THE MISSEGREGATION OF THE TWIN CITIES: HOW THE MINNESOTA LAND USE PLANNING ACT OF 1976 FAILED TO STABLY INTEGRATE THE TWIN CITIES METROPOLITAN AREA

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INTRODUCTION

Housing in communities across the United States continues to be racially and socioeconomically segregated. Despite widespread recognition of the problem, efforts to integrate housing through policy reform have often proven fragile. In the late 1970s, arguably the best regional housing integration program in the United States was underway in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area (known colloquially as the Twin Cities). Driven by a progressive spirit and the financial support of federal housing policy, the Metropolitan Council—the Twin Cities’ regional planning agency—sought to develop a collaborative approach to land use planning and development. With the passage of the Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act of 1976 (LUPA), the state government had given the Council the tools it needed to make its regional dreams come true.

The law’s primary goal was to contain urban sprawl. Yet in the minds of many, of equal importance was how the law would empower the
Metropolitan Council to comply with the Fair Housing Act of 1968, the landmark federal legislation that demanded that state and local officials “affirmatively further” fair housing in their communities. As such, a key metric of LUPA’s success was its ability to racially and economically desegregate the central cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul through “fair share” distribution of low- and moderate-income housing to nearby suburban areas. And in its first few years of passage, LUPA looked to be a runaway success: by 1980—a mere four years after the law’s passage—black residents were seven percent less likely to live in highly segregated census tracts than in 1970 (Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity 2015, 5). Importantly, the percentage of cities in the region that offered subsidized housing grew from 8 percent to 51 percent during that same time frame (Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity 2015, 5). By 1979, 40 percent of subsidized housing units were located in the suburbs, and between 1971 and 1979, almost 75 percent of new subsidized houses were built in the suburbs, a national best (Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity 2015, 13). On all accounts, the Twin Cities region was an exemplar in racial and economic housing integration in the 1970s.

However, the tides shifted in the early 1980s, as cracks in LUPA and the Metropolitan Council failed to withstand the pressure of uninterested policymakers, a dynamic interest group environment, changing federal housing attitudes, and more. By 1983, progress on housing integration had effectively stopped, and by many metrics, the Twin Cities was worse off in the mid-2010s than in the mid-1970s. For example, as of 2015, over 41 percent of blacks live in majority-minority census tracts, the highest level since 1970; meanwhile, only 5.1 percent of non-Hispanic whites live in such neighborhoods, highlighting the vast differences in neighborhood diversity that LUPA in part aimed to reduce (Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity 2015, 5).

Why did integration fail in the Twin Cities? How did fair housing arrive on Minnesota’s political agenda with such force, only to be systematically ignored and forgotten less than a decade after passage? I argue that focusing events such as the 1968 urban riots forced policy elites at the state and federal level to open up a policy window that enabled fair housing initiatives to enter federal, state, and local political agendas. I contend that the resultant policies, saddled with weak enforcement measures and supported by unstable, modestly invested coalitions, led to a weak reform that had little chance of standing the test of time. Finally, I suggest how this story might have ended differently—how the state legislature could have structured LUPA to better withstand political pressures and fundamentally alter political structures to maintain its objectives.
FRAMEWORK
The process of policymaking can be broken down into a set of subprocesses, including 1) the setting of the agenda; 2) the specification of policy options from which to choose; 3) the choice of a particular policy option; and 4) the implementation of the policy decision (Kingdon 2003). In order to understand some of the reasons fair housing policy reform may rise and fall in short order, I look at a case study of the Twin Cities metropolitan area regional housing policy landscape in the mid- to late-20th century, focusing specifically on how fair housing became prominent on the national and local policy agendas, why officials selected certain policy options with weak enforcement measures, and how those policy choices left the reform subject to erosion. Throughout this case study, John W. Kingdon's theory of political agenda-setting and Eric M. Patashnik's policy reform analysis guide my approach. These perspectives focus on how social reforms often require stable coalitions before and after passage in order to endure, especially once the focusing events that force an issue onto political agendas fade into memory.

THE PRE-REFORM SITUATION
In 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson established an 11-member commission to study the causes of the urban riots ripping across American cities. The resulting 1968 document, commonly known as the Kerner Report, began with an ominous warning of America's trajectory: “Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal” (United States Kerner Commission 1968, 1). The panel cautioned that an increasingly segregated society would threaten America's future, and in a bold declaration, the commission unequivocally implicated white society in the creation and maintenance of the American ghettos that separated black people from whites:

> What white Americans have never fully understood but what the Negro can never forget—is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it (United States Kerner Commission 1968, 1).

The commission ultimately recommended federal action on employment, education, the welfare system, and housing. In regard to housing, the panel called for “a comprehensive and enforceable federal open housing law” that would cover all housing sales and rentals, as well as a reorientation of
federal housing programs to better distribute low- and moderate-income housing outside of central cities—a “metropolitan dispersal strategy” that would break up the ghettos and integrate metropolitan areas across racial and class lines (Keating 1994). Four weeks after the report’s release, Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated, precipitating urban riots in more than 100 cities throughout the country. President Johnson capitalized on the civil unrest: he urged Congress to pass his oft-opposed fair housing bill as soon as possible to prevent further destruction. Less than a week later—after years of failed attempts and intense opposition—the Fair Housing Act of 1968 became law.

**Fertile Soil for Agenda Setting**

Focusing events can serve as the necessary spark to power new or existing coalitions toward placing a pressing issue on the government’s policy agenda. However, once focusing events fade from the public’s view, stable coalitions and substantial investments toward the reform’s implementation are necessary to prevent the erosion of social policies. In the case study at the center of this paper, the placement of fair housing on the policy agenda, the passage and underwhelming implementation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, and the similar fate of LUPA were direct results of such a framework. As Kingdon writes in *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, “a complex combination of factors is generally responsible for the movement of a given item into agenda prominence” (2003, 76.) It is important to point to all of the variables that placed fair housing on the federal agenda before assessing the reform itself. A series of focusing events (the 1967 urban riots and King’s assassination) and an activist national mood forced political elites (the Kerner Commission) to publicly wrestle with the connection between civil unrest (the problem) and racial housing segregation. Politicians and policymakers generated numerous alternatives to fix the problem, one of which was a federal fair housing act—a solution that President Johnson had pushed upon an unreceptive Congress for years. Suddenly, the combination of factors opened a policy window that transformed the fair housing agenda from a conversation into a landmark law. Yet these ideas were not born from the 1967 urban riots; civil rights activists had been fighting to end housing discrimination for years and President John F. Kennedy had signed an (all but ignored) executive order in 1962 to end such practices. But by 1968, the soil had become fertile enough for real change to happen and the Fair Housing Act was finally passed.
ROLE OF FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY IN THE REGIONAL INTEGRATION DEBATE

A key provision of the Fair Housing Act was the establishment of a civil rights office within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which would assess whether state and local governments tried to “affirmatively further” fair housing. However, the criteria by which HUD would determine compliance was unclear and ultimately ineffective: the agency directed jurisdictions receiving HUD funds to submit an “analysis of impediments” (AI) to fair housing, but these reports were optional, left expectations unclear, suffered from subpar data quality, and rarely received HUD review. (A 2015 rule change provided municipalities with better public data and replaced the AI report with a mandatory, user-friendly fair housing assessment.) Furthermore, how communities would tackle the fair housing problem was up for debate. Anthony Downs, an economist at the Brookings Institution and author of *Opening Up the Suburbs: An Urban Strategy for America* (1973), was a vocal advocate for regional integration strategies. Having previously served on President Johnson’s National Commission on Urban Problems, Downs argued throughout the early 1970s that opening up the suburbs to minorities would, among other benefits, lower the “possibility of major conflicts in the future caused by confrontations between two spatially separate and unequal societies in metropolitan areas” (Downs 1973, 26). However, sensing fears from white suburban residents and politicians that racial integration would increase social problems and reduce property values, Downs modified his recommendations to place a greater emphasis on economic integration instead (Downs 1973, 138).

George Romney, President Richard Nixon’s pick for HUD secretary in 1968, made no such distinction between economic and racial integration. Romney was the former governor of Michigan and witnessed firsthand the 1967 Detroit riots, during which 43 people were killed and over 2,000 buildings destroyed. He agreed with the Kerner Report’s conclusion that racially segregated central cities were the root cause of urban riots in the 1960s. In his capacity as HUD secretary, Romney sought to “affirmatively further” fair housing creatively by threatening to withhold federal grants from municipalities that were actively engaging in segregated housing schemes (Hannah-Jones 2015). However, knowing that Nixon would disapprove of federally-promoted suburban integration, Romney and his associates kept his plans secret from the Nixon administration. Romney successfully withheld grants from the Baltimore, Boston, and Toledo met-
ropolitan areas when those regions rejected affordable housing development in white neighborhoods.

When Romney tried to “affirmatively further” fair housing in 1970 in Warren, Michigan (a white Detroit suburb), a letter from town officials to the White House ended Romney’s bid. Soon, congressmen and local officials from across the South, who were vehemently against government-mediated integration policies, blasted Romney’s attempts at suburban integration, and Nixon responded by taking fair housing policy into his own hands. By 1972, Romney had resigned as HUD secretary after spending the last two years of his tenure powerless and isolated from the Nixon administration. Four years into the Fair Housing Act, federally promoted suburban integration was no more.

Perhaps due to President Nixon’s efforts to restrict the federal government’s role in suburban integration, regional councils of government (CoGs) became the focal point through which metropolitan dispersal strategies could be employed. CoGs, which often doubled as regional planning councils, were responsible for reviewing federal grant applications from local constituents regarding metropolitan planning, coordinating area-wide planning and development, and reviewing other matters affecting the region. In the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, the Metropolitan Council served these functions and more. Founded in 1967, the Metropolitan Council oversaw regional planning and development for the seven-county metropolitan area. However, it wasn’t until 1971 that the Council began to consider fair housing allocation when reviewing federal grant proposals from localities. By connecting this grant review mechanism (known as the A-95 review process) to regional housing allocation, the Metropolitan Council was able to push segregated suburbs to develop more modest-cost housing if those suburbs hoped to receive federal funding for planning projects. In 1973, the Council developed a Housing Allocation Plan that set regional goals to increase low- and moderate-income housing (Goetz et al. 2002, 15).

As the 1970s progressed, the Minnesota state legislature granted the Metropolitan Council more power to contain urban sprawl in the region. By 1975, the Council could now suspend proposals from towns, cities, and counties during the review process for up to 90 days, and suspend proposals with a larger regional footprint for up to 12 months (William Mitchell Law Review 1977, 306). During the following year, two interrelated housing items were on the political agenda in Minnesota: How should low- and moderate-income housing be distributed, and how much power should the Metropolitan Council have?
Public opinion on those two questions varied depending on where one lived in the metropolitan area. Minneapolis and St. Paul, which have consistently held a disproportionate share of subsidized housing since at least the 1970s, were generally in favor of not only increasing the Metropolitan Council’s power, but also of distributing low- and moderate-income housing more equitably throughout the region (Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity 2015). The Minneapolis Star’s (now the Star Tribune) editorial staff endorsed these viewpoints, as well. However, outer-ring suburbanites wrote contrasting opinion pieces extolling the virtue of, as one writer put it, leaving the “decision for local government action [...] to the local government officials” (Gartner 1976). Others called for Metropolitan Council members to be chosen by election, rather than appointment, to increase public accountability.

Yet absent from these conversations was the issue of race, the very impetus for federal fair housing legislation. Despite the progressive reputation of the Twin Cities, the rhetoric of key regional political actors rarely centered on racial integration. The political feasibility of fair housing seemingly depended on maintaining a class-based frame on the issue and nothing more.

The Politics of Reform Adoption

After nearly a year of deliberation, the Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act of 1976 (LUPA) passed the Minnesota State Legislature, despite opposition from many outer-ring suburban politicians who saw the law as an unfair transfer of power from local officials to the regional Council. Senator Robert Brown, an outer-ring lawmaker from Stillwater, said that the bill would not only give the Council outsized power over local decisions, but that it would also benefit large developers and speculators to the detriment of smaller developers (Wilson 1976). Central city and inner-ring suburban lawmakers, however, claimed that the bill would help contain massive urban growth and “save millions of tax dollars which otherwise might be spent to duplicate building public facilities in outlying areas” (Wilson 1976).

The Act required cities and towns from within the seven-county metropolitan area to develop comprehensive land use plans for the Metropolitan Council within three years of the law’s effective start date. The Council would assess whether each local government unit’s comprehensive plan—which would consist of policies and proposals for transportation, school infrastructure, waste control, and more—was consistent with the Council’s regional plans. Furthermore, the Act required each plan to ad-
dress how the locality would manage “private and public land use; land and water development and preservation; expected industrial and commercial development; planned population distribution; and local public facilities capacities” (William Mitchell Law Review 1977, 308).

The Minnesota Senate was instrumental in introducing the low- and moderate-income housing provisions of the Act. According to the Minneapolis Star, the Senate version of the bill required “that the [Metropolitan] council [...] set guidelines, which municipalities would have to follow, to ease local building restrictions, such as lot sizes and floor space, which now keep moderate-cost housing from being built in some communities” (Wilson 1976). Ultimately, municipalities were only mandated to follow these guidelines inasmuch as they needed the Metropolitan Council’s approval of their federal grant proposals; there was very little enforcement built into LUPA. Indeed, the Council’s A-95 federal grant review responsibility, a major pillar of power for regional councils across the country at the time (Mogulof 1971), was the key piece of leverage that would drive “cooperation” on the development of low- and moderate-income housing. The A-95 review process covered almost all federal programs “assisting physical development and new construction” (Hoffman 1975, 670), and had major impacts on local government planning initiatives:

Knowledge that the Council controls the flow of federal money to local units through its power of review should encourage cooperation. The Council’s determinations could affect the local unit’s ability to carry out projects included within its plan such as the construction of sewage facilities and public buildings and the implementation of open space land programs. Refusal to recognize the powers of the Council could prejudice a local unit’s proposals on both state and federal levels. (William Mitchell Law Review 1977, 309)

While many who feared that urban sprawl would lead to inefficient, uncoordinated development welcomed the bill, a number of community members argued that the containment strategy would lead to neglected development of inner-city areas. A Minneapolis Star editorial published weeks before the Act’s passage warned that “some of the policies aimed at the fringe […] might only drain off reinvestment needed by the core areas” (1976). Indeed, when it came to the fair housing component of LUPA, the battle between inner-city investment and affordable suburban housing development would be one of the primary fissures that irreversibly weakened the law within its first decade. Addressing such tensions and mitigating their fallout will be crucial for future fair housing legislation.
Erosion, Not Outright Reversal

Forty years after the passage of LUPA, the Twin Cities metropolitan area has steadily reversed course on the immediate gains in housing integration achieved under the Act. A combination of uninterested policymakers, ineffective monitoring and follow-through, shifting federal housing priorities, and fluid interest group participation resulted in the large-scale erosion of LUPA’s effectiveness. Housing re-segregation appeared in the Twin Cities region in the early 1980s and has not relented since. According to Myron Orfield, an expert on housing segregation and a professor at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis and St. Paul now have a higher relative share of subsidized housing (compared to their suburbs) than at any point since the 1960s (Institute of Metropolitan Opportunity 2015, 2). Since 1990, the population of high-poverty, racially concentrated neighborhoods in the Twin Cities has tripled (Metropolitan Council 2014, 4). At the same time, the older, inner-ring suburbs are experiencing the effects of rapid segregation as well: the non-white population of Brooklyn Center, an inner-ring suburb of Minneapolis, increased from 4 percent in 1980 to 54 percent in 2010 (Semuels 2016). While LUPA has not been repealed, it has essentially been ignored in the regional housing conversation. In particular, the Minnesota legislature’s passage of the Livable Communities Act (LCA) in 1995 negated many LUPA provisions without repealing them outright in a process Patashnik terms “smothering.” The downward spiral of the Twin Cities’ once-promising fair housing dispersal strategy is a sobering reminder of the seemingly intractable problem of American segregation.

Uninterested policymakers

Minnesota’s political leadership during much of the 1970s and early 1980s was heavily invested in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. Wendell Anderson, who served as governor from 1971 to 1976, was a major proponent of equitable reform measures: his 1971 tax bill—known as the “Minnesota Miracle”—coordinated state and local fiscal policy to better address educational funding disparities and bolster the fiscal health of cities and counties throughout the state. According to the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Anderson’s “rational state-local fiscal system…made Minnesota a model for other states to follow” (Haynes 2016). Anderson’s picks to head the Metropolitan Council also reflected a similar culture of reform: his first Council chairperson, Al Hofstede (1971 to 1973), pushed for fair low- and moderate-income housing distribution throughout the suburbs and central cities to better integrate the
region. The subsequent Council chairmen, John Borland (1973 to 1979) and Charles Weaver (1979 to 1982) continued this push toward regional integration under Governors Anderson, Rudy Perpich (1976 to 1978), and Al Quie (1978 to 1983). During this era, fair housing-minded politicians and officials worked to affirmatively further the housing integration goals of LUPA. Yet the Council’s housing dispersal strategy was still not innately enforceable. It was only the Council’s crafty use of A-95 federal grant review power that compelled cities and towns—required by LUPA to send development plans to the Council for approval—to incorporate fair share affordable housing plans within their development proposals.

However, uninterested policymakers at the state and Metropolitan Council level in the 1980s neglected to push for housing integration using this grant review mechanism, and as a result, cities and towns went unpunished for leaving low- and moderate-income housing plans out of their reports. When Rudy Perpich was re-elected as governor in 1983, he became more invested in broadening Minnesota’s international footprint than in furthering metropolitan issues. As such, Perpich’s picks for the Metropolitan Council during his second tenure crumbled under the pressure of a reorganized central city housing network and angry suburban politicians, who, according to Myron Orfield, “characterized integration as social engineering” and pushed for a reduced low- and moderate-income housing burden (Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity 2015, 15). As a result, the Council “began to back away from the fair share commitments of the Land use Planning Act” (Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity 2015, 15). By the mid-1980s, progress in metropolitan housing integration had frozen.

**Shifting federal housing priorities**

The changing federal housing landscape of the early 1980s further diminished much of LUPA’s effectiveness. Lawmakers in Washington heavily reduced federal housing subsidies and infrastructure grants, leaving the Metropolitan Council with less money to promote low- and moderate-income housing and less clout to demand regional fair share housing plans from localities through the A-95 grant review process (Goetz et al. 2003, 216). As such, the Council simply stopped its practice of determining each city and town’s low- and moderate-income housing fair share numbers and local planners never took up the task themselves.

**Fluid interest group participation**

During the late 1970s, a revolt of central city developers and non-profits,
who were angered that funding for affordable housing projects was increasingly directed toward the suburbs, led to the formation of the Family Housing Fund (FHF) in 1980. The FHF rapidly grew into a large network of housing developers and funders that shifted philanthropic and government resources away from suburban affordable housing development back into the central cities. By 1983, the FHF's board voted to establish the Twin Cities Housing Development Corporation (TCHDC), a nonprofit developer that built housing predominantly in the central cities.

The FHF further stabilized itself through close collaboration with the public sector. The Fund’s “president of 34 years is a former deputy director of the Minneapolis housing agency” and the organization has worked “closely with virtually every other major public, private, and nonprofit entity in affordable housing construction and finance” (Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity 2015, 14). The fluid nature of the various group identities (the establishment of the FHF and its network of partners and developers) and affiliations (the Fund’s public and private connections in Minneapolis and St. Paul) ultimately coalesced into a stable anti-suburban development bloc that used political pressure and creative partnerships to bypass LUPA’s fair share commitments.

The resulting disparities in affordable housing construction illustrate the power of this bloc. During its 33 years of operation, only 5 of the 40 projects completed by TCHDC were located in the suburbs of Minneapolis and St. Paul (Twin Cities Housing Development Corporation, 2017). Even more telling, 2,489 of the 2,697 units—just over 92 percent—that TCHDC has developed since 1984 have been in either Minneapolis or St. Paul. Add in the estimated 10,500 low-income units that the Family Housing Fund reportedly established in Minneapolis and St. Paul between 1980 and 1990 (Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity 2015, 14), and it becomes abundantly clear that the FHF and its partners succeeded in redirecting affordable housing away from the suburbs and back to the central cities.

**Modest investments and ineffective policy follow-through**

The Metropolitan Council did not have the authority to force localities into building low- and moderate-income housing; cities and towns were simply required to submit a development plan that detailed how they would go about fulfilling their fair share housing obligation. As one Council staff member noted, “we can’t say...you have to provide affordable housing. All we can say is that you have to provide the opportunity to not discriminate against affordable housing [emphasis added]” (Goetz et al. 2003, 216). A
coordinated support network of Metropolitan Council members, elected local officials, citizens, planners, and developers—all working toward fair share housing goals—was needed for a locality to develop low- and moderate-income housing in line with its fair share allotment. Unfortunately, there were critical breakdowns between various actors in this network that were caused by modest, but insufficient, investments post-reform or inadequate policy implementation and follow-through.

Many suburban officials and planners only modestly invested their resources to abide by LUPA's fair housing planning requirements. From 1976 to 1982, most communities within the Twin Cities metropolitan area submitted comprehensive development plans that, per LUPA's requirements, incorporated low- and moderate-income housing fair share goals. However, most of these communities subsequently failed to take the regulatory steps needed to facilitate low- and moderate-income housing development. According to an extensive analysis of post-LUPA implementation by Edward Goetz and colleagues, many communities “simply failed to carry out specific zoning and regulatory changes to facilitate lower-cost housing” (Goetz et al. 2003, 219).

As for the communities that did undergo regulatory changes, the scholars found that “many of the regulatory mechanisms used are actually ineffective in increasing [low-moderate] housing production” (Goetz et al. 2003, 220). Measures thought to cut costs rarely accomplished those goals, and planned unit development ordinances that cities passed were found to have “no impact on low-mod housing development” (Goetz et al. 2003, 220). Most communities also failed to invest in a post-LUPA inventory system to monitor the progress of their low- and moderate-income housing development. And suburban officials did little to assuage neighborhood opposition to fair housing developments; elected officials offered “tentative” support for developers’ plans if they were located in other districts and typically opposed projects that were planned for their district (Goetz et al. 2003, 221). All told, most communities did not extensively invest their resources into ensuring the success of LUPA's fair share housing initiative.

The ineffective follow-through from the Metropolitan Council enabled much of these modest investments to ultimately weaken LUPA's effectiveness. After various federal housing changes in the early 1980s weakened the Council's funding power and leverage over communities applying for federal infrastructure grants, it became fairly easy for cities and towns to ignore LUPA. Yet even before the housing landscape shifted at the federal level, LUPA had issues of follow-through that were simply exacerbated
afterwards. According to Goetz et al.:

For the years following enactment of LUPA, the Metropolitan Council has not monitored cities to determine (1) if local zoning conforms to the approved plan; (2) if the land set aside for high density housing in the plan was, in actuality, set aside as high density; (3) whether the housing built on such land that was set aside as high density was actually affordable to families of low- or moderate-income housing; (4) whether communities have in place other practices that impede the achievement of low- and moderate-income housing goals; or (5) whether the amount of low-mod housing built met the goals set out in the fair share allocation (for those years when the council was providing allocation numbers). (2003, 217)

In effect, LUPA failed on all accounts to provide a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system that would hold communities accountable for their fair share of regional low- and moderate-income housing needs.

**Smothering**

The Minnesota legislature struck the final nail into LUPA’s coffin in 1995 by passing the Livable Communities Act (LCA), whose impact on LUPA constitutes what Patashnik calls “smothering:”

In this scenario, a reform law is not formally amended, but policymakers enact subsequent laws with antithetical policy goals. The original form remains “good law” but gets buried so deeply under a maze of conflicting statutes or rules that it all but disappears from view. (Patashnik 2008, 33)

The LCA incentivized inner-city affordable housing development while also revising the income thresholds that qualified individuals for affordable housing. Under LCA, such income thresholds were much higher than those of individuals eligible for low- and moderate-income housing under LUPA, resulting in fewer low-cost homes being built throughout the region. LUPA and LCA laws are both still in force, but planners, developers, city officials, and even the Metropolitan Council use LCA guidelines almost exclusively when preparing and evaluating affordable housing proposals (Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity 2015, 24).

As the preceding sections make clear, however, the passage of the LCA was only the culmination of a long decline in LUPA’s effectiveness. Even in the absence of a final piece of “smothering” legislation, LUPA was hardly equipped from its inception to withstand shifting political environments
or a fluid network of interest groups that would eventually coalesce in opposition to regional integration. How could things have gone differently? And how well do Patashnik’s policy reform analysis and Kingdon’s agenda-setting framework explain LUPA’s run toward irrelevance less than 10 years after its inception?

**How Could LUPA Have Been Improved?**

The temporary success of LUPA in the late 1970s begs the question: how could LUPA have been implemented to stably integrate the Twin Cities? If such a question had an easy answer, many metropolitan areas would be more racially and economically integrated than they are today. The difficulty of this inquiry makes an analytical framework useful for investigating this question. As such, I will use Patashnik’s policy reform framework to inform my analysis of how the passage of LUPA could have led to long-lasting, effective reform.

LUPA’s failure to stably integrate the Twin Cities may stem from the lack of investment from actors post-reform. Modest investments existed at multiple levels, but the dearth of consistent post-reform monitoring from the Metropolitan Council is undoubtedly central to LUPA’s failure. However, it is difficult to separate the Metropolitan Council’s lack of effective monitoring and guideline creation from the reduction in federal funding that supported low- and moderate-income housing development. Therefore, a more stable LUPA may have been one less reliant on federal funding.

One avenue to explore for alternative funding would have been a metropolitan area tax, handled by the Metropolitan Council to fund regional infrastructure and development activities. Such an option would maximize the Metropolitan Council’s leverage, bolster regional investment in LUPA, and reduce reliance on federal funds. However, the political feasibility of such a plan would likely only exist if the Metropolitan Council were elected and not appointed, a hypothetical that has been debated since the Council’s inception. If the Council were willing to gain more community trust by changing to an elected system, would they have had the political capital to demand more extensive group investments toward LUPA? Perhaps. What is clear is that an overreliance on federal funding created a domino effect that led to the eventual decline of any leverage power the Metropolitan Council had through LUPA. Regional and local initiatives need independent funding sources to shield themselves from shifting political winds at the federal level.

On a broader level, the rise and fall of LUPA can provide valuable les-
sons that can be applied today to housing desegregation policies outside of the Twin Cities context. Firstly, the failure of LUPA suggests that future housing desegregation reforms should be less dependent on federal funds and HUD financial support. HUD’s dwindling budget and the Trump Administration’s stalling of the 2015 HUD rule that sought to clarify “affirmatively furthering” fair housing rules both signal that a reliance on federal dollars may diminish the likelihood of stable housing reform.

Secondly, as regional councils have declined in influence since the 1970s, individual municipalities must be more proactive in establishing stable funding mechanisms to build affordable housing equitably throughout their jurisdiction. Such an initiative would only see sustainable levels of success if community leaders, housing experts, urban planners, and city officials all work together to build effective incentives (e.g. tax abatements that promote inclusionary zoning) to desegregate neighborhoods along both racial and class lines.

Lastly, desegregation is not the only answer: it is critical that local and state governments provide adequate funding and resources to historically under-resourced neighborhoods alongside desegregation efforts. This strategy would maximize the welfare of all citizens while building the infrastructure needed to reduce neighborhood segregation.

**Conclusion**

LUPA was a temporary success for a number of reasons. Focusing events like the 1967 urban riots and Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination, along with policy elite discourse by the Kerner Commission and Anthony Downs, among others, created an environment that allowed various solutions at the federal (the Fair Housing Act) and state/local (LUPA) levels to enter the political agenda and become law. For a moment, the federal Fair Housing Act allowed LUPA to succeed in its goal to “affirmatively further” fair housing. However, shifting political landscapes at the federal, state, and local levels, along with a fluid interest group dynamic that eventually joined in opposition to suburban-heavy affordable housing development, resulted in the disintegration of LUPA’s strength. Overly reliant on federal funding, the law could not withstand flagging interest in fair housing at the federal level and became toothless within a decade, its guidelines and fair share regional housing goals ignored.

LUPA illustrates the promise and difficulty of stable housing integration practices. Not only does affordable housing development require funds that states and cities rarely have (or perhaps that states and cities rarely allocate toward affordable housing), but it also requires the political will
and welcoming environment of those in high-opportunity, typically white suburban communities. Such a combination has been historically difficult, but as the Kerner report makes clear while warning of the United States’ drift toward two separate and unequal societies, it is in the nation’s best interest to succeed.

REFERENCES


