The European Union (E.U.) has served as an anchor of order and stability in Europe for decades and continues to play an important role in shaping its external environment through enlargement, or the process of expansion through the accession of new member states. However, the logic that informs contemporary E.U. enlargement policy has undergone a significant shift. This paper argues that this change is attributed to the desire by the E.U. to ensure internal security in the aftermath of the Yugoslav and Kosovo wars. E.U. internal security and enlargement policy, therefore, are inextricably linked. This has resulted in a variable and differentiated enlargement process, with the emergence of a Europe characterized by metaphorical concentric circles of fading political authority as one moves from the E.U. “core” into the European “periphery.”

I. Introduction

Through economic and political integration, the European Union (E.U.) has served as an anchor of order and stability for half a century among its
member states. The E.U. continues to play an important role in stabilizing its external environment by orienting states beyond its borders towards Brussels through enlargement, or the process of expansion through the accession of new member states. The E.U. attempts to steer the domestic politics of states outside its borders and prevent the spillover of security issues from its neighborhood through various association agreements. This policy was perfectly exemplified by the E.U.’s decision to enlarge to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and to further integrate the Western Balkans. Both decisions occurred in the aftermath of the Yugoslav and Kosovo wars, respectively. The E.U. saw the two conflicts as existential threats and concluded that enlargement was the only means by which to attain internal and regional stability.

The E.U. ensures internal security by exporting the benefits of E.U. integration to non-member states. It is insufficient, therefore, to study European integration as an isolated phenomenon. An understanding of the E.U.’s external environment is equally important in assessing how the enlargement process shapes Europe. In that light, this paper will discuss the nexus between two different E.U. enlargement frameworks and the security priorities which inform them. Specifically, contemporary E.U. enlargement can be better interpreted from a Watsonian post-sovereign model. The Watsonian model is contrasted with the Westphalian statist model that has informed previous E.U. enlargement rounds. The statist model assumes that the E.U. behaves like a state in its external relations and that there are strict divisions in both physical borders and authority between E.U. members and non-members. Alternatively, the Watsonian model is a variant of an imperial model that depicts varying degrees of integration among states. In other words, the divisions between E.U. members and non-members are blurred and the E.U.’s authority over external states varies as a result.

The Watsonian post-sovereign model underscores the limitations of state-based analytical approaches in E.U. studies and, when applied, makes the particularities of the E.U.’s order, in general, and its security provision through enlargement, in particular, become more apparent. By discussing the nature of the E.U.’s enlargement process and, by extension, the composition and structure of the E.U. itself, this paper ultimately seeks to address the conceptual and structural limits of Europe.

The discussion will proceed in four parts. The second section outlines the methodology of the paper, drawing on a comparative case study of recent E.U. enlargements to trace the causes and consequences of the shift in enlargement logic. The third section outlines the theoretical framework
and presents in greater detail both the Westphalian and Watsonian models. The fourth section presents the empirical analysis and outlines the impetus for and means of enlargement employed by the E.U. towards CEE, the Western Balkans, and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) states. The concluding section discusses select theoretical and policy implications derived from the analysis.

II. METHODOLOGY

In the growing body of literature on the E.U., there are conflicting conceptual and theoretical assumptions. The E.U. can be generally envisaged from two distinct analytical points of view, depending on how one conceptualizes the E.U. itself. The first account is the more common statist Westphalian model, which refers to the organization of the world into territorially exclusive sovereign units, each with an internal monopoly over the legitimate use of force (Caporaso 1996, 34). Although forms of the state have varied historically, states as envisioned by the Westphalian model are all bound by a common principle of sovereignty. Domestically, sovereignty implies non-interference in the internal affairs by other states and, subsequently, an international system with no overarching government. Following from this approach, Moravcsik (1993) argues that European integration is driven by cooperation among a collective of sovereign states that voluntarily pool sovereignty and reconstitute it at a higher level. Sidjanski (2001) contends that the E.U. is a federal entity and that its integration resembles a process of state building. While providing interesting insights, the focus of these authors on the “statist” aspects of integration produce inward-looking analyses that miss the nuances of the E.U.’s external relations. One cannot presuppose that the E.U. assumes the role of a state-like entity when interacting with external states. After all, the E.U. violates the key tenants of the statist model: it does not have a centralized internal governance structure, hard borders, or a monopoly over the legitimate use of force (Zielonka 2006, 148).

The “empire analogy” provides an alternative to the statist approach in understanding the E.U. and its external relations. Cooper (2000), Zielonka (2006), and Wæver (2000) view the E.U. polity and its security provision as a variant of a benevolent empire. For the purposes of this paper, an empire simply denotes a hierarchically organized system of political relationships. As such, an empire is a morally neutral concept because it does not presuppose specific mechanisms—whether consensual or coercive—by which authority is exercised. The empire analogy envisions an E.U. with varying metaphorical layers of political authority, with greater
centralization among more deeply integrated E.U. members and greater
decentralization as one moves away from the E.U. This implies that E.U.
memberhship is not uniform, but rather varied depending on different levels
of integration. Thus, not all states are sovereign equals like the Westpha-
lian model predicts. The notion that E.U. enlargement and its security
structure are indicative of an imperial structure is complex and requires
greater specificity to be used as a model. Existing literature generally fails
to provide an analytical framework for systematically discerning among
different institutional structures within such a system. Thus, it is difficult
to predict where a state might be positioned in the imperial system or
what kind of instruments might be employed in the expansion process.

Given these gaps in the current literature, this paper will test the ap-
plicability of the more complete Watsonian (1992) imperial model. The
model suggests that within an imperial system, states can be located on a
notional spectrum between absolute independence and absolute empire,
in order of increasing centralization. The model provides a framework
that differentiates individual states within an imperial system based on
the degree to which authority is centralized. It therefore provides a useful
analytical tool with which E.U. conformity to the model can be tested.

The E.U. case represents a least-likely case study for the Watsonian
imperial theory because its current structure does not unequivocally imply
empire. Because the model presupposes different levels of integration,
two cases representing two official E.U. alternatives for integration will
be briefly compared. The first is the E.U.’s framework for full integration,
or the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP).\[2\] The SAP represents
a comprehensive legal agreement between the E.U. and the Western Bal-
kans. It requires states to replicate the E.U.’s economic, legal, and politi-
cal standards, outlining the region’s path to increasing integration with
the E.U. The second represents the framework for partial integration, as
conceptualized by the European Neighbourhood Policy.\[3\] The ENP pro-
vides E.U. neighbors with a framework for deepening association without
offering full membership. If the E.U.’s structure conforms to the imperial
model, one can expect that the SAP and ENP will represent two distinct
layers of integration in the European system. States that fall under the SAP
would be more deeply integrated within the E.U. structure and subject to
greater E.U. authority, while states under the ENP would be more loosely
associated and more autonomous.

The scope of this paper is limited to the post-Cold War era because
contemporary enlargement to Eastern Europe is complicated by greater
socioeconomic discrepancies between E.U. members and non-members.
Also, today there are more diffuse threats in the European periphery that may threaten E.U. internal security. The analysis is limited to collective decisions in which the E.U. acts as a unified actor at the macro-level, rather than discussions of individual member states’ preferences. Enlargement occurs because net benefits exceed net costs for the E.U. as a whole. Furthermore, enlargement is conceived as a top-down process, not considering the interests and preferences of non-members. In other words, it examines the types of institutional arrangements the E.U. creates with its neighbors and its reasons for doing so.

Lastly, this paper proposes a security-based argument for enlargement. Security, for the purposes of this analysis, is conceptualized as “soft security,” which refers to political, social, and economic threats of non-military origin (Moustakis 2004, 141) such as organized crime, resurgent nationalism, uncontrolled migration, terrorism, and energy security that threaten the E.U. as a whole, rather than member states or individuals (Wæver 1996, 106). Therefore, soft security shocks serve as the primary impetus for the E.U. to integrate those regions in which security threats originate. The soft security approach to enlargement differs from an economic explanation based on expanding a common market. It also differs from identity-based explanations, which argue that the E.U. enlarges only when external states fully identify with its norms and values (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005, 15).

**III. Conceptualizing the Logic of Enlargement**

**The Nature of E.U. Security Interests**

Europe has witnessed a transition from the “politics of exclusion,” or the bounded and divisive process of institution building during the Cold War, to the contemporary “politics of inclusion,” which blur the aforementioned divisions (Smith 1996). The transition was paralleled by a shift in E.U. security interests due to the structural and geopolitical changes in post-Cold War Europe. During the Cold War, the E.U.’s predecessor, the European Communities (E.C.),7 ensured its security by erecting hard borders around Western Europe. After the fall of the Soviet Union, however, the E.U. maintained order by integrating the non-Western European periphery within its political, economic, and security structures. As a result, the dual division between East and West during the Cold War was replaced by a blurry spectrum of inclusion and exclusion from the E.U.’s institutions.

The transnational nature of soft security threats in the aftermath of the Cold War produces a fundamental gap between internal security and external insecurity. The E.U. has tried to bridge this gap by simultaneously exporting
internal stability and integrating outsiders from the E.U. periphery that pose or might pose a threat to E.U. internal security. Thus, enlargement has become a form of security provision whereby a state considered to be an actual or potential threat is reformed, socialized, and incorporated into the E.U. The next section examines the means by which the E.U. engages its neighbors through two theoretical models: (1) the Westphalian statist model of enlargement and (2) the Watsonian post-sovereign model of enlargement.

**Westphalian Logic of Enlargement**

The statist Westphalian model of enlargement assumes strict divisions between insiders and outsiders, with clearly defined permanent borders between sovereign actors (Browning and Joenniemi 2008, 529). Applied to external relations, the model denotes a preference for “hub-and-spoke” bilateralism between the E.U. and external states, with clear distinctions between members and non-members (Tassinari 2006, 10). The E.U. can only integrate outsiders by transcending the sovereignties of individual states and pooling sovereignty at the E.U. level (Caporaso 1996, 35). Thus, Westphalian enlargement is an all-or-nothing process. A state is either a full member or a non-member, with no middle ground variant for integration. The Westphalian model views the E.U.’s security provision as inherently tied to the territorial expansion of E.U. borders through full membership. According to this model, security is attained by institutionalizing neighbors who might pose a threat to E.U. internal security, a threat to their own security, or a combination thereof.

Thus, Westphalian enlargement results in an "internal security-enlargement dilemma." The dilemma is an apparent trade-off between increasing internal security within the E.U. and expanding the borders of the E.U. through full membership. At first glance, it appears that such a dilemma would be a transitory phenomenon. Although the accession, or the formal process of meeting E.U. standards before full membership, of relatively less stable and less developed states would decrease the E.U.’s stability in the short run, in the medium-to-long run new members are assumed to be sufficiently socialized in order to increase security. Even if socialization and integration result in successful dissipation of a threat, upon the completion of an enlargement round, the borders of the E.U. would again expand to areas that are relatively less stable. Based on the Westphalian nature of enlargement, the division between insiders and outsiders is maintained and only moves spatially outward, with no significant integration between the E.U. and the new neighbors. Westphalian enlargement is not only unsus-
tainable but also counterproductive: internal security cannot be attained because external instability increases as one moves further into the E.U. periphery. If the Westphalian logic of enlargement persists, it will result in a cycle of insecurity for the E.U. by perpetually bringing its borders closer to areas of greater instability. The expansion of the E.U.’s borders in this manner simply regenerates the dilemma. Furthermore, the E.U.’s “absorption capacity,” or its finite ability to integrate new members, also underscores the limited and unsustainable nature of a Westphalian model of enlargement (Europa 2006).

**Post-Sovereign Logic of Enlargement**

According to the post-sovereign approach, the E.U. ensures its security by strategically excluding its neighbors from full integration in the E.U. (Browning and Joenniemi 2008, 524). The resulting structure resembles an imperial order, characterized by concentric circles of fading political authority and influence of the E.U. Watson provides a comprehensive analytical model of such systems, demonstrating that imperially organized systems of states were historically constituted by: (1) a directly administered core; (2) states under the dominion of the core, with varying degrees of autonomy; (3) an area of hegemony in which the core controls the external relations of individual states; and (4) relatively independent states beyond the imperial structure (Watson 1992, 125-126). The core can be defined as a group of deeply integrated states across many domains, which concertedly exercise political authority over states within the subsequent concentric circles. The core would theoretically represent a group of states within the E.U. that are highly integrated across many domains, act concertedly, and exercise control over the rest of Europe. As seen in Figure 1, Watson’s circles are metaphorical, in the sense that they represent layers of political authority, not necessarily layers transposed over geographic borders.

The Watsonian imperial model does not take as a given the strict territorial divisions between insiders and outsiders like the Westphalian model; instead, it depicts a layered spatial map whereby many states can be considered to lie on a spectrum within the E.U.’s institutional structure. Because states are neither inside nor outside, the model blurs the absolute distinctions between members and non-members. Through such a post-sovereign modality, the E.U. can approach strategic security issues through a soft security lens within the enlargement process, delinking territoriality and security (O’Brennan 2006, 156). Because internal security and external security are fundamentally linked, the E.U. entrenches a range of soft security concerns in its external policy, resulting in an increasingly invasive policy towards
its less stable neighbors without the explicit prospect for full integration (Lavenex 2004, 681). The depth and scope of this mode of E.U. external governance varies largely based on the nature of E.U. interests with the respective external state. Ameliorating the security dilemma, therefore, requires different grades of integration, which effectively delinks security and territoriality. As a result, the E.U. can attain internal security by creating a security buffer around its borders, consisting of partially integrated neighboring states. These neighbors can meet security challenges before they reach the E.U. because their associative agreements with the E.U. require implementation of substantial security reforms. This suggests that the Watsonian post-sovereign logic of enlargement can remedy the E.U.’s security dilemma. E.U. enlargement, then, should be re-conceptualized in a way that allows for differentiation in membership, which is an idea that has been underexplored in the literature.

Re-conceptualizing Enlargement

Articles 6(1) and 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provide the legal and geographical limits for E.U. membership, stating that any “European State” that respects the principles of “liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law,” may apply to become a member of the E.U. The Copenhagen Accession Criteria complement the TEU, because they stipulate that prospective

Figure 1. Applying Watson’s metaphorical concentric circles to contemporary Europe

![Map of Europe with concentric circles](http://www.yoel.info/world_outline_map_blank_public_domain_royalty_free.gif)
members must conform to political and economic criteria and accept the Community acquis, or the full corpus of E.U. law. However, enlargement policy, as codified solely in E.U. treaties, misses the subtleties of the process. While only Croatia, Macedonia, and Turkey are official candidates, a number of states satisfy the official membership criteria on paper. As many as twenty-four states have implemented reforms through their respective E.U. agreements.

According to the above definition, there is a clear distinction between conceptualizing enlargement as the admittance of new members and conceptualizing enlargement as the expansion of the E.U.’s authority (Stefanova 2005, 60). The former assumes that, once admitted, incumbent and new members are bound in an equitable political relationship with equal rights, obligations, and influence on internal decision-making. The latter assumes an asymmetric, top-down relationship that differentiates between incumbent, new, and future members, similar to a layered Watsonian model, which is more appropriate than exclusively conceptualizing enlargement as the admittance of new members. The E.U. and external states have entered into association agreements of varying substantive depth and complexity, which could be either transitory or permanent arrangements. They range anywhere from memoranda of understanding to preferential trade agreements to accession agreements for future members. This institutional variety in external relations implies a non-uniform approach to integration of outsiders into the E.U.’s structure. Thus, the process of enlargement can be defined as a gradual and formal process of horizontal institutionalization of organized rules and norms (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 5) that can vary based on the degree of association. This definition distinguishes formal enlargement (e.g. institution-building, contractual relations) from informal enlargement (e.g. societal interaction, economic interdependence, shared values and norms). More importantly, it also allows for differentiation in European integration.

According to the post-sovereign model of enlargement, the degree of institutionalization between the E.U. and external states is differentiated in layers. As such, states proximal to the E.U. are more integrated and less autonomous than states situated further in the periphery. Distant states are more autonomous and bound through looser association agreements, as summarized in Figure 2. The following section will outline a process by which such an institutional arrangement can emerge.
Figure 2. Comparison between two structurally differentiated layers of the E.U. system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prospective Members e.g. Macedonia</th>
<th>Wider Europe e.g. Ukraine</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional Framework</strong></td>
<td>- Stabilization and Association Process</td>
<td>- European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Accession/European Partnership</td>
<td>- Action Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logic of Content</strong></td>
<td>- Integrative process</td>
<td>- Associative process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Legal contract</td>
<td>- Political agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Explicit membership perspective</td>
<td>- Degree of integration is ambiguous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Strict conditionality and monitoring</td>
<td>- Soft conditionality and monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authority Relationship with the E.U.</strong></td>
<td>- Consolidation of authority to the E.U.</td>
<td>- Authority of E.U. is diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Significant loss of autonomy over internal and external affairs</td>
<td>- More autonomous individual states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Limited ability to influence scope and content of agreements</td>
<td>- Greater ability to outline individual interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Euro-convergence Snapshot</strong></td>
<td>- Full adoption of <em>acquis</em></td>
<td>- Selective adoption of <em>acquis</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Fulfill Copenhagen Criteria</td>
<td>- Fulfill Copenhagen Criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Mandatory reform in security, justice, and home affairs</td>
<td>- Mandatory reform in security, justice, and home affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Participate in E.U.’s joint positions and actions</td>
<td>- Optional convergence in joint positions and actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Promote regional cooperation</td>
<td>- Promote regional cooperation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
This section traces how the E.U. has changed the ways in which it engages its external environment. It outlines the E.U.’s decision to include countries in CEE, using the Westphalian statist logic of enlargement as a theoretical framework. It then attempts to show why a post-sovereign logic of enlargement was employed for the Western Balkans and the ENP states.

**Westphalian Enlargement and CEE**

Before 1993, enlargement was not explicitly on the E.C. policy agenda. Instead, the E.C. engaged CEE through trade and aid agreements, and later, association agreements designed to promote domestic reform (Skalnes 2005, 217). The E.C. noted that there was no link between association and eventual membership; the association agreements were perceived to be a permanent solution for the region at that point in time, because the E.U. had no intention to integrate CEE (Sedelmeier and Wallace 1996, 370). However, enlargement preferences were reassessed based on security imperatives in the backdrop of the Yugoslav war. The most significant factor leading to a more proactive E.U. external policy, including placing enlargement on the agenda, was regional instability and Europe’s inability to mitigate the conflict in Yugoslavia. According to the European Council, the security concerns resulting from the Yugoslav conflict, including the potential influx of refugees and the conflict’s spill over into other neighboring states, suggested integration as a possible solution (Larsen 2000, 338). By giving CEE states prospects for E.U. membership, the E.U. aimed to provide stability in a region lacking a viable security structure (Higashino 2004, 354).

In 1992, the E.C. recognized the significance of the security dimension in enlargement, arguing that European institutional structures did not respond to the need to include CEE under a coherent security structure. Consequently, the European Commission recommended full membership as the solution to the CEE stability dilemma. This recommendation was accepted at a 1993 European Council meeting in Copenhagen (European Commission 1992). The E.U.’s subsequent adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria purposefully raised the threshold for future membership. The criteria required CEE to undertake political, economic, and legal reforms to ensure its accession would not be a socioeconomic or security burden on the E.U. The accession prospects of CEE states were thus tied to their ability to attain the relatively high standards of socioeconomic and political development of the E.U. While the Copenhagen Criteria were a conscious
step by the E.U. to maintain the pace of internal integration, the criteria also raised the bar for E.U. membership and effectively furthered the gap between insiders and outsiders. According to the Westphalian logic, both incumbent members and eventual CEE members were to be relative equals after enlargement and, by extension, more distinct than those outside E.U. borders.

The European Commission deemed the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia to have made sufficient progress and began negotiating accession agreements in 1998. The remaining five CEE states—namely Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania—were excluded pending more substantial reform (Skalnes 2005, 224). However, the conflict in Kosovo in 1999 brought a similar shift in E.U. enlargement policy to respond to the changing security environment. The European Commission’s Composite Paper in October 1999 categorized the Kosovo crisis as an “existential threat” for Europe. The paper proposed implementing an “emergency measure” to establish a new rule to allow accession negotiations with states that fulfilled the political aspects of the Copenhagen Criteria, even if they did not yet fully comply with the other aspects (European Commission 1999b). Consequently, the E.U.’s December 1999 Helsinki Summit concluded that enlargement served as a means to “lend a positive contribution to the security and stability on the European continent” (European Council 1999). By February 2000, the Council agreed to begin accession negotiations with the five formerly ineligible CEE states. In light of the crisis in the Balkans, the E.U. had to balance the need to stabilize its neighbors with the legal requirement that all members fully satisfy the Copenhagen criteria. The E.U. decided on a compromise. It lowered the threshold for negotiating accession; however, satisfying the Copenhagen criteria remained a requirement for membership. As a result, the E.U. was able to provide concrete membership prospects to the remaining states of CEE, and future candidate states thereafter. The European Commission concluded that binding states to the enlargement process before satisfying all conditions for accession was necessary to promote the peace and prosperity of Europe (European Commission 1999b).

The E.U. had no direct security interests in CEE immediately after the Cold War. The low level of institutionalization supports the notion that enlargement is driven by E.U. security interests. Although CEE failed to be integrated because it posed no direct security threat, the negative externalities of the Yugoslav and Kosovo wars provided the impetus for the E.U. to not only deepen relations with CEE but also temporarily lower
the accession negotiation criteria for five states. The E.U. remedied the emerging internal-external security gap through integration in the form of full membership for CEE, affirming that internal security creation was inseparable from enlargement. The timing of key decisions for enlargement indicates that potential soft security threats in the external environment served as the catalyst for deepening relations. The E.U.’s policy towards CEE was also indicative of the reactionary nature of E.U. external policy. Attempting to adapt to the changing geopolitical climate of Europe, and without a notable security culture of its own, the E.U.’s responses were largely crisis-driven.

The means by which the E.C. initially engaged CEE, the region’s subsequent inclusion in the E.U., and the E.U.’s exclusion of other states all indicated a Westphalian logic of enlargement. In the aftermath of the Cold War, CEE states were eager to show their European credentials and sought E.U. accession. The response was a low level of association without formal integration as the region was considered to be in the E.U. periphery. However, when the E.U. decided to fully integrate CEE, it did not offer intermediary forms of membership but rather subscribed to a one-size-fits-all undifferentiated approach towards the states of the region.

The strict delineation between the E.U. and its future members, on the one hand, and outsiders, on the other, was not only exemplified by what the E.U. did, but also by what it did not do. While the E.U. agreed to full integration for all ten CEE states, it lacked the foresight to also build stronger institutional ties with the relatively less stable states that would eventually border an enlarged E.U. Following CEE accession, the E.U. would border the Western Balkans to the southeast and Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova to the east. The E.U. had failed to develop substantial ties with these bordering regions in the wider E.U. periphery, with the relationships largely limited to policy dialogue (White, McAllister, and Light 2002, 139-140). The E.U.’s eastward enlargement made the divergence between CEE and states with no accession prospects more apparent. Increasing association with CEE states diverted E.U. aid, trade, and diplomatic attention toward CEE. It also disrupted visa-free travel and stimulated institution-building and structural reform in acceding states, leaving the wider periphery without a stimulus for reform (Fritz 2005, 203). Lastly, though the acceding CEE states made explicit demands for deeper institutionalization with future neighbors, such a regime was not manifested until a decade later as the Eastern Partnership. This evidence supports the undifferentiated Westphalian logic of enlargement. The CEE enlargement showed a myopic E.U. external policy with regards to E.U.
security interests. The policy assumed that E.U. internal security could be maintained by fully integrating a selection of immediate neighbors as full members (i.e. the ten CEE states) while almost fully ignoring its future, relatively less stable neighbors (i.e. the Western Balkans and Ukraine). The E.U. could not attain long-term security by enlarging based on a Westphalian logic that fully integrated some states and fully excluded others given the nature of its soft security interests.

Post-Sovereign Enlargement and the Western Balkans
Immediately following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the E.C. developed a policy of containment in the Western Balkans that was consistent with the exclusionary nature of a Westphalian logic of enlargement (Letica 2004, 228). In 1994, regional integration emerged as a possible solution to instability in the Balkans. At the request of the Commission, a high-level expert panel published the *Durieux Report* on implementing a common European foreign and security policy. The report concluded that the Yugoslav conflict could be linked to the E.U.’s failure to convince the region about the benefits of E.U. accession (Durieux Report 1994, 5-7). Arguably, the report’s findings were an implicit recognition of the ineffectiveness of the Westphalian logic that had informed E.U.-Balkan relations. In late 1996, the E.U. established the Royaumont Process as the new framework to implement the Dayton peace agreement that ended the war in Bosnia after the break-up of Yugoslavia. The process concluded that stabilizing the Balkans after the war required a greater role by the E.U. in preventative diplomacy and increasing regional cooperation (European Commission 1999a). The initiative was analogous to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements signed with Eastern Europe in that it adopted a one-size-fits-all policy that effectively excluded Western Balkan states from membership. Thus, at the post-Yugoslav war juncture, E.U. policy was consistent with the Westphalian logic of enlargement: Brussels’s eye was fixed on CEE.

Just as the Kosovo crisis provided the impetus for an intensified enlargement process for CEE, it exerted a similar effect on the Western Balkans. By May 1999, the European Commission recommended a new type of association agreement for the Western Balkans to allow the countries to be fully integrated into the European structure. This agreement was ultimately affirmed at the 2000 Feira European Council. Adopted officially as the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), the SAP recognized that the main motivation for reform in the Balkans was the prospect of membership. As such, a more flexible approach to integration, which would explicitly allow differentiated relations with the E.U. in the context
of enlargement, was needed (European Commission 2009b). The SAP’s implementation throughout the 2000s signified a shift in the logic that drove E.U. enlargement policy. Specifically, the E.U. opened the door for a post-sovereign enlargement policy that was receptive to enlargement without necessarily enlarging formal borders.

Increased association with the Western Balkans again exemplifies the prevalence of soft security considerations underpinning the process of enlargement. The E.U.’s main concern was that continuing instability and conflict in the Balkans would spill over into the E.U., as the region was considered both an exporter of domestic problems and a transmitter of international crime (Andreev 2004, 379). The 1999 Kosovo conflict served as an existential threat for the E.U. and a catalyst for deeper integration with the region through the SAP framework.

The Western Balkans proved to be the watershed case, however, because while it initially conformed to a Westphalian model, subsequent E.U. policy indicates a transition to a post-sovereign logic of enlargement. Only after it became evident that CEE would be fully integrated into the E.U. did the E.U. propose a more proactive and flexible policy for the Balkans. The E.U. could no longer provide for its own security territorially, absorbing some states through full membership while almost fully excluding others. The E.U. explicitly recognized that it had to play a vital role in shaping its neighborhood because the integration of acceding states would bring the E.U. closer to instability and insecurity (European Commission 2000). In other words, the E.U. implicitly recognized what this paper terms the “internal security-enlargement paradox.” The 2000 Feira Council concluded that all states in the Western Balkans were considered as potential E.U. candidates; however, in the absence of full accession, the Commission aimed for their “fullest possible integration,” noting it was “vital for the stability and security of Europe” (European Council 2000).

Despite the E.U.’s affirmation of the European perspective of all SAP signatories, the E.U. has been less committed to enlargement in the Western Balkans than it was for CEE. This supports the notion that recent enlargement is based on a post-sovereign logic that could result in a state of suspension between inclusion and exclusion. At the 2005 Brussels European Council, the E.U. presidency affirmed that future enlargement negotiations were to be an “open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand,” implying that potential members might have to be absorbed into European structures through the strongest possible bond absent of full accession (Council of the European Union 2005). This shift in enlargement policy explicitly opened the door for
non-members to be included in the E.U. institutional structures in varying degrees, unlike the one-size-fits-all policy applied to the CEE states. In practice, the new enlargement policy would entail integration of states in layers of concentric circles that precluded a renewed security dilemma.

The relationship between the E.U. and prospective member states corresponds with the first layer on Watson’s spectrum, as seen in Figure 1. In institutional terms, this layer consists of the SAP framework, which subjects states either to Accession Agreements (for candidates) or to Europe Agreements (for future candidates). The institutional relationship simultaneously entails exporting E.U. norms and standards and incorporating outsiders into the de facto European security apparatus. Underpinning this dual process is the principle of conditionality, or the governance strategy by which the E.U. provides external incentives, whether material or political, to induce the target state to comply with certain E.U. conditions. This relationship can be conceived as imperial because it is inherently top-down: it entails a rule transfer from the E.U. to external states, it is subject to strict conditionality and monitoring, and it ultimately results in the external restriction of a candidate’s sovereignty. For instance, individual partnerships are legal documents whose initial clauses stipulate that, “the Council is to decide on the principles, priorities and conditions to be contained in the partnerships, as well as any subsequent adjustments” (Council of the European Union 2008). In other words, the substantive aspects of the relationship are defined by the E.U., which sets priorities for reform and defines the “common” principles and norms on which they are based. The applicant state, therefore, has a weaker bargaining power relative to the E.U. This asymmetry has increased since CEE enlargement, resulting in concessions and compromises that increasingly reflect the interests of the E.U. (Moravcsik and Vachundova 2005, 199-200).

This policy is also benign, as it ultimately entails integration into the E.U. structure and produces material and political gains for integrated states. Furthermore, sovereignty is, on paper, voluntarily surrendered through institutionalization rather than usurped through force by the E.U. The partnerships are indicative of the E.U.’s expanded authority through civilian means, rather than military conquest and territorial expansion. Expansion of the E.U.’s political authority is inherently incentive driven. The E.U.’s objective towards its neighbors is not conquest, but rather stability and peace by exporting its values and institutions, as seen in the export of the E.U. acquis. E.U. policy towards countries on its periphery, therefore, has a moral dimension which contributes to its founding principles of peace, stability, and security, as pursued through integration and enlargement.
Nevertheless, because the E.U. maintains significant control over candidates’ internal and external affairs, notably in the soft security realm, candidate states fall under the E.U. “dominion” category on Watson’s spectrum. It is no surprise, therefore, that some scholars claim no other country has embarked on a comparable strategy short of colonization or annexation (Rhein 2007). In that light, the term “Accession Partnership” is a misnomer because despite the E.U.’s benign instruments, the structural relationship is asymmetrical. It is precisely this paradox that makes E.U. enlargement policy unique. Certainly, it is difficult to reconcile the E.U.’s promotion of democratic principles with the direct control of people beyond its borders. If enlargement is indeed conceived as the expansion of the E.U.’s imperial reach, it represents empire-building by alternative means.

**Post-Sovereign Enlargement and Europe’s Neighborhood**

In the mid-1990s, the E.U. signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with former Soviet Union states to the east and Association Agreements with African states to the south. The agreements simply increased coordination with the E.U. and, as a result, the E.U. had a minimal influence on those states’ domestic and external affairs (Smith 1998). The impetus for deeper institutionalization of the region through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), however, was primarily driven by soft security concerns. The ENP is a direct response to previous enlargement rounds and perfectly exemplifies an attempt to avoid a renewed security dilemma. In light of the then-impending enlargement to CEE, a 2001 Commission communication recognized soft security issues as the main concern for the E.U.’s wider neighborhood (European Commission 2001). The threats were reaffirmed in the E.U.’s security doctrine developed in 2003 as the European Security Strategy (ESS). The ESS views enlargement as a positive process, and also as bringing the E.U. closer to “troubled areas” and requiring a more strategic and engaged E.U. external policy.

The ESS outlines several strategic objectives by which to defend E.U. internal security. The first is to address threats directly, noting that “[w]ith the new threats, the first line of defense will often be abroad” and, consequently, the need to “be ready to act before a crisis occurs” (ESS 2003, 6). Therefore, the ESS calls for a proactive external policy of prevention by applying the principles of enlargement to ensure a stable external environment. Second, the E.U. is to shape security in its neighborhood, with the ESS stipulating that, “integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the E.U. closer to troubled areas. Our task is to
promote a ring of well governed countries” (ESS 2003, 7). The ESS not only envisages the E.U. as a strategic actor, but also defines its geostrategic interests, its zone of influence, and the means by which it will engage its neighborhood. The logic underpinning the ESS’s objectives is directly reproduced in the ENP (European Commission 2004). Thus, the ENP can be seen as the political manifestation of E.U. security prerogatives for the E.U. periphery.

The ENP is the outcome of a pragmatic response to an altered external environment. It represents a policy that is a diluted form of the SAP framework, such that its aims and instruments are consistent with previous enlargement policies (Kelley 2006, 31-32). However, the ENP covers a broader geographical scope than the SAP, applicable to immediate neighbors of the E.U., whether by land or sea. The ENP also exemplifies the blurred line between internal and external security, as the Union’s capacity to provide security and stability to its citizens is no longer distinguishable from its interest in its neighbors’ stability (European Commission 2003). Consequently, the ENP’s objective is to share the benefits of enlargement with non-members that share the E.U.’s fundamental values and interests in an increasingly integrated relationship (European Commission 2004). In return for concrete progress in implementation of political and economic reforms and partial alignment with the _acquis_, E.U. neighbors stand to benefit from the prospect of increased economic integration with the E.U. (European Commission 2003). Therefore, the ENP’s development is symptomatic of the conflation of the E.U.’s internal and external security concerns. The E.U. incorporates states under the ENP framework primarily to stabilize its border regions and, by extension, its security interests.

The ENP’s key instruments are bilaterally negotiated Action Plans, which are tailor-made political, but not legal, documents. Therefore, ENP states are not legally bound to the content of the Action Plans. Because the relations between the E.U. and its neighborhood vary according to the geographic location, political and economic situation, capacities for reform, and the perception of E.U. interests, the ENP is anchored upon differentiation. The explicit goal of the respective Action Plans is “more than association and less than membership” (European Commission 2009a). Therefore, the ENP remains structurally distinct from the process of enlargement, although it does not predetermine how relationships with the E.U. may develop in the future (European Commission 2009a). This essentially affirms that the integration of ENP states is an open-ended process that will largely depend on the degree of convergence with European norms and values, implying a form of “soft conditionality” (Kelley 2006, 36).
Accordingly, the Action Plans are less intrusive with regards to control over the domestic and external affairs of concerned states. The Plans are, nevertheless, acutely E.U.-centric, evoking an asymmetry in the relationship between the E.U. and ENP states. First, the ENP does not build new institutions to coordinate and implement Action Plans; that role is retained solely by the European Commission. This raises questions about the “joint ownership” notion underpinning the Action Plans, which assumes that plans are founded on the needs, capacities, and interests of both the state concerned and the E.U. Second, the Action Plans are negotiated bilaterally. The power asymmetry between the E.U. and individual states means that bilateralism on paper is often unilateralism at the negotiation table (Browning and Joenniemi 2008, 40-41). Third, the structural asymmetry between the E.U. and ENP states is also implicitly revealed in the text of the Action Plans. The inherent ambiguity of the plans in defining the means and ends of the E.U.-ENP relationship results in a vague process that leaves ENP states unable to discern, a priori, their final degree of integration. This ambiguity is deliberate; in the absence of hard conditionality, ambiguity keeps states oriented toward Brussels by emphasizing that, theoretically, there always exists the possibility of deeper institutionalization (Tassinari 2006, 9). In sum, the ENP is a “light,” less intrusive, and less influential institutional variant of the SAP. Therefore, ENP states fall under the “hegemony” ring on Watson’s spectrum.

V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

By tracing the means by which the E.U. has engaged its external environment, this paper has proposed that, primarily due to security concerns, contemporary E.U. enlargement policy has undergone a significant shift. The result has been a differentiated map of fading political authority across Europe. The transition was substantiated by the introduction of the internal security-enlargement dilemma, which assumes that internal security and enlargement are interrelated. While conceptually useful, the dilemma is difficult to prove empirically and the conclusions must be taken with some caution. The Yugoslav and Kosovo wars exemplified a shift in E.U. policy, one where E.U. security interests played an important role in the decision to enlarge to include CEE and further integrate the Western Balkan and ENP states. The shift in policy indicated a shift to a Watsonian post-sovereign logic of enlargement. This paper has argued that the Watsonian model is more appropriate than the Westphalian model to explain the logic of contemporary E.U. enlargement.

In considering the differences between the SAP and ENP frameworks,
the preliminary test of Watson’s imperially-structured model indicates that it is plausible to see E.U. external relations as ordered upon concentric circles. However, Watson’s model also predicts the existence of a hard core, which this paper did not consider because its scope was focused on external relations and has assumed the E.U. to be a unitary actor. Whether such a core exists could be tested in future research. Moreover, E.U. enlargement does not occur in an institutional vacuum. The E.U.’s soft security provision is also complemented by NATO’s hard security provision, which was not addressed in this paper. Finally, this paper has not considered alternative explanations for enlargement. For instance, a constructivist institutional approach suggests that convergence of identity drives enlargement. Testing whether there exists a spectrum of identity akin to Watson’s model could provide a new, albeit very challenging, avenue for future research.

Conceptualizing the E.U. polity in a post-sovereign manner can also inform various policy-making processes. Beyond the E.U.’s relatively well-developed political culture in promoting peace and development, the E.U.’s security and strategic culture remains underdeveloped. It is increasingly apparent that the E.U. aims to have a robust security culture and more important role in the regional soft security arena. The resulting security order is likely to be organized according to concentric and, perhaps, overlapping layers of relations, serving to progressively buffer the E.U. from threats beyond its borders. This analysis has also shown the stabilizing effects of the E.U.’s enlargement policy, specifically with regards to the states of CEE and the Western Balkans. Therefore, enlargement should proceed based on a post-sovereign logic, which implies that many external states can be simultaneously integrated in the E.U. structure. The degree to which they integrate will depend on the nature of E.U. security interests. It will also depend on the capacity of the respective states to meet E.U. requirements for accession and continue domestic reforms without immediate benefits. Halting the enlargement process, or spelling out its geographic limits, would be counterproductive to the extent that it redraws dividing lines between insider and outsider states similar to the politics of exclusion of the Cold War. Moreover, closing the door on those states hopeful of accession might remove their main impetus for reform, namely E.U. membership and access to the single market. E.U. enlargement policy should therefore continue to “place nobody as non-European but everybody as more or less European, more or less close to the center of Europeanness” (Wæver 2000, 263). In other words, there should be no finality to “Europe.”

Enlargement based on a post-sovereign logic also demands differentiation in membership. As such, the official policy of E.U. enlargement should be
redefined on a spectrum from “integrative enlargement” (i.e. SAP states) to “associative enlargement” (i.e. ENP states). The former suggests a greater degree of integration, consolidation, centralization, and lost sovereignty. The latter implies a lower level of association that is more decentralized, less intrusive, and results in a relatively lower level of lost sovereignty. The E.U.’s ability to elicit reforms will be greater in more proximal layers to the E.U., with fading authority as one moves toward the periphery. Consequently, if a state is of particular security importance to the E.U., the E.U. would employ institutional mechanisms associated with integrative enlargement and the SAP. The E.U. would also formally disaggregate the ENP between European states that might have a membership prospect (e.g. Ukraine) and non-European states with no such prospect (e.g. Morocco). States in the former group would be subject to a legally binding structural framework resembling a synthesis between the SAP and ENP, while states in the latter group would remain under a political instrument like the ENP. Explicitly differentiating among ENP states can thus increase the E.U.’s authority over the legally bound and more integrated states. As a result, the E.U. would have an increased capacity to elicit reforms deeper into its neighborhood according to its security interests. Because of the political nature of enlargement, the E.U. would likely refrain from explicitly admitting to the existence of such gradated forms of membership. In reality, however, membership has been defined differently for different states.

This paper conceptualizes enlargement as an inherently top-down, E.U.-centric policy informed by security interests. Previous enlargement rounds have exhibited a pattern that premised enlargement on E.U. security imperatives and ascribed key decisions to being driven by exogenous factors. Enlargement has been a reactionary process responding to security shocks in the E.U. neighborhood and, to an extent, security interests have trumped the level of socioeconomic development of outside states with regard to final enlargement decisions. In order to better ensure regional stability and internal security, the E.U. must adopt a more proactive approach to its external relations, rather than responding primarily to crisis situations. This would entail increased coordination and cooperation in security matters between the E.U. and non-member states beyond the official policy of enlargement. Some examples might include an enhanced role for Europol in signing individual strategic agreements with outside states, or the establishment of intermediary security regimes for cooperation. Such initiatives can increase transparency and confidence, produce working sub-regional partnerships and, most importantly, create an inclusive form of security and a common strategic culture across Europe.
From a theoretical perspective, the E.U., in its current form, does not fit the common Westphalian model of a territorially sovereign entity. Conversely, the European structure is more indicative of an imperial configuration, owing to the development of an authority structure with concentric circles emanating from the E.U. The contemporary European system is characterized by both hierarchical and anarchical principles, and the E.U. clearly exhibits the slow emergence of a post-Westphalian order within the constraints of the Westphalian state system. The E.U. case also demonstrates that studies of internal security should not be restricted to state-based analytical approaches. In applying Watson’s model, the nuances of the E.U.’s soft security structure become more evident, and a similar model can undoubtedly be applied to domains other than security.

This paper has shown that although the era of classical European empires has passed, the contemporary European system is nevertheless a multi-level order consisting of a relatively integrated E.U., a proximal neighborhood that is perpetually en route to Europe, and a more distant European periphery that is as much “European” as it is not. One can therefore speak not of one politically united “Europe,” but rather of multiple “Europes.” Wherever and whatever Europe might be, this paper has shown that its definition will be, in part, derived from a security logic.

Notes

1 For the purposes of this paper, “neighborhood” refers to all E.U. non-member states which border the E.U. by land or sea.

2 The E.U. has diffuse decision-making, multiple jurisdictions, cultural heterogeneity, and fuzzy borders. In contrast, traditional empires have a clear hierarchy, highly centralized authority, hard borders, and cultural homogeneity. See Zielonka 2006, 1.

3 The SAP framework includes Croatia and Macedonia (as candidate states bound by Accession Partnerships), and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Albania (as potential candidates bound by European Partnerships).

4 The ENP framework includes: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine.

5 I have not considered the preferences of E.U. institutions like the European Commission, the European Council, and the Council of the European Union, all of which have a role in the enlargement process. While important, including a discussion of individual member state and institutional preferences would be at the expense of theoretical parsimony.
Alternatively, hard security refers to the traditional military defence of states. Deeper E.U. cooperation in hard security is unlikely under the Common Foreign and Security Policy given the role of NATO and thus is excluded from analysis. The E.C. was the precursor to the E.U. until the 1992 Treaty on European Union absorbed it into the E.U. The “E.C.” form is used to describe events before the implementation of the Union in 1993, and “E.U.” is used for events thereafter.

I have borrowed and modified Browning & Joenniemi’s concept of the “integration-security dilemma.”


The Eastern Partnership is an institutional arrangement that upgrades existing relationships with the E.U. to far-reaching association agreements. The Partnership avoids any discussion of full membership.


There arguably exists a “variable core” of overlapping institutional arrangements in the E.U. as opposed to a “hard core.” A variable core entails a group of deeply integrated states; however, the states which form the core would shift depending on the issue domain. Thus, one can speak of several “cores” of integration within the E.U. See Tassinari 2006.

E.U. enlargement is often coterminous with that of NATO because NATO membership can indicate a state’s stability.

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