in the political changes at the Blue House in Seoul.

Similarly, Huntington fails to consider the impact of individual decisions in assessing the opportunities for democratization in Eastern Europe. According to Huntington, Communism is a political system inherently hostile to democratic transitions. By its nature, a Communist political system, "... is likely to ensure that economic development neither achieves a level nor assumes a form that will be conducive to democracy." Lastly, Huntington points to the negative influence of the Soviet Union as an overriding obstacle:

Democratization could occur in those societies only if either the Soviet Union were drastically weakened through war, domestic upheaval or economic collapse (none of
which seems likely) or if the Soviet Union came to view Eastern European democratization as not threatening to its interests (which seems equally unlikely.)

In making his bleak predictions, Huntington clearly fails to account for the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev and his unorthodox assessment of the future needs of the USSR. Recent events in Eastern Europe do not come as a surprise to some analysts, who argue that previous democratic traditions, economic failure and, "...long-suppressed popular yearnings for freedom and national self-determination" made movement towards democratization inevitable. What was surprising was how quickly change has occurred and the response (or lack of it) by the Soviets.

Gorbachev, in pressing for extensive Soviet economic reforms, decided to allow a simultaneous, limited political opening of the Communist system. Given his endorsement of new approaches in his own country, Gorbachev could hardly rationalize the suppression of similar reforms in Eastern Europe (indeed, he may have deliberately encouraged such reforms in order to improve his own chances of success). By publicly renouncing Soviet intervention, Gorbachev radically altered the dynamics of change in Eastern Europe, accelerating latent tendencies there to move away from a traditional Communist system.

As each country in Eastern Europe embarks on its own path to political pluralism, individuals (including Gorbachev, government officials and opposition leaders) continue to play critical roles in shaping the transition to democracy. One analyst asserts that, "...the violence of the transition in each Eastern European country has been in inverse proportion to the foresight shown by its leaders in paving the way." Clearly, the capabilities and commitment to democracy of individuals within and outside of the governments will continue to be significant in determining the stability and further development of democracy in Eastern Europe.

Can improvements be made in the approach taken by Huntington that may help to explain how and why such varied transitions to democracy have taken place? Several factors mentioned in the specific cases above can seemingly be generalized in the quest for a more accurate theory: 1) the decisions of individual leaders that democratization was in their interests (based in part on a new historical situation); and 2) the facilitating role played by international attention, including the presence of the media. Additionally, Robert Dahl, in his latest work, makes valuable theoretical contributions to our understanding of how democratization has spread — additions and insights which help one in thinking about prospects for the continued growth of democracy in the world.

Dahl enumerates a slightly different list of conditions that affect the likelihood of democratization. While he admits that, "...no single condition can account for the existence or absence of polyarchy," Dahl declares that, "...market-oriented economies are necessary to democratic institutions." More broadly, he emphasizes the importance of the existence of a modern, dynamic pluralist (MDP) societies, characterized by relatively high income levels, long run growth, a relatively small or declining agricultural sector, extensive literacy and urbanization. Such societies have two general features: they tend to disperse power, influence, and control; and they foster attitudes and beliefs conducive to democracy.

One detects a note of uncertainty in Dahl's discussion of determinants of democracy which is absent in Huntington. Dahl argues that a mixture or variation in conditions may have an unpredictable effect. If democratic transitions do occur, the resulting systems may be unstable — either they will revert back to authoritarianism or oscillate between authoritarian and democratic systems, a pattern common to
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the Third World repeatedly emphasized by Huntington. Yet, unlike Huntington, who implies in his article that such instability is inevitable, Dahl leaves some room for change: the possibilities and limits of democracy in the world, "... are highly dependent on existing and emergent social structure and consciousness." For example, while recognizing the importance of democratic beliefs, Dahl suggests that appropriate "democratic" values or political culture might be developed. Yet, he doubts whether most newly emerging democracies will have the time to encourage the development of values. An additional problem, not explicitly mentioned by Dahl, is whether governments will know how to go about doing so.

Perhaps the trend towards democratization in the last decade will have a lasting impact by molding "social structure and consciousness" in countries which have the potential for a transition to democracy. Dahl observes significant changes which he believes may strengthen the potential for transition in non-democratic countries. First, he notes the existence of "... a nearly universal effort by rulers in the late twentieth century ... to exploit the idea of "rule by people" in order to gain legitimacy." As disenchantment with faltering non-democratic systems grows, a democratic alternative appears to be increasingly considered by citizens and elites alike.

Second, Dahl stresses the extent to which democratic MDP countries provide, "... an image — if not a model — of a relatively desirable though politically distant future." The enormous influence of MDP and democracies in all aspects of global affairs creates a responsibility for the MDPs and democracies to encourage the future expansion and maintenance of democracy:

... the support [the MDPs and democracies] give to the development of democracy in non-democratic countries has become potentially more important than it has ever been before. But so too is the negative influence of their indifference or opposition.

Dahl concedes that there might be a role for the democratic countries in encouraging democratic transitions if they, "... steadily pursued a policy of supporting changes in the direction of democracy and discouraging changes away from it." As a way to increase the potential for future democratic transitions, Dahl urges a focus on the dynamics of change within currently non-democratic countries, including the identification of pre-democratic institutions already existing or that could be encouraged. Nonetheless, he doubts the efficacy of such efforts if other conditions favorable to democracy are absent, especially since most conditions are difficult to change through external influence alone.

Where does theory go from here? Experts clearly failed to predict the wave of democratization before us today. There may be a new historical dynamism afoot which theory could not have predicted. Individuals in key authoritarian positions may well have calculated that old systems were inappropriate and that some form of democratization was in their interests. People have taken to the streets, using their voice (and their feet) in support of democracy, even in societies without a previous "democratic culture." International attention, often transmitted through the media, has acted as a significant catalyst for the process in many nations (with China being a notable and frustrating exception.)

Yet, Huntington and others who stress that foundations must be laid before democracy can be sustained might respond to those who gloat over their erroneous predictions with a simple warning: only time will tell. Will the political openings which have occurred in Eastern Europe, Latin America and East Asia be translated into fully functioning and stable democratic institutions? Already, analysts are warning that the newly emerged democracies in Latin America — besieged by debt, drugs and domestic
insurgencies — are increasingly fragile. Similar concerns have been expressed about the nascent democratic institutions emerging in Eastern Europe. If individual leaders made the decision to democratize only as a means to an end, what happens when democracy does not bring the desired end? If democratic transitions only fuel popular discontent, or focus unwanted international attention on continuing human rights violations, leaders may no longer support the development and survival of democratic institutions, and the wave of authoritarianism will return.

In short, the key preconditions enumerated by Huntington and Dahl may not be relevant in predicting the widespread establishment of democracies ongoing today, but the absence of those preconditions may eventually be revealed as the reasons why these new "democracies" break down. As Dahl warns:

... the story of democracy is as much a record of failures as of successes: of failures to transcend existing limits, of momentary breakthroughs followed by massive defeats, and sometimes of utopian ambitions followed by disillusion and despair.

Notes


According to Dahl, by the mid 1980s, the number of polyarchies totalled 50, less than a third of the 168 nominally independent countries, a proportion which only slightly differed from that which existed in 1950. Huntington similarly argues that the "net record of change in the state of democracy in the world was not very great. It would be difficult to argue that the world was more or less democratic in 1984 than it had been in 1954." Using Freedom House's calculations of the percentage of the world's population living in free states, he points out that from 1975 on, the proportion living in freedom "never went above 37.0 percent." (It is worth noting that in 1990, Freedom House estimated 38.87 percent of the world's population lived in free states, as compared to 32 percent in January 1973.) See Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, op.cit., p. 299; Huntington, op.cit., p. 197; and "The Comparative Survey of Freedom." Freedom at Issue, vol. 112 (January-February 1990), p. 7.


6. Huntington, op.cit., p. 214. In his earlier work, Dahl suggests almost identical conditions: the degree of concentration in the socioeconomic order, the level of socioeconomic development, the existence of inequalities, subcultural pluralism, foreign control, and beliefs of political activists. See Robert Dahl, Polyarchy, op. cit., p. 203.


8. In countries with a relatively long democratic history (where institutions have lasted at least twenty years), the breakdown of democracy is "extraordinarily rare," according to Dahl. It is these "stable" democracies which he predicts will remain the core of democracy in the world in the future. See Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, op.cit., p. 315.


13. It remains to be seen whether the democratization that has occurred in these countries will be consolidated. According to some observers, the ruling elites in South Korea have already taken arguably undemocratic actions in the face of rising labor militancy and slower growth rates. vol. 106 (January-February 1989), p. 15.


15. Robert Dahl, Polyarchy, op.cit., p. 15. Unfortunately, the same can not be said of China, where the government calculated quite differently. Despite wide media coverage of the events in Tiananmen Square, coercive force was used to bloodily repress student demonstrations during the summer of 1989.

16. Huntington does account for elite decisionmaking in his descriptions of the process by which countries become democratic, yet fails to do so in making his predictions. He notes that elites may view, “ ... democracy as a means to other goals, such as prolonging their own rule, achieving international legitimacy, minimizing domestic opposition, and reducing the likelihood of civil violence.” See Huntington, op.cit., p. 212.


20. A.O. Hirschman’s exploration of the effectiveness of voice and exit can be useful to understanding the significance of Gorbachev’s actions. Hirschman has argued that “the chances for voice to function effectively as a recuperation mechanism are appreciably strengthened if voice is backed up by the threat of exit.” In a sense, Gorbachev made available the option of an actual “exit” (which many East Germans have taken advantage of) as well as a limited form of ideological “exit:” a tolerance of new approaches and a diversity of thought in the Marxist system. By doing so, the use of “voice” by loyal, but discontented, members of the Eastern bloc became more effective in promoting change. See Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 82.


22. According to Dahl, a country is more likely to develop and to sustain democratic institutions if: it possesses a modern, dynamic, pluralist society, the means of violent coercion are not concentrated, it is culturally homogeneous or not strongly divided into subcultures, political activists display “democratic” beliefs, and it is not subject to intervention by a foreign power hostile to democracy. See Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, op.cit., p. 264.


29. One factor which may become significant is, “...the growing consolidation of an international democracy movement,” according to Freedom House. “The full international implications of this emerging democratic network has yet to become clear but its existence heightens the cost of state repression." *Freedom At Issue* (Jan./Feb.1990), op.cit., p. 6.

30. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*, op.cit., p. 313. Schattschneider would surely criticize the reference to “rule by the people” which he asserts (and Dahl would agree) is an inaccurate description of modern democratic systems. By continuing to use the term, we have, “...defined democracy as something unattainable” [and simultaneously], “...we have made democracy one of the most emotion-charged words in our civilization. This is the impossible imperative which threatens to entrap all of us.” See Schattschneider, *op.cit.*, note 2 on p. 139.


33. Dahl asserts that “If the U.S. had steadily followed such a policy in Latin America throughout the 20th century, I believe that democratic institutions would have become more deeply implanted, at an earlier time in more Latin American countries, than has historically been true. But the U.S. did not follow such a policy. On the contrary, more often than not, its direct and indirect intervention weakened the development of democratic institutions in Latin America.” See Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, op. cit., p. 317.

34. Many of the recent “democratic initiatives” programs embarked upon by the U.S. in the 1980s are aimed at developing democratic values and institutions. For example, the National Endowment for Democracy, a non-governmental organization funded by Congress, seeks, “…to promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions and values abroad.”


36. As Schattschneider warned, “...the foundation for democracy is not to be found in self-interest. Simply put, democracy is first a state of mind.” As quoted in the introduction to *The Semisovereign People*, op.cit., p. xii. Whether that state of mind is actually present in a majority of the proto-democracies is, at best, debatable.

Japan From Showa to Heisei: A New Era, a New Politics?

by Jeffrey Young

A little over one year ago the Showa era in Japan ended with the death of Emperor Hirohito and the Heisei era began. This change coincided with Japan’s rise to prominence in the world economy and prompted great political debate about Japan’s past, present, and future in relation to this new status. In television documentaries, newspaper editorials, and casual conversations, Japanese wondered at how the Showa era, which means “enlightenment and harmony,” could have been so lacking in either; violent and ideologically-torn political struggles wracked the country during this period as never before. Based upon their experience of this history, the Japanese looked to the Heisei future with uncertainty about what the new era might bring: peace and commerce? political and economic conflict?

Most commentators stressed that the new era name Heisei, implying “the coming of peacefulness,” symbolized Japan’s striving for peace rather than its attainment. Consequently, there was a recognition that the impulse behind the selection of Heisei was a forward-looking one: that positive efforts would be required by the Japanese in order to reach political and social peace. The choice of Heisei showed that perhaps the most important lessons from both the failures and successes of the Showa past — that the world mattered to Japan and that Japan mattered to the world — had become embedded in the debate on Japan’s political goals. Almost all agreed that Japan would have to articulate its national goals while keeping its relations with the outside world foremost in mind.

Ideology and values as meaningful forces — meaningful in the ways suggested by this debate within Japan — rarely figure prominently in Western interpretations of Japanese politics. Even works that ask political questions common to the liberal and many other Western traditions — what, for instance, is the nature of democracy in Japan — often treat political ideas as convenient rationalizations or purely ideological cover for the institutional structure, and not as ever-present reasons for why democratic (or other) political structures exist. Japanese political values as such are rarely studied; so rare are these studies that they are almost conspicuous in their absence. It is even rarer to find Japanese political values included in comparative studies of Western political ideas. For example, Ralf Dahrendorf, in his 1989 book The Modern Social Conflict: An Essay on the Politics of Liberty, omits Japan from his description of the value-laden conflict between the politics of provisions (economic growth) and the politics of entitlements (political rights, access to economic growth). Dahrendorf classifies Japan as the prime nation of the politics of provisions and denies that Japan’s modern experience occurred within a liberal context, implying that Japan’s politics can contribute nothing to the further development of the politics of liberty.

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The contrast between Dahrendorf's interpretation of modern politics and ideas — a nearly universal political struggle, minus Japan (which has had no such struggles) — and the actual history of the ideological clashes within Japan and between Japan and the world that led to fascism and war, defeat and famine, and industrialization and the loss of a way of life, could not be greater. Dahrendorf represents those who, upon viewing Japan's present economic strength, write the country's history backwards and say that Japan's economic success proves that it has had scant regard for political ideals and even less for liberal ones. However, not only the end of the Showa era retrospectives but also much recent scholarly work on Japan has correctly emphasized that political choices gave birth to the growth economy. The alleged consensus on economic growth as the exclusive postwar goal was an almost last-ditch political effort to win the social peace that had completely escaped Japan for its first full modern century. Similar political choices, devolving largely around values, face Japan today. As "Heisei" symbolizes that the Japanese concept of peace has moved from a static to an active one, so Japan's change from vulnerability to the world to interdependence with it is bringing about changes in values, ideology, and politics. When looking at Japan's undoubtedly larger future role in the international order, the new ability of Japan to project its influence requires that politics and its ideological bases be examined more broadly than before.

The scholarship pointed to above, both Western and Japanese, has documented the postwar political changes as movement towards pluralism. Pluralism has entered Japan's political life in many ways: through representation of varied interests within the ruling Liberal Democratic party and the Diet, at times decisive policy input from the opposition, and a decline in the strength and reach of the national bureaucracy. The political opinions upon which these changes rest have widened, become more competitive, and do not fall easily into past patterns of thought. What consensus existed on the primacy of economic growth as the goal for postwar Japan broke down in the 1970s under demands from the citizenry for solutions to the problems — pollution, crowding, anomie — created by rapid economic growth. The selection of national goals in key areas such as environmental protection and administrative reform has responded to public demands for stricter care for the environment, less regulation of the economy, and a more democratically-oriented bureaucracy.4

This partial democratization of political structure and underlying values has given rise to changes in the direction of political discourse within Japan regarding its foreign relations. Diversity of political opinion has also increased with the deepening economic interdependence between Japan and the world. This interdependence, particularly between Japan and the US, grew rapidly in the 1980s. Because the newly forged relationships are often asymmetrical, every linkage between the two countries spawns polar opinions over the merits of further interdependence. Some parties benefit from new relations that hurt other parties. The liberalization of farm products imports is a clear example of polarization induced by interdependence. A Japan that keeps out foreign products protects farmers but makes consumers pay high prices. As liberalization proceeds farmers perceive their interests to be hurt while many consumers benefit from change and would like to see more. Here interests diverge: here politicians can exploit these interests for their own gain. Indeed, given the localistic nature of Japanese electoral politics and the unequal impact that changes such as liberalization have on different localities, politicians profit by raising the temperature of the debate over the US-Japan relationship, and extremists gain an audience.

A shrill tone also calls to mind the traditional view of independence defined as freedom from foreign ideas and customs that might transform the ultimate values of Japan. In this tradition, which has dominated Japan's foreign relations since the 19th century modernization drive, practical foreign
technology and ideas have been the tools whereby quintessential Japanese values are preserved. This is not to say that all Japanese have agreed on what these values are; Japanese thought and action has displayed much uncertainty over the substantive values of the nation, as evidenced by Japan's conflict-ridden modern history. Many in Japan, knowing that a seamless adoption of foreign ways is impossible, have also feared the destructiveness of foreign technology, capital, and ideas on the Japanese way of life. There has never been complete agreement on what means should be adopted to protect which values. Native substantive values and foreign means thus exist in uneasy tension. This tension pits more radical modernizers against cultural conservatives, and during times of deepening interdependence such as the one we are witnessing now, the tensions between these two groups rise.

Common to both modernizers and conservatives, though, is the belief that some degree of cultural security defined in the old way as resistance to transformative foreign ideas is necessary to preserve the political values of the Japanese nation. Drawing upon this background, both politicians and the public often see interdependence as overdependence and as a threat to their social and political values. Writers such as Ishihara Shintaro and Morita Akio have played upon this threat and shifted opinions within Japan towards aggressive, outward-looking assertions of nationalism. Ishihara, as a ruling party politician uniquely popular for speaking his mind, intends to counter one particularly galling foreign criticism, that Japanese leaders do not voice their ideas and lack vision about politics and Japan's international role. He states that Japan's voice will grow with its weight in the world economy and predicts that the world will have to listen. To the extent that Ishihara is right, Japan and its sense of how the world economic and political system should work will enter into the conflict between the politics of provisions and the politics of entitlements, or any other version of world political discourse.5

Ishihara and Morita's *The Japan That Can Say No* is a sorry attempt at defining Japan's politics to the world and is a negation of meaningful dialogue. The fault in Ishihara and Morita's nationalist argument is that Japan today can better retain its unique values by making concessions within a liberal international system than it can by following nationalistic policies. Japan's independence ironically lies in not upsetting the international system, a contention that has yet to find its way fully into political discourse: the stock-taking at the end of the first year of the Heisei era did not recognize this fact either. Fortunately, though, much of the populace and most of the decision makers in Japan disagree with Ishihara's ideas. Some business circles realize that continued innovation and product development depend upon an international order that encourages tie-ups with foreign companies and open access to Japan's markets. These circles and others with absolute interests in the international system are contributing to the debate that of course preceded the transition to the Heisei era but has gained strength with greater understanding of the meaning of interdependence.

Now that Japan's importance to other countries approaches their importance to Japan it can pose the debate over independence in new terms. This independence differs from the type envisioned by Japan's deeply conservative early modernizers who strove to protect traditional values (as they saw them) by adopting foreign technology and practices. Whereas the early independence was an attempt to ward off stronger foreign powers, the contemporary independence is based on confidence and exchange with foreign countries. The retarding effect of the early conservative ideology on Japan's relations with the world might be expected to decrease given that some have realized that Japan's new interdependence has weakened the old way's relevance. In many areas of technology, there is nothing left for Japan to borrow from the world. The world now looks to Japan for technology transfers, advanced capital goods, and a
market for their own competing products. Debate within Japan is shifting from the development stage questions of the wisdom of reliance on foreign technology to assessing the potential advantages of playing the role of technology supplier and market for the world. When and how Japan will countenance this change, jettison the sense of vulnerability that helped maintain the old theory of independence, and summon the will to make the domestic changes needed to sustain a new position, are questions that should drive discourse on both sides of the Pacific.

Notes

1. The Showa era began in 1926 with the accession of Hirohito to the throne. Since his passing in January 1989 Hirohito has been referred to by the name of his era and is now known as the Showa Emperor. As his son, Akihito, became emperor, the new era name Heisei was chosen.


Section 2
The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon

by Laurel A. Neme

This article examines the political economy of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon by looking at the formation of political constituencies to fight the deforestation and their successes to date. Over the last few years, the political strength of environmental constituencies in the Brazilian Amazon — principally rubber tappers and Indians — has grown considerably. Despite opposition from powerful cattle ranchers, they have begun to have an impact on the political process in Brazil, prompting the government to begin changing both its rhetoric and its policies on deforestation. The new democratic government of President Fernando Collor de Mello is under considerable pressure from these groups and the international community to swiftly adopt more sweeping changes. The demands of addressing Brazil’s severe economic crisis while maintaining a measure of political strength and stability will make it extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, for Collor to fully meet their demands. Nevertheless, environmental constituencies in the Amazon will likely see continued and expanded efforts on the part of the government to address their concerns.

In the United States and the West in general, the rapid pace of deforestation in the Amazon is seen as a major environmental threat. Two of the principal reasons for this perceived danger are its contribution to global warming and the threat of species extinction. Environmental groups in developed countries have strongly decried deforestation on these grounds.

The political environmental pressures in the Brazilian Amazon, however, are much different than in the West. Western concern about deforestation in the Amazon stems primarily from an ecological philosophy. In contrast, in Brazil some of the most important pressures fighting deforestation have economic survival at their root. Both the historical causes of deforestation and current pressures to halt deforestation are fundamental byproducts of landlessness and poverty, themselves a result of maldistribution of land and income and struggles for political power.

The Amazon region, which occupies about 58 percent of Brazil, has an extremely sparse population, containing only about 5 percent of the country’s inhabitants. Brazil governs almost 40 percent (2.8 million km²) of the world’s tropical rainforests, more than any other single country. While there is much debate over the exact extent of deforestation in the Amazon, there is no doubt that the rainforest

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is being cut down at an alarming rate. Satellite images indicate that deforestation has increased exponentially since the mid-1970s, from 0.6 percent of the total area cleared in 1975 to 12 percent by 1988. In the past, the Amazon’s vast size made some believe that the rainforest was endless, that deforestation was not a problem. Today, however, there is growing concern about deforestation within Brazil.

This article examines the political economy of deforestation in the Amazon by looking at the formation of constituencies and alliances to fight the deforestation and their successes to date. The article is divided into three sections. The first section identifies historical factors causing deforestation in the Amazon. To do that, it will provide an overview of the development scheme for the Amazon, the economic and political pressures in the country, and the military government’s motives in addressing these pressures. The second section will explore the development of political constituencies around the issue of deforestation in the Amazon. It will show how deforestation has brought together traditionally opposing groups — rubber tappers and Indians — at the same time that it has intensified class conflict — between forest dwellers/settlers and wealthy landowners. The third section will look at how these environmental constituencies have influenced Brazil’s political system. This influence will be measured by changes in actual government policies and by shifts in political philosophies, that is, rhetoric.

**Political Economy of Deforestation**

Development of the Amazon has meant a rapid expansion of the amount of land under agricultural use, either for crops or livestock, which in turn has been the primary cause of deforestation in the region. The following sub-section discusses the government’s colonization scheme, the political motives for this policy, and the political reasons for portions of the program’s success or failure.

*The Colonization Program*

Although development of the Amazon region began early in the 20th century, rapid deforestation has been associated with the more intensive Amazon development of the 1970s. This development began under the military government’s colonization scheme announced in the National Integration Program (PIN) in 1970.

To provide access to the remote region, PIN allocated resources for construction of an east-west TransAmazon highway and feeder roads, partly using funds from a World Bank loan. Land for resettlement was obtained by nationalizing a strip of 100 km of land along the new highway, bringing 2.2 million km² of land under federal control that had previously been under control of individual states. The government set up a new agency, called the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA), as part of the Ministry of Agriculture to administer the federal land and oversee the resettlement effort. INCRA gave settlers 100 hectare (250 acres) plots for $700, to be repaid over 20 years, as well as six-month loans. Settlers were then located in small communities (48 to 66 houses) containing medical facilities, a primary school, and a general store run by another agency of the Ministry of Agriculture (not INCRA).

The government actively promoted its resettlement program, successfully recruiting many program participants as well as numerous “spontaneous migrants” (people who settle in the region without government assistance). This success quickly outstripped INCRA’s ability to manage resettlement. According to one estimate by a Brazilian government official, for each family settled by INCRA, four others established themselves in the region.

Migrants flowed into the Amazon in two different streams. The first was composed of migrants from the Northeast who had left their land as a result of poverty and drought and moved to eastern
Amazonia. A second stream from the South typically moved to western Amazonia (Rondonia, Acre and Mato Grosso). This group left their land due to increasing consolidation of landholdings caused by government-sponsored mechanization of large export farms. Also encouraging migration was the high price of land in the South, which made it possible for those who sold their land to obtain bigger plots in the Amazon.

Incentives for development of the Amazon in the early 1970s were not limited to poor migrant peasants. The government also provided fiscal and monetary incentives to encourage large scale ranching in the region through its late 1960s "Operation Amazonia" development program. Under this program, investment tax credits and subsidized credit were given to ranches in order to provide cheap food, mainly beef, to urban areas.

The goals of large and small scale developers quickly came into sharp conflict. Pressure from the Association of Amazonian Entrepreneurs (AEA), a ranching group from the South, along with the settlers' failure to produce sustainable crops, prompted the government to shift its emphasis away from social considerations to economic growth. Thus, in 1974 PIN was replaced by the Program of Agricultural, Livestock, and Mineral Poles in Amazonia (POLAMAZONIA). POLAMAZONIA promoted large-scale export-oriented projects in the livestock, forestry and mining sectors in 15 "growth poles" throughout Amazonia. This change was justified on the grounds that large enterprises were better able to produce an agricultural surplus for export.

The result of the shift towards support for wealthy ranchers, together with the government's inability to manage the large numbers of peasants entering the region under its colonization program, led to numerous land disputes in the Amazon that continue today.

The process for obtaining title to land in the region illustrates how these disputes arose and exacerbated deforestation. Settlers could obtain title to land by either participating in an official settlement project or by showing evidence of effective use of land, with deforestation considered a valid means of land improvement. On the face of it, these policies seem even-handed. In reality, however, they put peasants at a severe disadvantage vis-a-vis ranchers because it was very costly, in terms of both time and money, to obtain titles.

In addition, although some ranchers legally obtained land when peasant settlers who failed at farming — due to poor soil fertility and/or lack of credit — sold their land, others regularly circumvented the law with the complicity of the government. Frequently, ranchers obtained title to land by bribing INCRA officials or by kicking peasant settlers off their land with the threat of violence. Rural violence intensified as new lands were occupied by squatters.

Political Motivations for Amazonian Development

While there were many motivations for Amazonian development, all of them can be seen as a way of bolstering the legitimacy of Brazil's military government. These motives can be categorized as: facilitating economic growth, improving national security, promoting nationalism, and limiting peasant unrest.

Economic Growth. One of the program's objectives was to increase agricultural production in order to facilitate economic growth. Both the promotion of smallholder agriculture through PIN and large scale enterprises through POLAMAZONIA were motivated by a desire to produce an exportable agricultural surplus that would earn valuable foreign exchange that could be used to finance economic
growth in other sectors. Economic growth would show that the regime's policies were benefitting the country, thereby securing the support of the populace and legitimizing the military government.

In addition, economic growth policies, particularly the promotion of large scale enterprises, favored those groups who were the government's bases of support. The military government was supported by diverse political factions, but particularly by the agroindustrial and industrial entrepreneurial elite. By favoring these groups, the government was hoping to sustain its political strength.

**National Security.** The program was also aimed at improving national security. Settling the area would eliminate havens for guerrilla movements and protect the country's borders from invasion. For example, the government was worried about a small Communist guerrilla movement in southern Pará. Settling people loyal to the government in this remote area diminished the threat that insurgents would use the region. In addition, the Brazilian government was concerned that territorial disputes would occur over the Amazon's immense resources. Settlement in the area would prevent border incursions and secure the country's right to the riches of the rainforest.

**Nationalism.** A third motive behind the program was to promote nationalism. Settlement of the harsh frontier of the Amazon instilled pride in the country's people. Development of the Amazon was referred to by one Brazilian official as 'our moon shot'. This nationalism also served to divert attention away from the country's economic problems, which were a source of potential instability to the government.

**Limit Peasant Unrest.** Probably the most important motive of the colonization program was to limit peasant unrest in order to stem political instability. This goal was couched in terms of concern over poverty and landlessness, particularly in the Northeast but also in the South. Resettlement was politically easier than, and hence preferable to, land reform or income redistribution, which would have threatened the government's major base of support, the large landholders.

To demonstrate his concern for the landless masses, President Emilio Medici announced PIN 10 days after his visit to the drought-stricken Northeast in 1970. Medici proclaimed resettlement was away to provide "land without men for men without land." The government saw the Amazon as a safety-valve for population pressures and social tensions in other regions, particularly the Northeast. The Northeast is one of the country's most volatile regions, with a long history of peasant insurrections.

Some migrants from the South were recruited by the government so that they might bring capital-intensive and sophisticated farming methods to the region, thereby helping agricultural production and promoting economic growth. Others, however, were encouraged to come to Amazonia to stop their potential urban migration, which would have increased pressures for political unrest in the cities.

The government also hoped the colonization program would limit rural unrest by denying peasant opposition the opportunity to mobilize into a widespread social movement. Resettlement in the Amazon would keep peasant struggles fragmented, local, and focused on obtaining a plot of land, [allowing] the military [to]... avoid the growth of collective organizations and the emergence of political awareness.

Ironically, while the government's colonization program may have succeeded in at least temporarily fragmenting peasant opposition and unrest, it simultaneously spurred organization of different
political opposition groups, namely rubber tappers and Indians who lived and worked in the Amazon prior to its rapid development.

**Formation of Alliances**

The economic threat posed by environmental degradation has served to mobilize a traditionally unorganized group of people into a political unit that makes demands on the government. Forest dwellers, because their way of life has been threatened, have organized to stop the deforestation. In addition, deforestation has led to a commonality of interest between the rubber tappers and Indians, superseding their historic enmity. This commonality has resulted in the formation of an alliance between the two, helping to bolster the political clout of each.

Organization of these groups, as well as of peasants, has been fought by both the ranchers and the government. Ranchers opposed organization because they believed mobilization of forest dwellers and peasants would threaten the legitimacy of their rights to land. Similarly, the government tried to fragment opposition and limit organization in order to maintain its legitimacy and stability. Both realized that political power and influence, particularly among the poor, depends on organization.

**Rubber Tappers**

The rubber tappers are perceived as the chief opponent to deforestation in the Amazon. The assassination of Francisco (Chico) Mendes Filho, the head of the rubber tappers' union, in December 1988 brought the struggle of the rubber tappers against deforestation to the attention of the American media. However, this murder was not the first, and undoubtedly will not be the last. It represents the continuation of long-standing efforts by wealthy ranchers to undercut efforts by rubber tappers to secure access to forested land and to halt the empowerment of the rubber tappers' union.

The rubber tappers' union was originally established as a means to obtain a fair market price for their latex. Historically, rubber tappers were in a situation of continued indebtedness to the estate owners, or rubber barons, as a result of the rubber barons' monopsony and monopoly power. The rubber barons purchased the tappers' latex at below-market prices while selling needed supplies to them at exorbitantly high prices. The tappers were then forced to borrow money from the ranchers, leading to continued indebtedness. As ranchers and peasants increasingly displaced tappers from their land, the raison d'etre for the union changed from price issues to the question of control over land. This change was also faced by Indians and peasants. Thus, conflicts that had...

    formerly revolved around working conditions, percentages of the product given over to the landlord, the processes of exchange or the conditions of access to the resources, were transformed into a grinding struggle over the basic need for land and its resources in order to survive.\(^{21}\)

Organization of the tappers around this new issue was difficult because their isolation kept them unaware of other expulsions. In 1973, the Catholic Church began organizing base communities, including rubber tappers, peasants and Indians, which allowed the exchange of information and made tappers realize land conflicts were widespread.\(^{22}\) The Church was important in giving forest dwellers the necessary skills for organization.

Interestingly, the government was also partly responsible, albeit unwittingly, for the empower-
ment of the rubber tappers. Prior to the creation of the rubber tappers' union, the government had created a rural workers' union, the Confederation of Rural Workers (CONTAG). Among other things, CONTAG was charged with representing rubber tappers and peasant farmers in land disputes. CONTAG fell into disfavor with rubber tappers, however, because it focused its efforts on legal means of solving conflicts, with resettlement of the tappers a favored option. While land conflicts were debated among lawyers, ranchers would continue to cut down the trees, meaning the rainforest would be destroyed whether or not the legal decision was in the tappers' favor.23

Despite its failure to adequately address the concerns of the rubber tappers, CONTAG served as a training ground for future union leaders, including Chico Mendes. Thus, ironically, in its attempt to control the organization of the forest dwellers, the government helped provide the means for organized opposition to its policies.

The rubber tappers have made use of these organizational skills since 1976, when they formulated a strategy of passive resistance, or stand-offs, to protect their land from deforestation. When tappers learn a tract of land is to be cut, the entire community will go to that area, stand in front of the bulldozers, and physically stop the deforestation. Because these confrontations usually include women and children, indiscriminate violence against the protesters is limited. Although police have made arrests and private armies have removed protesters forcibly, it is estimated that stand-offs have a positive effect by stemming deforestation.14

Perhaps more importantly, the tappers' ability to organize stand-offs has changed the political dynamics of deforestation in the Amazon with much broader implications for their fight to save the forest. The rubber tappers have become a political constituency that the government cannot ignore.

Indians

Amazonian natives, or Indians, are the second major opponents of deforestation. As with the rubber tappers, the forest allows Indians to sustain themselves through shifting cultivation, hunting, ranching, fishing, and collecting local resources. Pressure for land has reduced Indian territories to under 6 percent of the country's area.25 While different tribes face threats from different groups of people (e.g., Kayapó land is threatened by miners while that of other tribes is jeopardized by ranching), frequently it is peasants who invade Indian lands after being expelled from other lands by ranchers. However, settlers' access to the Indian land is short-lived. Once they clear the area they are once again pushed off by ranchers.

Expulsion from land is a different issue for Indians than for rubber tappers or peasants. For the latter two, land is almost solely an economic asset, providing the means for economic survival. For Indians, however, land is sacred, representing the past, current and future lives of the tribe and its members. The tribe is tied to particular tracts so that leaving that land would mean breaking the pillars of support of their society. Thus, Indians will not voluntarily sell or abandon their land, forcing those who want their land (i.e., ranchers) to forcibly remove them, often by killing them through raids.26

Like the rubber tappers, Indians in the Brazilian Amazon have faced considerable organizational obstacles because they are isolated and widely scattered throughout the country. Unlike the tappers, however, the Indians also had considerable language and cultural barriers to overcome before they could mobilize as a single cohesive unit. In addition, their inferior legal status, a result of government discrimination, provided a major impediment to the exercise of political power. Despite all of these obstacles, however, the numerous Brazilian Indian tribes have succeeded in organizing themselves, first to fight for equal legal rights and later to combat deforestation.
The road to political organization has been a long one for the Indians. Much like Native Americans in the United States, Indians in Brazil have special legal status. Under federal Indian policy, Indians are legally considered minors under the wardship of the state. This classification is based, in part, on the belief that Indians are inferior due to their ethnic background and culture.

The government agency responsible for protecting Indians is the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI). FUNAI, as part of the Ministry of the Interior, often has interests contrary to those of the Indians, which at times has led to problems of corruption. The Interior Ministry and FUNAI have put forth several proposals that would have, in effect, changed the status of Indians from wards of the state to full citizens. This change would have meant ownership of land would have been transferred from the government to individual Indians, rather than collectively to the tribe, with the idea that, eventually, it would have fallen into non-Indian hands.27

These proposals have motivated Indians to organize in opposition. A branch of the Catholic Church, the Indigenist Missionary Council, helped Indians get together in the early 1970s to exchange information and experiences. Shortly thereafter, in 1980, the Indians created their first formal organization, the Union of Indigenous Nations (UNI). Although FUNAI tried to stop the creation of UNI, claiming wards of the state should not be allowed to organize, pressure by other Indian support groups led to abandonment of this attempt. These support groups, many of which formed in the late 1970s, give Indians legal support, help organize meetings, and serve as a source of information about indigenous people.28 Some of these support groups are Cultural Survival, the Brazilian Anthropological Association, and CEDI, an academic group.29

In the 1970s Indians began participating in national politics as an autonomous political force. One of the problems they encountered was their lack of previous experience in manipulating the political process. Government agencies had always served as the liaison between Indians and the federal government. A provision in the 1988 constitution allows Indians to have independent representation, whereas previously they were required to be represented by FUNAI. This will likely lead to accelerated participation by Indians in national politics.30

In sum, the political organization of Indians has not been around land, but rather around their own legal status and rights. Until recently, the government attempted to limit or circumvent Indian rights as much as possible. Now that the Indians are organized and have support from other domestic and international groups, they are in a better position to fight for their territory. This enhanced ability, along with a commonality of interest, has allowed them to join with the rubber tappers in fighting deforestation of the Amazon.

**Alliance of Forest Peoples**

Historically, for decades before the Amazon colonization plans of the 1970s, rubber tappers and Indians were enemies because the tappers forced the Indians off their land. Today, with Brazil's monopoly on global rubber production long gone, both the rubber tappers and Indians realize they have a common interest in stopping deforestation. A member of the governing board of the rubber tappers' union recognized this commonality when he stated:

> We have the same way of life, and the same enemies: the rancher and the logger. The isolation we live as tappers and Indians intensifies the solidarity among men and reinforces the bonds of family, friendship, and cordiality between people.31
The two groups came together formally for the first time at a meeting in the state of Acre in March 1989. The meeting brought together rubber tappers and forest dwellers from all over Brazil, including Indians from many diverse tribes, as well as national and international scientists, local government officials, members of political parties and representatives of other non-governmental organizations. Participants composed an agenda for the alliance that gave forest dwellers, not the government or outside organizations, the primary role in devising the plan for regional development. They also promoted agrarian reform as a way to recognize and validate forest peoples' rights to land. In addition, they advocated establishment of extractive reserves, or areas set aside for common use and protection by forest dwellers, that were favored over national parks, which protect the land without allowing forest people to use it. The alliance wanted to demonstrate that "it is possible to have development without destruction."32

Although this alliance is still very new, it signifies an important political development in the Amazon. Although it may seem like a natural union, the historical enmity between the tappers and Indians was a considerable obstacle to an alliance. The ability to overcome this obstacle lifts the political power of each group to a new level — with the government now being forced to pay even greater attention to the demands of both groups.

Peasants

Peasant settlers, at once a source and victim of deforestation, comprise the majority of Amazon residents. They have been caught in the middle between ranchers and forest dwellers. On the one hand, ranchers have pushed peasants off the land, forcing them to move further into the interior and deforest new areas. As they cleared these areas, the ranchers would again expel them from the land. This cycle has put the peasants in conflict with forest dwellers, whose livelihood has been threatened by the settlers' deforestation, and with ranchers, who force them off the land.

The Catholic Church and rural workers union (CONTAG) have helped organize peasant resistance to expulsions by the ranchers. Thus, like the rubber tappers and Indians, peasants began to refuse to leave their plots and defy the hired gunmen of the ranchers. They also began working their plots collectively and organizing their own protection, so that police and private thugs could not remove them from their land.33

To alleviate their conflict with forest dwellers, outside groups have also encouraged peasants to harvest forest resources, which does not involve clearing the land and would, therefore, remove a source of conflict with the forest dwellers.34 This conversion from solely agriculture to sustainable extraction, however, would depend on political organization that helps peasants retain possession of the land. Thus, as the interests of peasants come more in line with those of the other forest dwellers, peasant settlers could eventually become part of the alliance of forest peoples.

Ranchers

Ranchers have organized their own movement, the Rural Democratic Union (UDR), whose primary purpose is to stop agrarian reform. Formation of the UDR was prompted by the threat that ranchers' land would be expropriated by the federal government for redistribution if they could not demonstrate the land was in "productive use." The UDR had little trouble attracting members, as it played on ranchers' fears of losing their land. The organization quickly grew, with a 1988 membership of close to 300,000, comprised mostly of wealthy ranchers.35 The UDR fights agrarian reform by lobbying public officials and influencing public opinion. Ranchers have leverage because they serve as a base of support
for the government. The government, in formulating policies, must assure they favor ranchers if it is to continue to receive their confidence. Ranchers also directly influence local officials through bribes or coercion. Their wealth and support of the government has historically given them better access and more power to influence policies.

Ranchers, as individual members of UDR, have used violence against forest dwellers and peasants to gain control over land. However, this violence has galvanized formation of organized opposition groups. In addition, it has attracted the attention of national and international human rights organizations, who have served to bolster the legitimacy and power of the opposition peasant and forest dweller groups.

The UDR, as an organized representative of rancher interests, clearly has a great deal of political clout. However, the very fact that ranchers have felt the need to organize formally suggests the government is no longer favoring them indiscriminately. The formation of UDR is testimony to the increasing influence of the rubber tappers, Indians and peasants.

Success of Constituencies
The success of each of these constituencies with respect to deforestation has been mixed. Deforestation, while still occurring, has been vastly reduced. In 1988, dry season fires burned 37 percent less forest than in 1987, with that downward trend continuing in 1989. In part, this reduction is due to weather. A farmer or rancher needs to have 5 dry days before it is possible to ignite the trees. Because 1989 was one of the wettest dry seasons of the decade, the ability to burn was reduced.

It would be a mistake, however, to say that weather was the only contributing factor to reduced burnings. Government policies reducing incentives for deforestation and its increased enforcement effort have also helped lessen the fires. There has been progress towards halting deforestation on the following fronts: productive land use, tax incentives, enforcement, extractive reserves, and national political philosophy.

Productive Land Use
The influence of the UDR in preventing agrarian reform, while perhaps declining, is still strong. For instance, a series of marches in 1987 prompted President José Sarney to exclude almost 98 percent of farms from his land redistribution program, thereby allowing most ranchers to keep all of their land.

The UDR has also been successful in maintaining the definition of productive land use that is employed for federal land expropriation. An attempt to change the criteria was prevented by UDR's lobbying efforts, meaning cleared pasture land still shows productive use.

However, the 1988 constitution did adopt a provision eliminating penalization of owners of uncleared land. Forest dwellers can now show that their resource extraction, which depends on a standing forest, is a productive use, thereby allowing them to obtain rights of possession. Consequently, ranchers will face increased competition over land rights.

Nossa Natureza
In response to attempts to internationalize the Amazon, in April 1989 President Sarney issued a Brazilian plan, called Nossa Natureza or Our Nature, for protecting the region. This plan was at first perceived as an attempt to mollify international pressure to halt deforestation, albeit a largely cosmetic one, and reassert Brazilian sovereignty over the Amazon. Its budget was minuscule in comparison to other ecologically harmful investments, such as dams and roads. However, Nossa Natureza has instituted several reforms, including reduced incentives for clearing of land, and increased monitoring and enforcement efforts.
Incentives for Deforestation. Nossa Natureza suspended the tax incentives that made it artificially profitable to clear large tracts of land for cattle pasture. However, the fact that most of these incentives had already been eliminated suggests that this suspension may have been a way of garnering political favor in the international arena. Critics have argued that tax incentives should be ended, not just suspended, and other policies promoting deforestation should be eliminated. For example, critics complain that cattle pasture is still considered a productive use of land.

These conflicting policies indicate competing pressures on the government. On the one hand, the government does not want to antagonize its base of support, yet on the other, domestic and international pressure has forced it to address the problem of deforestation. In addition, financial pressure on the budget, rather than simply environmental pressure, may also have contributed to suspension of costly incentives.

Enforcement. In 1989, a new environment agency, the Brazilian Institute for Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), was created to implement the government’s Nossa Natureza program. Under this program, IBAMA must authorize each land clearing. IBAMA will not allow more than 200 hectares (500 acres) to be cleared. Inspection crews — 70 mobile teams and 120 inspection stations in all the states — monitor the Amazon for any illegal activity that harms the environment. This increased enforcement effort has resulted in $10 million in fines in one month — from mid-August to mid-September 1989 — against landowners burning the forest without permission. Increased enforcement has been financed by World Bank and Brazilian funds.

Brazil’s enforcement effort has been met by growing violence against forestry agents. The killing of an agent in the state of Pará, the attempted murder of IBAMA’s representative in the state of Acre, and death threats against IBAMA’s president, show the landowners’ fear of the government’s new attempts to reduce deforestation. It also demonstrates the decline in the landowners’ ability to influence government policy and the increase in the political power of opposition forces. Domestic interests seeking to protect their own economic livelihood have been bolstered by international pressure, which has been based on the global environmental implications of deforestation.

Extractive Reserves
Rubber tappers began pressing for extractive reserves in 1985 as a way of securing access to the rainforest. Extractive reserves are communal, not private, rights to land that will be used by the local population. The state provides long-term leases for the land in the reserve, with the knowledge that the community will live there and extract resources from it. Communal use rights would prevent land speculation. Further, land in extractive reserves is preserved, not deforested. While national parks containing virgin forest had been established previously, the extractive reserve represented an innovative concept — using the land while protecting it. The first reserve was established at São Luís de Remanso in Acre in February 1988.

Extractive reserves are vulnerable for several reasons. While the establishment of reserves is supposed to involve the local community, government planners may not heed their advice. In one instance, the government planned to settle 10 times as many families on a reserve as was advocated by the forest people. Another problem is that the long-term leases could be rescinded at any time by the government.

Tappers have urged that reserves be combined with a change in their control of rubber marketing. For the tappers, control over rubber production would be irrelevant if they did not also receive a fair price. The establishment of reserves, along with a change in the marketing system, are essential for ending the
rubber tappers' debt slavery. Thus, by successful organization around the deforestation issue, the rubber tappers' union has begun to address its original focus, namely the control over the means of production and distribution.

National Political Philosophy
The increasing prominence of environmental issues in Brazil has been accompanied by a growth of political rhetoric about protecting the environment. While rhetoric itself does little to protect the environment, it helps change attitudes, which in turn influence steps toward action. The most obvious shift in national philosophy is Nossa Natureza, a document outlining the country's plan to protect the environment. To many critics, the plan was too little too late, representing only a government attempt to assuage international pressure while doing little to actually address environmental concerns. Nevertheless, this document provides a legal commitment to protect the Amazon.

Intensified national environmental concern was also reflected in political statements made in the country's 1989 presidential campaign. One of the two candidates in the runoff election for the presidency, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (known as Lula), called for a debate over the road-building program in the Amazon. He also decried previous governments' environmental degradation when he stated, "they burned the green [of our flag] polluting the blue out of our sky." Lula's statement is indicative of the feeling that environmental protection is in the national interest. The 1988 constitution's recognition that every individual has the right to a healthy environment further indicates a shift in national philosophy toward preservation of the environment.

Politically, this shift has resulted in the legal formation of a Green party. In March 1988, the Greens were able to obtain enough signatures to register as a legal political party. While securing a small proportion of the total ballot in recent elections, the Greens have received votes in every municipality, illustrating their nationwide appeal.

The Green party agrees with the forest peoples alliance that the Amazon should be developed by those who live there. While it is too soon to say what impact their support will have on the political power of the alliance, if the Greens are successful in future elections their power in the political process will increase, as will the power of their allies, implying that Brazil will continue to move toward ecological preservation.

Conclusions and Prospects for the Future
The rubber tappers and Indians, through their mobilization, have developed some measure of political clout, as indicated by new government policies designed to protect the Amazon. These groups have been assisted by increasing international concern, which has been based largely on the global environmental threats associated with destruction of the rainforest. In contrast, environmentalism in the Brazilian Amazon has been associated with economic survival.

Environmentalism has taken on a new role in Brazil's national political consciousness. This change is due not just to Amazon groups, but also to other groups such as those fighting urban pollution and the Green party. However, the unequal distribution of land, and all the other issues it entails, needs to be addressed before a long-term, sustainable solution to degradation of the Amazon can be implemented. That poses an enormously difficult challenge to the current Brazilian government. Land reform, perhaps the obvious solution to the dual problem of landlessness and income inequality, will be very difficult to implement because it will mean antagonizing wealthy landowners, the government's traditional base of
support. One does not have to look very hard to find examples of Latin American governments toppled by upper-class and/or military revolts against governments promoting redistribution of wealth.

Further, land reform in and of itself might not address the concerns of the Amazon’s various environmental constituencies. For example, land reform that only provided land to peasants for agriculture in the Amazon, rather than to forest dwellers involved in sustainable extraction, would not stop deforestation.

As a new and fragile democratic regime, the current Brazilian government is in a particularly precarious position. Democracy may provide better avenues for political input from the poor than did rule under the military regimes that ran the country from 1964 to 1985. However, the new president, Fernando Collor de Mello, faces a severe economic crisis that may tie his hands, economically and politically, in addressing their demands. Further, Brazil’s strong tradition of military rule means that a coup is always possible. The prospects for serious land reform in this political context seem rather slim, at least in the near future.

Clearly, long-term solutions to deforestation in the Amazon hinge on the government’s ability to address the country’s economic problems (e.g. hyperinflation, external debt, disparity in income and landlessness) while maintaining its political stability. As one of his first acts as President, Collor recently introduced a radical 26-point program to control the country’s hyperinflation—almost 5,000 percent over the past year. The program includes provisions to privatize one-third of Brazil’s 188 state industries, cut one-third of the country’s $5.5 billion worth of subsidies and tax incentives, reduce the civil service, freeze bank deposits above $1,200 (80 percent of all bank deposits) for eighteen months and devalue the currency. Although Collor has enjoyed very high public approval ratings since his election to the Presidency, his economic reform policies will undoubtedly cost him much political capital as the economic recession that has followed his reforms exacerbates unemployment, poverty and landlessness.

Despite Brazil’s economic difficulties, several signs indicate Collor is also committed to giving Brazil’s environmental problems serious attention. Collor reportedly showed sensitivity to international concern about deforestation in the Amazon during meetings with Environment Ministers in several countries prior to his inauguration. He also named a world-renowned conservationist, José Antonio Lutzenberger, to be Secretary of the Environment, a move that has been lauded by international environmental groups. Lutzenberger has criticized several government-supported policies, including rampant burning of the Amazon forest and the usurpation of Indian lands. In addition, Lutzenberger accepted the position on the condition that Collor would abolish all subsidies for unsustainable development in the Amazon.

Whether Collor can muster the political strength to combat both a severe economic crisis and serious environmental degradation remains to be seen. Some of his economic policies may help slow deforestation in the Amazon. Curbing inflation, for example, will help reduce land speculation in the region. Environmental critics, however, call for more far-reaching policies, such as imposing higher taxes on land sales, prohibiting road building in areas where the soils cannot sustain long-term agriculture, expanding extractive reserves and creating training programs to help peasants develop extractive skills. Aggressive action on these fronts would also entail considerable expenditure of Collor’s political capital.

The enormity of the economic and political challenges facing Collor suggest efforts to slow or stop deforestation in the Amazon in the next few years will be largely incremental. Although policies that promote sustainable economic use of the riches of the rainforest will be more politically palatable than
turning the Amazon into a national park, as some in the industrialized countries might recommend, they will still be difficult to implement. Whatever course is taken, environmental constituencies in the Amazon will likely see continued and expanded efforts on the part of the government to address their concerns. That alone constitutes a political success story.

Notes


6 Ibid., pp. 17 and 19.


22 Ibid., pp. 219-220.

23 Ibid., p. 172.

24 Ibid., p. 170.


28 Ibid., pp. 98-99.


31 Ibid., p. 183.


33 Ibid., p. 179.

34 Ibid., p. 180.
Towards a Supportive, Integrated Learning Environment: Preventing Teenagers from Dropping Out of School

by Karen Thomson

Reducing the percentage of young people who drop out of school before completing high school or even junior high school is an objective that does not have a simple, single-faceted solution. Achievement of this objective would, however, present benefits to society as a whole. This article explores actual and potential initiatives targeted at drop out reduction that involve many different groups within our communities — schools, families, businesses, and neighborhood leaders. The diverse contributions to education and human development that these groups can bring to drop out prevention efforts can create a foundation of community support that may help at-risk students acquire the education that will enable them to contribute more fully to society in the future.

Drop out prevention is a complex problem. There is no single cause; no single “typical” drop out; no single solution. There is no single subpopulation that suffers the effects of high drop out rates. Drop outs usually suffer reduced job and wage opportunities and lack skills that might have enhanced their lives in other ways. But society as a whole also suffers if substantial numbers of its citizens are not sufficiently educated.

Low high school completion rates can result in a shortage of qualified workers for businesses in an era in which requirements for entry into the labor market are becoming increasingly skills-based. Citizens in poor communities where students are at high risk of dropping out already suffer from criminal attacks that are often committed by people from the community who have become alienated from it in the same way that many drop outs have — whether the criminals are drop outs themselves or not. Citizens in more fortunate communities are not immune to the effects of crime either, however, and may well suffer more in the future if increasing numbers of people are marginalized from society. Those concerned about

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the size of America's welfare rolls also have incentives to decrease drop out rates. Although certainly not all drop outs are marginalized or criminal, to the extent that dropping out signals or contributes to a disintegration from society, drop outs are a high-risk group for limited futures.

Drop out prevention is at least as daunting as any other social challenge. The statistics are complex and not uniform in what or how they measure aspects of the problem among different researchers, regions, or schools. When the students involved are inheritors of the underclass label, the causes and effects of their estrangement from the educational system are both difficult to distinguish from one another and difficult to ignore, and are similar to the causes and effects of long spells of poverty in general: past, present, and perceived discrimination, alienation from the mainstream, low parental educational attainment and employment levels, and limited or non-tangent "middle class" aspirations and opportunities. Even when the students in question have not been raised in long term poverty, their own limited educational attainment can contribute to the likelihood of their experiencing poverty during their own adult lives and during their children's youth.

The perceived futility of anti-poverty efforts that surrounds many discussions of the underclass — whether stridently vocalized by conservatives or uncomfortably buried in liberals' uncertainties — is all too easily paralleled within schools themselves. Students at risk of dropping out are frequently those who have come to doubt their own capacity to perform in school academically, or to adjust in the school community. Whether the doubt is the result of academic failure, lack of integration into school activities and support systems, or a combination thereof, these students have the impression that they do not belong. This lack of belief in the "appropriateness" of their being at school can originate from or be exacerbated by tacit or explicit messages from school and local adults that their success is unlikely. Thus part of the beginning of any solution to drop out rates among at-risk communities must be a belief among adults involved that the initiative can succeed.

Coupled with that outlook must be efforts to foster self-esteem among the students. Successful drop out reduction programs have frequently been those that start on a small scale, thereby allowing the staff and other players involved to become accustomed to the program and, one would hope, make any swift improvements that may be needed before it is expanded. Small scale initiatives can be frustrating when one is anxious to reach a large population of students, but careful test piloting of any new program is a necessary step before implementing it on a wide basis. Another benefit of small scale programs is that they facilitate small tutor ratios, a factor that has been shown, along with other forms of increased contact between teachers, other significant adults, and students, to make a difference. Small ratios allow supportive relationships to develop for the children and enable adults to monitor children's academic and emotional progress.

Small, targeted programs must be balanced with the prevention of practices that isolate at-risk students too much from the others. Isolation into "pullout" remedial programs frequently gives students a negative label that they and other young people apply too often to the students' personal worthiness and chances for success. The desire to keep at risk students as much within the educational mainstream as possible suggests that reforms be widely expandable to whole schools and school systems. Dissenters concerned that this represents unfocused targeting of those at highest risk should realize that schools in troubled areas can be the first to begin the new programs, and that the current educational reform movement and dire situation in many schools supports the revision of schooling for all students.

Despite the desire to avoid negatively labelling children, it is crucial that students having difficulty
learning the basics be identified early in their educational careers and receive as much help as possible. Tutoring can take place after school, in Saturday programs, or as part of the school day, and may work best if not open only to such children. This is one reason why integrating supplementary learning with enjoyable activities is so critical. Another possibility is to subdivide homeroom classes into smaller groups or to link sections of one class with students of comparable ability from other classes during critical math and language arts lessons. Implementing such revisions in elementary school should be done without disrupting the cohesiveness and homeroom support of a main teacher's classroom.

Program evaluations indicate that the most successful prevention programs incorporate curricular reform in some way, no matter how high the level of additional services. Initiatives that make important academic lessons seem more relevant to students' lives can decrease the probability that young people will consider their coursework "dumb" or "arbitrary". Examples such as movements toward a less Eurocentric curriculum can also foster the development of self-esteem. Curricula that increase students' awareness of the contributions of diverse segments of the population to American society can help members of our increasingly diverse student population to perceive themselves as potential contributors to society, which may increase their personal justification for staying in school. Another positive curricular change is collaboration between teachers of different subjects to design lesson plans that complement each other, rather than isolated lessons without clear relevance to anything else. Contrary to conservative dissent, there is no evidence that such reforms make subject matter too "soft" and result in less learning of the basics. Instead, programs that fuse "important" and more aesthetic lessons such as art can inspire motivation in the students and make lessons interesting enough to be remembered.

Right-wing officials such as Chester Finn, Assistant Secretary of Education in the Reagan Administration, complain, as Finn does in "The High School Drop Out Puzzle" that to seek a coalition of as many elements of society as possible to combat the drop out problem is a cop out that will merely dissipate responsibility for improvements. Finn attempts to dismiss such arguments by labelling them the "familiar rhetoric of general social reform: no one in particular is responsible for the problem, certainly not the individual who manifests it, and everyone must join hands in a hazy, albeit well-intentioned, effort to solve it." Collaborative approaches to drop out prevention and re-enrollment, however, may avoid the diminished effectiveness that can accompany group efforts if ultimate accountability remains solely within the schools. Community members and institutions can play supportive roles for which the school remains the focus.

Businesses in a number of cities, demonstrating their concern for the future of the labor pool, have already begun programs with some successful outcomes, such as providing summer or after-school jobs and college scholarships, or encouraging professional employees to conduct career and mentor-oriented advising workshops at local schools. The limits of success in such initiatives in programs such as the Boston Compact, which united companies and schools to provide jobs for high school graduates, summer employment for college students, and improvement efforts in reading, math, and drop out reduction, suggests that, although beneficial, such efforts should be combined with other services.

As the overall number of young adults shrinks, making it harder for colleges to construct entering classes as large as classes of previous years, officials will increasingly recognize the tragic irony of the presence of increasing numbers of young people without the skills to enroll in their universities. Colleges can and, in some instances, have begun to contribute to improvements in secondary education. Vermont's Middlebury College, for example, has begun a partnership with an inner city high school in the Bronx
through which a regular exchange of professors, teachers, high school students, (and perhaps in the future undergraduate student recruiters) occurs between the college and the city. High school students are cited by the concern for them that is demonstrated, intrigued by having college professors as visiting instructors, and inspired by the suddenly more conceivable possibility of attending college. When that sort a future seems more attainable, remaining in high school acquires a new importance.

Similar concerns are relevant to junior and senior high schools and staff members, who must recognize their vested interest in the quality of educational preparedness students will have as they leave earlier elementary and middle schools to enter their classrooms. Encouraging dialogue for innovative ideas between local schools may minimize duplication of mistakes and maximize implementation of beneficial programs. This is especially critical given the fact that not all drop outs drop out of high school: early one sixth of Houston’s drop outs in a given year were middle school children. One promising strategy is to enlist the aid of older students in the neighborhood schools as tutors for younger children. This gives both student populations a sense of importance, reinforces the tutor’s own grasp of the material, and encourages the maintenance of community ties to former schools that may have been sources of support for the older child.

Adult citizens can help reduce drop out rates by volunteering at schools as tutors and by active involvement in local school issues, which sends the message to the neighborhood’s young people that school is important and allows the needs of a local community to be voiced during policymaking decisions. School policies that facilitate such community involvement in planning should be implemented more likely and further developed, especially those that maximize participation of parents and guardians.

The families of at-risk students also stand to gain from improvements in their children’s educational attainments. Aside from the possibilities of economic benefits in the long term future if their adult children help support them as higher wage earners, families frequently have non-monetary interests helping their members realize goals and potential. Although some guardians may not demonstrate though active concern for academic performance, few actually have outright desires for their children to poorly in school.

Policies involving communication with guardians, even those as simple as notification of student problems, should be organized to reflect the fact that children’s guardians are not always as easy to reach on the phone or to identify as one specific person as they may have been in 1950s mainstream America. Whenever possible, school records should list more than one additional relative or loved one whom the official guardian will allow to provide assistance when they are unreachable. Programs involving parent unselling have demonstrated reductions in drop out rates for troubled students,9 and those incorporating parents into planning and implementation of reforms have had significant positive outcomes in elementary and middle schools.10

Finally, incentives for the students themselves to stay in school require further evaluation. Requiring a diploma can improve one’s marketability and earning potential in job searches and be helpful in other areas. Yet the degree of return is not equal for all individuals, and is not always visible to young people, particularly those witnessing limited opportunities for advancement among adults in their community. The combination of a dearth of economically successful role models, pressures to earn money, neither legitimately or through get-rich-quick lures of drug dealing and other illicit activities, and a tendency for many youth to view things with a short term rather than long term perspective can render benefits insignificant in a fifteen year-old’s eyes, especially if the student feels uncomfortable,
alienated, or doomed to failure in school. Drop out intervention strategies, therefore, must include more immediate incentives. Some examples are summer or after school job placement efforts, involvement in extracurricular or quasi-curricular after school activities, development of mentor relationships, and active, open encouragement and support.

Finn contends that it makes little sense to attempt to reduce drop out rates without making high school completion or twelve years of schooling mandatory. Increasing the minimum years of schooling or raising the age at which students can leave school may well have some merit. One benefit would be that would-be students who, under current circumstances, have left school but wish to return could find it easier to re-enter a public school with their age peers rather than be assigned to programs designed for adults. Many students in this category are considered "push outs" because their exit from the system resulted from disciplinary difficulties or other aspects of estrangement from the school community. When they do try to reenter a school, they may find that they have been labelled as troublemakers, and that schools are reluctant to enroll them. In these instances, schools in cities such as Washington, D.C. may trudge through red tape long enough to allow the child's sixteenth birthday to pass. After that birthday, public schools in many areas are no longer legally obligated to find a place for these would-be students. Whether administrative delays result from intentional practices, lack of concern, or mere disorganization, they do prevent some students from re-entering an academic environment. Paperwork should be reduced through computer use and through more direct linkages between parties involved, such as past and future schools. Mandating more years of schooling could force schools to find places for these young people. Whatever else it may do, however, the suggestion does nothing to remedy the problems that lead students to leave. Without addressing those problems, policymakers and school systems risk playing a numbers game that may increase the time students spend in school without ensuring that the additional time has any benefit. Rather than simply focusing on forcing students to attend for longer lengths of time, one must create improvements and incentives so that students want to be there and so that the learning environment enables the time spent to be worthwhile. High interest programs such as vocational training, sex education and parenting classes, and transitional support for returned truants are good possibilities.

Similarly, high absenteeism should be addressed not by exploring the means of punishment potentially available to truant officers, but by ensuring linkages between truant officers and members of the social service network that will facilitate referrals for families in need of assistance. A child uncomfortable with school — or a family reluctant to send a child to a school in a new environment or under difficult circumstances — needs supportive intervention. The threat of legal or other punishment, such as reduction in the family's welfare benefits, can make a family and concerned outsiders hesitant to seek help, and should not, therefore, be the first step in returning a child to the school system.

The contributions of diverse segments of the local and larger community to drop out reduction can have powerful impacts and must not be underestimated. Such efforts must receive active encouragement and guidance from experts in relevant education, youth, and social service fields, particularly in light of current government fiscal constraints. Successful collaborative improvements, however, must begin within the schools and classrooms themselves. Just as planning and implementation incorporating parents maximizes support from key figures in the children's lives, active involvement of teachers and local school staff in the design of changes is also critical. Without the support and comprehension of teachers and others who are responsible for instruction and involvement with students daily, new policies risk disuse and misuse, or even the hostile avoidance of staff members who resent dictation of procedures from above.
Planning must, therefore, include teachers and other staff. Similarly, the planning process itself must be designed in such a way as to allow time for collaboration, scheduling of meetings at times appropriate to teachers' hours of availability, and individual preparation for implementation within teachers' classrooms.

Eliminating the drop out problem will not be a simple, single-faceted process. Through interactive, integrative efforts such as those described above, however, schools should be able to foster environments that maximize learning and support of self-esteem, and thereby maximize retention of the students whose contributions will be so sorely needed in our nation's future.

Notes


Why the U.S. Invaded Panama

by Thomas Mahr

The recent invasion of Panama was the biggest U.S. military action since the Vietnam War. In this article the author uses the framework of national interest theory to examine the justifications given for this intervention and argues that the reasons cited for the invasion were not central to U.S. national interests. The paper then examines other unstated interests — expansive military and intelligence capabilities based in the Panama Canal Zone, the commitment of U.S. prestige to General Noriega's removal, and domestic political incentives — and concludes that these were the real motives underlying U.S. actions.

On December 20, 1989, the United States’ two-and-a-half year campaign to remove General Manuel Antonio Noriega as leader of Panama culminated in an invasion by more than 24,000 U.S. troops which resulted in the deaths of 23 American soldiers, 3 American civilians and hundreds of Panamanians as well as millions of dollars of damage. President George Bush claimed that this attack was necessary to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking (or at least to bring Noriega to justice) and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties. While these seem laudable goals, given the history of U.S. involvement in Latin America, it strains credulity to believe that the largest American military operation since Vietnam did not involve issues historically more central to American foreign policy-making. In fact, the U.S. invaded because it perceived vital defense and security interests to be at stake, although these interests, as realists like Hans Morgenthau would predict, were cloaked by the moral justifications cited above. Because vital interest were at stake, and because lesser tools failed, military intervention became both necessary and possible.

After a brief examination of U.S. policies toward Panama from mid-1987 through 1989, this paper examines the weight of various stated and unstated U.S. interests in Panama. It then identifies those interests central to U.S. actions and explains the initial failure of the U.S. to achieve its stated goals.

Panama and U.S. Policies

Background

The dispute in Panama centered around the rule of General Noriega, who became the de facto leader of Panama in 1983. Noriega rose to the top of Panamanian intelligence under General Omar Torrijos, who led Panama until his death in a plane crash in 1981. In this role Noriega developed extensive contacts with the U.S. military, the Central Intelligence Agency and other top American officials. After

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becoming head of the National Guard in 1983, Noriega consolidated the Guard, air force, navy, canal defense forces, police forces, national investigations bureau, and other internal security agencies into the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) and took command of this strengthened security force. In the 1984 elections that were supposed to mark Panama's transition to democracy, the slate of candidates Noriega had selected emerged as winners. Although these elections were marred by fraud, the U.S. chose to look the other way.²

In 1985 a prominent opposition leader, Dr. Hugo Spadafora, was brutally murdered, and suspicions centered on the PDF. When President Ardito Barletta called for an investigation, Noriega removed him from office and replaced him with Vice-President Eric Arturo Delvalle. Then, in June 1986, Seymour Hersh of the *The New York Times* published a series of articles alleging Noriega's involvement in rigging the 1984 election, drug- and arms-trafficking, money laundering, the killing of Dr. Spadafora, and leaking U.S. intelligence to Cuba. The articles claimed that these offenses, though well-known to U.S. officials, were overlooked because of Noriega's willingness to cooperate with U.S. intelligence and to sanction U.S. military operations that technically went beyond the rights granted under the Panama Canal Treaties.³

These allegations gained credence in Panama in June 1987 when, for the first time, a former high-ranking PDF officer substantiated the allegations. After Noriega dismissed Colonel Roberto Díaz Herrera from his post as second-in-command of the PDF, Díaz detailed Noriega's involvement in the killing of Dr. Spadafora and the 1984 election fraud and also claimed that Noriega was responsible for the death of General Torrijos. This led to widespread popular protests against the Noriega regime that forced the government to declare a state of emergency, prompting comparisons by the media and policy-makers with the popular uprisings that had recently toppled dictators in the Philippines and Haiti.

The United States responded by signalling its displeasure with Noriega and then calling for him to leave. Over the next two-and-a-half years General Noriega's tenacious hold on power proved an acute embarrassment to the U.S., ultimately forcing it to resort to military intervention to remove him. In the meantime, U.S. attempts to remove Noriega involved economic sanctions, bilateral negotiations, multilateral diplomacy, a federal drug indictment, rhetorical and "covert" financial support for the democratic opposition (the Civic Crusade), support for the government of the former Noriega puppet Eric Delvalle, and calls for PDF coups. These policies often contradicted each other, and in the long run appear to have been counterproductive.

**U.S. Economic Sanctions**

In the spring of 1988, the Reagan Administration recognized the Delvalle government as legitimate so that Delvalle's representatives could petition U.S. courts to freeze Panamanian assets in the United States. The Administration also suspended all U.S. government payments to Panama and rescinded Panama's preferential treatment under the Generalized System of Preferences and the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Finally, in April the Administration prohibited payments (except some taxes and payments for essential services such as electricity) by U.S. citizens or organizations to the Noriega regime.⁴ These steps induced a severe liquidity crisis in Panama, forcing banks to shut down and resulting in the use of barter and uncashed government checks in place of cash. Also, according to the U.S. Commerce Department, the policies contributed to a near-doubling of the unemployment rate from 1987 to 1989, negative economic growth of 20% in 1988 and an additional -7.5% in 1989, and a nearly 20% drop in total trade between Panama and the United States from 1987 to 1989.⁵
Despite these effects on the Panamanian economy, the economic sanctions appear to have had little effect on Noriega, and they actually may have strengthened his position by allowing him to stir up "anti-gringo" feelings. As the Reverend James Ottley, Episcopal Bishop of Panama, testified in asking that sanctions be lifted, "I am here to say, sir, that the economic sanctions, as far as I understand it, have not worked. The people are suffering and the economic structure...is being destroyed.... An entire nation should not suffer because of the differences of the government of this country with one man...." Those that appear to have been hit hardest by the sanctions were the poor and the upper middle class supporters of the Civic Crusade, not Noriega or his top supporters. In fact, the sanctions caused a split in the Civic Crusade, and the split clearly weakened the opposition. The sanctions also split the international community; some nations (particularly in Latin America) that had previously voiced concern about the Noriega regime came to its support in order to protest American interference in the internal affairs of Panama.

**Negotiations**

The U.S.'s use of diplomacy and negotiations in Panama may also have done more to hurt its cause than to help it. When the United States recognized the Delvalle regime in an attempt to pressure Noriega, it undercut the role of the Civic Crusade and also set the precedent that the United States would act unilaterally; this allowed the opposition to relax and popular discontent to dissipate. As Ambler Moss, former Ambassador to Panama under Presidents Carter and Reagan, testified:

> Unfortunately, when you have a relationship between two countries such as the United States and Panama where for so many years there has been an overwhelming U.S. presence in Panama, the tendency is now of a lot of Panamanians when the gringos enter in such force is to sit back and watch and see what the gringos are going to do rather than deal with the problem themselves.7

Similarly, signalling support for a PDF coup offered short-run chances for a quick solution but undercut longer-run support for the Civic Crusade.

Negotiating directly with Noriega offered little hope of achieving his departure. As long as the opposition appeared weak, the United States had little to offer Noriega in return for his stepping down. Dropping the drug indictments was little inducement: While he was in power, Noriega had nothing to fear from them since he would not extradite himself to the United States.

Thus, the only result of U.S. attempts to negotiate Noriega's departure was the demoralization of the opposition — which had been excluded from the negotiations. Ambassador Moss suggested that this was a major drawback: "I think that one of the causes of the consternation of the Panamanian opposition right now is the fact that they don't know what the United States is negotiating with their sitting dictator. They may not like the bargain made."8

This history of U.S. actions demonstrates that the U.S. did not show consistent support for any of these means, and by switching among them it canceled their effectiveness and undercut its announced goals of promoting democracy, combating drug trafficking, protecting Americans and defending the canal treaties. What were the U.S. interests — named and unnamed — in Panama that led to these actions? And why did these actions for so long fail to achieve U.S. goals, making military intervention necessary?

The initial efforts of the United States failed primarily because the U.S. did not match its policy tools to the realist power aspirations that underlay its idealist rhetoric, and because the stated goals did not
involve "vital" interests, the U.S. did not initially use military force. In fact, U.S. policies were initially ineffective precisely because these stated goals were peripheral to U.S. interests; the policies were followed to cloak the major interests underlying U.S. involvement in Panama. The real goal underlying United States policy, the goal that precipitated the crisis, was the maintenance of expanded military rights and intelligence capabilities in the Panama Canal Zone. The immediate cause of military intervention was the growing damage to U.S. national prestige and President Bush's personal political prestige. As the risk of domestic and Congressional opposition to the use of military force declined amid frustration with Bush's failure to achieve his stated goals, it became possible and necessary to use military force to achieve the real goals.

U.S. Interests in Panama

In "The Concept of National Interest," Donald Nuechterlein argues that, while the term "national interest" is central to international political theory and foreign policy-making, there has been no systematic attempt to discuss this concept and define the goals of states. Nor has there been an attempt to determine the level of intensity which should be ascribed to different interests in specific cases. He suggests using a matrix of both types and levels of interest to identify the interests at stake in international conflicts, examine possible tradeoffs among them, and decide the appropriate policy. He defines the four basic interests of states as defense of the homeland, economic well-being, a favorable world order, and an ideological interest. Events that affect these interests are then weighted: survival issues are those in which "the very existence of the state is in jeopardy;" vital issues are those in which "serious harm will likely result to the state unless strong measures, including the use of conventional military force, are employed;" major issues are those in which "the political, economic and ideological well-being of the state may be adversely affected," requiring "corrective action in order to prevent them from becoming serious threats;" and peripheral issues are those that do not adversely affect the well-being of the state, though the interests of private citizens and companies operating abroad may be endangered. In accordance with this discussion, it is possible to classify and weigh the issues at stake in Panama.

The Four Stated Interests

**Defending Democracy**

Throughout the crisis the United States claimed an ideological interest in restoring democracy to Panama. However, this was really a peripheral issue, as the well-being of the United States was not adversely affected by the lack of democracy in Panama. Despite its rhetoric, U.S. actions demonstrate that promoting democracy in Panama was not a major, let alone a vital, issue.

Before the crisis the United States implicitly acknowledged that it would support non-democratic government in Panama by supporting Noriega yet failing to include Panama in the list of Latin American nations that had achieved democracy under the Reagan Administration. As the crisis developed the rhetorical commitment of the U.S. to "democracy and civilian rule" escalated. But Administration actions belied this commitment. When it recognized the Delvalle government as legitimate in February 1988, the United States suggested that it was democratic and constitutional — even though Delvalle was a product of the fraudulent 1984 election and then of the 1985 coup that removed Barletta. This was the same government for which, in June 1987, when confronted by the question, "Is it not true that what we really have in Panama is a military dictatorship operating under a facade of democracy?" Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State William Walker could only come up with the weak defense: "I think that is an exaggeration, somewhat of a distortion." Bush continued to demonstrate the United States's disdain for true democratic expression of the will of the Panamanian people by channeling $10 million in covert aid to Panama in an effort to influence the May 1989 election. Moreover, when Noriega, citing foreign interference, annulled the results of the election, the Bush Administration did not recognize the Civic Crusade candidates as the legitimate government; instead it clarified that it had "no problem" with the PDF and intimated that a PDF coup — and presumably a PDF role in Panamanian politics — would be an acceptable alternative to Noriega.

**Combatting Drug Trafficking**

United States domestic political rhetoric has elevated the war on drugs to a vital national security threat; hyperbole aside, international drug-trafficking can pose a threat to U.S. interests. While federal indictments and Congressional testimony leave little doubt that Panama was involved in this activity, it again does not appear likely that it would have resulted in serious harm to the U.S.; it was therefore at most a major interest and probably only a peripheral interest.

Before Noriega's February 1988 indictment in U.S. federal courts, the U.S. was willing to overlook his involvement in drug trafficking to achieve other goals. As The Economist argues, "In the mid-1980s...some of America's allies were using cocaine to finance military adventures in Central America. Some of it was let through Panama, and the Americans knew it." Former Ambassador to Panama Jack Hood Vaughn asserts that the U.S. government was fully aware of Noriega's drug trafficking and chose to ignore it in return for intelligence and military favors. As late as February 1988 the State Department was preparing a draft report — the latest in an annual series — praising Noriega for his cooperation in anti-drug efforts. In fact, an official State Department statement on February 12, 1988, while acknowledging reports of Noriega's drug trafficking, continued, "Nevertheless...Panama and the United States have cooperated successfully in...efforts to halt drug trafficking."

While that position soon became untenable for domestic political reasons (after wide press coverage of the indictments and Congressional testimony highlighted Noriega's involvement in drug trafficking), drug trafficking per se has never been perceived as an overriding national interest. We have not invaded Colombia to strike at the Medellín cartel — surely a greater drug threat than Noriega — and we have not sent thousands of troops to combat drug dealing in America's ghettos where it has a far more direct impact on the United States. And in Panama, as Ambassador Vaughn testified:

The PDF have become a major militarized cocaine mafia of extraordinary proportions and reach. If we were to see Noriega and his top 6 colonels, and 25 lieutenant colonels and 45 majors, and down to staff sergeants, removed, that still would not make much of a difference in eliminating the drug problem.

In slightly less colorful language, Administration officials made the same point in closed door testimony to Congress: "Members [of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee] also said [Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Michael H.] Armacost warned that there is no guarantee that any successor would be more acceptable to the United States." Yet the United States repeatedly stressed its willingness to work with the PDF in post-Noriega Panama, and it was willing to drop Noriega's indictments in return for a role in installing a new Panamanian government.
Safeguarding U.S. Citizens

Because tens of thousands of Americans live and/or do business in Panama, the U.S. had a clear world-order interest in ensuring that American citizens could operate peacefully and safely there. However, in the thirty-month period before the invasion, only three American deaths were related to the crisis: a U.S. marine killed in a firefight with other U.S. marines, a U.S. marine shot when his patrol startled a Panamanian hunter, and a U.S. marine shot in Panama City by the PDF after running a PDF barricade. The only major reported property damage resulted from a June 1987 attack on the U.S. Embassy; the United States demanded and the Panamanian government paid $106,000 in compensation for this incident.

Given that General Noriega was attempting to stir up anti-American sentiment during this period, the toll seems low — especially when compared to other Latin American countries (e.g., El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua) or to most major American cities over a similar period. Though Noriega's implicit support for attacks on Americans in December 1989 was worrisome and provided the immediate excuse for the invasion, the threat to American lives and property appears to have been minimal. Thus, although the safeguarding of American lives was used to justify the invasion, in Nuechterlein's terms it was only a peripheral issue, not a primary reason for military intervention.

Protecting the Integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties

The Panama Canal clearly constitutes a strategic defense interest of the United States. All but our largest warships can traverse the canal, dramatically shortening the time required to strengthen either the Atlantic or Pacific fleets during an emergency. Also, maintaining the right to "protect and defend" the canal was central to the U.S. position during the negotiation of the Canal Treaties.

However, the strategic value of the canal has declined significantly in recent years, and because its security was never threatened, protecting the canal itself was not a vital issue for the U.S. As Ambassador Moss testified before Congress:

During the last round of treaty negotiations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff termed the waterway an important asset but would not go so far as to term it a vital asset. In peacetime, it is not used heavily by U.S. naval vessels.... Because of its vulnerability to missile attack, the canal would likely not be available in time of war.

According to Nuechterlein's analysis, only vital and survival issues justify a policy of military force. Yet none of the stated justifications of U.S. military intervention appears to have been a major issue, let alone a vital issue. This explains why for so long the U.S. policy vacillated among weak efforts to pressure Noriega to leave: None of the stated issues justified sustained actions. But it does not explain why the U.S. persisted in committing its prestige to changing the Panamanian government. This suggests that other, unstated interests were involved.

Unstated U.S. Interests

Uses of the Canal Zone Unrelated to the Defense of the Canal

As discussed above, because of its declining strategic value, the canal itself does not appear to have been of overriding concern. However, the status of the surrounding Canal Zone as headquarters for the U.S. Southern Command — which has authority over all U.S. military operations in South and Central America — is a major asset that remained largely undiscussed during the crisis. While the Pentagon has...
made plans to shift the headquarters to the United States when the base rights expire at the end of the decade, the U.S. would understandably prefer to maintain as many of its basing rights intact for as long as possible. The only other military base that offers American soldiers the tropical, Spanish-speaking surroundings desirable for training (for possible future U.S. military missions in Latin America) is Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, which is also scheduled to close in 1999.21

Technically, U.S. bases in the Canal Zone may only be used for defense of the canal. However, Noriega in particular, and the PDF in general, were willing to grant the U.S. great leeway in using these bases. For example, during the 1980s the importance of the Canal Zone to United States policy increased significantly as Noriega cooperated in allowing the U.S. to use it to support contra operations in Nicaragua.22 And in 1986 "National Security Agency officials acknowledged that their Panama station monitors intelligence activities in all of Central and South America." Thus, any action that would undercut cooperative relations between the United States military and the Panamanian government could hurt (extra-Treaty) U.S. defense and intelligence interests, reinforcing the long-term interest of the United States in having a friendly and domestically viable government in Panama in 1999.

From this perspective, by the end of 1987 the United States no longer wanted Noriega in power. If a popular uprising succeeded in removing him, it was in the U.S. interest to express its support for the movement as soon as possible. But even if Noriega were to defeat the uprising, he had lost his attraction for American policy-makers. Up until 1987, Noriega's willingness to allow the U.S. to use Panama as a staging area for military and intelligence activities seems to have outweighed the streaks of independence and uncooperativeness — such as drug trafficking and supplying sensitive intelligence to the Cubans — that had caused some U.S. officials to urge that he be removed, or even assassinated.24 As evidence of Noriega's activities began to become public, he became an embarrassing contradiction of stated U.S. policy.

In addition, as events of 1988 and 1989 were to prove, Noriega had amassed enough independent economic and political power that he could reject U.S. demands. In fact, it appears likely that his decision to reject a U.S. request that he extend U.S. basing rights in the Canal Zone beyond 199925 may have convinced the CIA and Defense Department that the benefits of his rule in Panama no longer outweighed the costs. The combination of Noriega's declining domestic viability, increased publicity of his illicit activities, and intransigence to U.S. demands made his removal a major issue, threatening the political and ideological well-being of the United States.

National Prestige and Domestic Politics
United States defense interests depend on other nations' perceptions of U.S. power. Once the United States publicly committed its prestige to Noriega's removal, the prolonged failure to remove him suggested an embarrassing decline in the power of the United States. The testimony of Francis J. McNeil, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, depicts U.S. fears about some possible effects of such a perceived decline: "If Noriega hangs on, it will stimulate military coups in several other Latin American countries and encourage the Medellin cartel to conduct leveraged buyouts of other Latin American governments." Thus, achieving stated goals in itself became a major — and possibly vital — issue, independent of the importance of the underlying goals.

Nuechterlein argues that the assessment of whether an interest is vital depends on the analysis of the risks attendant on the use of military force. Among the risk factors he identifies as most important are the risk of public and Congressional opposition. From 1987 through most of 1989, the domestic political
costs of military intervention were estimated as too great for it to be seriously considered until other avenues had been tried. The Pentagon, leery of entering a conflict without broad popular support, was at first openly critical of suggestions that the U.S. intervene militarily. "Of course we could overthrow Noriega," said a senior Pentagon source. "But there would be bloodshed. We would have American boys coming home in body bags. And we would pay a terrible political price, too."27 In May, 1989, the bipartisan leadership of the Congress had unanimous praise for Bush's restrained reaction to the annulment of the Panamanian elections.

However, the ability of Noriega to hang on to power changed the domestic political constraints in the United States. Each new U.S. initiative was initially greeted with bipartisan support in the Congress; as each failed to remove Noriega expeditiously, the consensus broke down. By fall 1989, Bush was under fire from critics who argued variously that the U.S. should be more forceful or that U.S. sanctions had helped Noriega by their very harshness. President Bush appeared to take personally criticisms of the failure of U.S. policy. Especially after he was strongly attacked for failing to support the October 1989 coup and characterized as "indecisive" and "wimpy," Bush had strong incentives to take military steps in Panama and bury forever the "wimp" image that threatened to reappear as a major political liability. The growing domestic political discontent (as manifested by widespread criticism of the U.S. failure to militarily support the October coup) with the continuing damage to American prestige of the failure to get rid of Noriega — appears to have had led the Bush Administration to conclude that the potential benefits of escalating the conflict outweighed the potential costs. This made military intervention possible and therefore — given U.S. goals — necessary.

Conclusion

Major United States military and intelligence interests in Panama caused the United States to intervene in Panamanian affairs. Once the U.S. was publicly committed to removing Noriega, domestic politics and international prestige made it necessary to succeed. However, the policies corresponding to the purported goals of the U.S. could not achieve these real goals. Thus, the U.S. was forced to risk offending domestic and international public opinion by invading Panama. Because the invasion was widely perceived as immediately successful in achieving its goals, the risk appears to have paid off in the short-run. Whether the benefits of this short-run perception of success will outweigh the longer-run costs in terms of relations with the third world and world opinion in general will depend on the ability of the United States to produce a stable situation in Panama and withdraw quickly. The Congressional debate over aid to Panama, press accounts questioning the Pentagon's claims of "success," and the continued need for U.S. troops to maintain order in the Panamanian countryside suggest that the costs will continue to mount for the foreseeable future.

Notes


12 *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, v. 25, no. 41, p. 1541.

13 "Is it Suez time for Panama?" *The Economist*, V. 306, no. 7540, March 5, 1988, p. 44.

14 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "The Political Situation in Panama," p. 7.


17 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "The Political Situation in Panama," p. 7.


20 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "The Political Situation in Panama," p. 49.

21 *The Economist*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.


23 Joel Bleifuss, "In Short," *In These Times*, v. 14, no. 8, January 10, 1990, p. 4.


26 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "The Political Situation in Panama," p. 12.

27 Larry Martz et al., "A Test of Wills," *Newsweek*, v. 113, no. 21, p. 38.
The Need for Rapid AIDS Testing of Blood Supplies in Rural Africa

By William L. Driscoll

Five years after transmission of AIDS through blood transfusions was virtually eliminated in the developed world, hospital patients in rural Africa who need transfusions are still receiving unscreened blood; hundreds each year are thus infected with the AIDS virus. Although a new and inexpensive technology to identify the presence of AIDS antibodies in blood supplies could save the lives of these patients, the World Health Organization and African governments have been slow to adopt the technology, largely due to a lack of awareness. Prompt action can prevent further cases of transfusion-associated AIDS—in rural Africa and in other AIDS-endemic areas—and can even result in immediate cost savings for government health ministries.

Blood used for transfusions is now screened for AIDS in the hospitals in Africa’s capital cities, and in most or all of the regional hospitals within each nation. These hospitals screen for AIDS using a test called ELISA (pronounced ee-LIES-uh), the same test used in the developed world. ELISA testing was introduced in Africa through the efforts of the World Health Organization and the international aid community. But the ELISA test is inappropriate for Africa’s smaller, district-level hospitals in rural areas: it requires costly equipment; its supplies must be kept refrigerated; and the supplies are relatively expensive, costing $3.00 per test. The result is that district hospitals, with neither the capability to screen for AIDS nor supplies of blood pre-screened by an urban hospital, routinely transfuse unscreened blood.

The Rapid AIDS Tests
Since 1987, scientists in Brazil, Japan, and the United States have been reporting their development of inexpensive, rapid tests to identify AIDS-infected blood samples. The rapid AIDS tests, though much more compact and easier to use than the ELISA test, are based on the same principle: they identify the presence of antibodies to the AIDS virus in the blood of those who carry the virus.

The United States Agency for International Development has funded a field study comparing the accuracy of five different rapid AIDS tests when used by trained technicians in Kinshasa, Zaire. The results showed excellent performances by the rapid tests “HIVCHEK,” made by DuPont, and “Serodia-HIV,” made by Fujeribio, Inc. of Tokyo. (These two tests use the term “HIV” for human immunodeficiency virus — another name for the AIDS virus.) HIVCHEK identified 98.6 percent of the blood samples with the AIDS virus, while Serodia-HIV identified 99.1 percent of the infected samples. An ELISA test used in the study was no more accurate, identifying 98.6 percent of the AIDS-infected blood samples. (The reported accuracy of each test is in comparison to the highly accurate Western blot test, an expensive test used only in research or to confirm the results of other tests.)

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HIVCHEK gives results in five minutes, while Serodia-HIV requires two hours to conduct. The quicker HIVCHEK test is more useful, because doctors in Africa's district hospitals commonly take blood on the spot from a relative of the patient, and transfuse it within fifteen minutes. Serodia-HIV costs $0.70 per test, while HIVCHEK costs $1.50 per test when purchased in quantity by a developing country. Assuming labor and administrative costs of $.50 per test, the total cost for screening a blood donation for AIDS using HIVCHEK would be $2.00.²

Costs and Benefits of Preventing AIDS Through Screening of Blood Supplies
While a cost of $2.00 per test is substantial compared to the per-capita health expenditures of African nations, it is dwarfed by the economic cost per AIDS victim in Africa, as calculated in a study by the World Bank and the World Health Organization.³ Leaving aside humanitarian concerns, the study found the economic cost per AIDS victim — in terms of lost labor productivity plus health care costs — to be at least $1,022 in rural Zaire and $2,529 in rural Tanzania (in 1985 U.S. dollars). Assuming that each person infected with the AIDS virus will ultimately die of AIDS, these figures also represent the costs for each transfusion-associated transmission of the AIDS virus. Simple division shows that AIDS screening using the HIVCHEK test, at $2.00 per test (including administrative costs), is economically justified in rural Zaire wherever at least one in 500 blood donors has AIDS, and in rural Tanzania wherever at least one in 1,250 blood donors has AIDS. Because rates of AIDS infection are higher than these levels in nearly all parts of rural Africa, rapid AIDS testing is economically justified in virtually every district hospital. Where 1 in 100 blood donors has AIDS, the benefit/cost ratio would range from 5:1 to 12:1. Where 10 in 100 blood donors has AIDS, the benefits of screening would exceed costs by a ratio of 50:1 to 125:1.

Funding Resources Available to African Nations for AIDS Screening of Blood Supplies
An African nation has at least two options for funding rural AIDS screening. The national government could appeal to the international aid community, consisting of the foreign aid programs of the developed countries. These donors have provided full funding for the first year of African national AIDS prevention programs, in amounts ranging from $2 million to $8 million per year. In comparison, a program costing $25,000 per year (plus additional first-year training costs) could screen 12,500 blood donations in a hypothetical African nation with a rural population of 5 million (assuming transfusions are given at the average African rate of 2.5 per 1,000 population per year). International donors would likely meet such a request.

Alternatively, the government could replace ELISA screening in urban hospitals with rapid AIDS screening, and use the cost savings to finance rural AIDS screening. The use of rapid tests for screening in urban hospitals has been recommended by researcher Sheila Mitchell of Family Health International in Atlanta, in a study funded by the Agency for International Development. Mitchell, after finding HIVCHEK to be more accurate than the ELISA test in field trials in Kenya and Ghana, recommended in an unpublished study ⁴ that urban African hospitals replace ELISA with HIVCHEK for screening, and confirm the results using another rapid test and the Western blot test. (Confirmation is not needed to dispose of a donated blood sample, but it is recommended before counseling a blood donor that she or he has AIDS.)

By making this change in their screening methods, urban hospitals in Africa could achieve both greater accuracy and substantial cost savings. Mitchell found that her proposed screening method would cut the cost for AIDS test supplies 80 percent — from $9.97 per test using ELISA and Western blot, to $2.16.
Thus for every 1,000 blood samples tested by Mitchell’s proposed method in Africa’s urban hospitals, the cost savings could finance approximately 4,000 rapid tests in rural areas.

Replacing Some Transfusions with More Appropriate Treatments
When rural AIDS screening of transfusion supplies is funded as part of a national AIDS plan, consideration should be given to the medical conditions for which transfusions are given. Some transfusion screening costs could likely be avoided if transfusions are given only where they are the most appropriate treatment. For instance, an estimated 100,000 children are born each year in Africa with sickle cell disease and they typically receive numerous transfusions for symptomatic anemia. Dr. Alan Fleming of the Tropical Diseases Research Center in Zambia, who in 1987 first called for AIDS screening of all blood donations in Africa, has long recommended that sickle-cell anemia be treated not by transfusions but “by measures such as prescribing prophylactic antimalarials and folic acid at established sickle-cell clinics.” Similarly, where blood is available and drugs are not, transfusions are frequently used to treat the symptoms of malaria, where treatment with chloroquine (or other drugs for chloroquine-resistant malarial parasites) would be more effective and less costly. Dr. Fleming has also observed that “most of the blood transfused in tropical Africa is used in the department of obstetrics, but certainly the most severe anemias can be prevented by prenatal care.” Where other treatments or preventive practices would be more effective and less costly than transfusing AIDS-screened blood, they should be the preferred method for preventing transfusion-associated transmission of AIDS.

The World Health Organization’s Competing Policies on AIDS Screening of Blood Supplies
The World Health Organization, which provides African nations with technical assistance in AIDS prevention, has competing policies on rapid AIDS screening of blood supplies. On one hand, WHO’s guidelines for AIDS prevention programs call for screening of blood used for transfusions wherever AIDS is endemic. WHO has also distributed a limited number of rapid AIDS tests in Africa, and began field trials of rapid tests in 1989.

Yet WHO has apparently deferred implementation of rapid AIDS screening in favor of the agency’s long-term goal of universal blood banking. Such a policy was implied by Dr. Jonathan Mann, former director of WHO’s Global Program on AIDS, in a statement at an international planning meeting for universal blood banking in May, 1988:

HIV has focused attention on the need for safe blood. Relatively low risks of transmission of HIV through blood are generally regarded as unacceptable.... It may therefore be possible to harness the political and social commitments to preventing HIV infection through blood transfusion to come closer to realizing the long-standing dream of ensuring integrated blood transfusion services throughout the world.

The obvious concern with the universal blood banking program — a concern raised at the 1988 meeting — is that full implementation of AIDS screening of blood supplies would be delayed in many parts of the world until a universal blood banking system was established.

The rationale for universal blood banking is strong: blood banking could help ensure an adequate blood supply while preventing transmission of syphilis and hepatitis B. These two diseases present serious health concerns. While syphilis can be cured by injections of penicillin (where available), no drug treatment is available for hepatitis B. In post-transfusion cases of hepatitis B, mortality in the developed
world ranges up to 15 percent. In a blood banking program, the syphilis spirochete can be identified by screening, and is also killed by refrigeration. The presence of hepatitis B virus in a blood sample may be identified through a blood test for the hepatitis B antigen.

While universal blood banking would yield significant health gains, its implementation would require considerable time and investment. Plans for universal blood banking envision blood collection vans that travel throughout each country, bringing blood to a central laboratory for screening, and distributing safe blood supplies to hospitals, which would need refrigerators to store it. A pilot program is now implementing national blood banking in five countries: Swaziland, Congo, Botswana, Vietnam, and Bolivia. Up to seven more countries will be reached in the second round of this program. But the World Health Organization has no timetable for achieving blood banking throughout Africa, and the program is expected to take many years to complete. Indeed, some countries might resist the development of a national blood banking system, knowing that they would ultimately have to bear its costs. Alternatively, if scientists (with encouragement from WHO) could develop a rapid hepatitis B test, then the two incurable diseases spread by transfusions — AIDS and hepatitis B — could both be screened out of blood supplies without the need for blood banking.

**Recommendations**

Rapid AIDS testing must be implemented quickly in rural areas where AIDS is endemic, alongside the long-term program for universal blood banking. African governments can take the initiative by including rapid AIDS screening in their AIDS prevention plans. The World Health Organization, which helps African governments prepare these plans, should press for inclusion of rural AIDS screening. Likewise, the international donor community — which reviews national AIDS programs before approving funding — should insist on widespread screening in every country where a significant percentage of blood donors carries the AIDS virus. Any of these parties can bring rapid AIDS tests to Africa’s district-level hospitals; whoever does so will save lives and prevent untold suffering.

**Notes**


2. Neither HIVCHEK nor Serodia-HIV has been shown to reliably indicate the presence of HIV-2, a relatively rare variant of the first AIDS virus, known as HIV-1. However, several manufacturers of rapid AIDS tests are evaluating newly developed tests that can identify HIV-2; ideally these tests would be employed in countries where HIV-2 is present.


13. Blood banking could possibly prevent transmission of malaria as well. Although malarial parasites cannot always be identified in blood, transfusion-associated transmission of malaria can be prevented to the extent that blood banking can provide hospitals in malarious areas with blood from non-malarious areas.
Ten Lessons in the Care and Feeding of the Elected Official

by Rob Abbot and Matt Dinkel

The dual role of public servant and politician makes most elected officials a little crazy. As a staff aide, you must recognize the forces which drive your fearless leader, study the maze of possible responses, and be ready to guide your boss out of any emerging thicket.

A politician’s success is closely tied to public perception, so measures of performance are elusive. An elected official needs a solid point of reference. The aide’s success depends, in some part, on the ability to provide reliable information and consistent advice in the whirlwind that public life can so easily become.

These Lessons are meant to offer some sense of how a staff aide can help the boss get the job done. They are based on simple principles: Believe in your boss; work to earn her confidence; anticipate disaster. Don’t be overly assertive or eager to please. Don’t go out on a limb with your own opinion until the chips are down.

Lesson #1. Keep the mission in view.

Your boss was actually elected to do a job. Help with remembering what it was. Mayors fill potholes; legislators vote; dog catchers catch dogs. Politicians tend to have vision. But when seeking re-election, they’re better off with a record.

Lesson #2. Just say, “No.”

Your boss should be the “yea sayer.” The role is to say, “Can do,” and to tell people what they want to hear. You should bear the bad news to unsuccessful supplicants and frustrated constituents. Even when you know the answer will be yes, play the pessimist and let your boss be the hero.

Lesson #3. Insist on easy access to your boss and information about spontaneous initiatives.

Elected officials are understandably inclined to wheel and deal and to keep their own counsel. Politicking between policy makers often has a certain spontaneity that defeats the most ardent staffer’s efforts to keep on top of all the boss’s contacts and commitments.

Lesson #4. Keep your boss out of the office.

Your boss will only cause trouble looking over your shoulder. Moreover, an idle boss will just come

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with more inane assignments for an already overworked staff. Every elected official (with the possible exception of a recent two-term president) will inevitably succumb to the temptation to micro-manage your orts and fiddle with your prose.

**sson #5. Let the idea be your boss's.**

Your work belongs to the boss anyway, so you might as well let the thought remain that all good ideas are generated by elected officials. That way you don't have to waste a lot of time defending them.

**sson #6. Don't let the boss outflank you.**

In discussions of policy or strategy, the leader wants a full range of opinion. Make sure that the extremes are covered so the boss can operate somewhere in the middle. Otherwise the elected official may be carried away playing devil's advocate and talk everyone into something silly.

**sson #7. Get to your boss first and last when a decision must be made.**

Many actors want to influence an elected official's decisions. You should work to identify for your boss those influences that threaten the quality and integrity of decisionmaking. In addition, when a tough decision is imminent, many politicians are susceptible to the influence of the last person who reaches them. Consequently, dedicated staffers should begin to track the decision making process early and keep up the pressure until the issue is resolved.

**sson #8. Don't put it in writing.**

Blunt, irreverent, or outrageous words may be spoken without lasting harm. However, when put in writing, even the most innocuous statement can become a bombshell. Before committing your ideas to paper, imagine your words being read by the worst junk yard dog reporter you know. Murphy's Corollary 9: Anything embarrassing will be leaked.

**sson #9. Don't ignore your doubts.**

A lot of stupid things are done in politics. They all seemed like a good idea at the time. Your job is to imagine the worst and make sure it doesn't happen.

**sson #10. Don't get discouraged.**

You are competing with influential, seasoned professionals and powerful interest groups for your boss's ear. You can't expect to win more than a fraction of the battles. Elected officials are politicians first and consequently are more likely to focus on political considerations than are their issue-oriented staffers. That doesn't mean you stop pushing for the best decision possible. When you begin to tire of the challenge, it's time to stand aside and let someone else have a go.

These suggestions do not address the question of the aide's own survival. That subject could fill a volume, but it's essence is "to thine own self be true." Remember that no matter how skillful or conscientious a staffer you may be, your fortunes are tied to those of your boss. The best knot is tight but easily untied if and when the occasion demands.